Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIII, Southeast Asia

218. Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State⁰

Djakarta, December 27, 1961, noon.

1124. CINCPAC for POLAD. Embassy telegram 1120,¹ Department telegrams 652, 653, 656, 660.² President Sukarno was unable to see me yesterday but received me at 7:30 this morning. Foreign Minister Subandrio was also present. After listening carefully to my comments, President expressed his appreciation for the active efforts of the US in stronger terms than I have heard him previously use in this connection.

“America will have my eternal gratitude if it helps us solve this problem peacefully,” he said, stressing that bonds of friendship would be established between our respective nations that would have great import for future.

Sukarno concurred generally with Subandrio comments in Embassy reftel, making following points:

1. He agreed with suggestion for bilateral talks with third party presence and also endorsed Subandrio’s view that Secretary General U Thant would be most appropriate third party.

2. He not only agreed with idea but thought exploratory secret talks at Ambassadorial level were essential to success of formal negotiations.

3. Although agreeing that talks should be held without preconditions on either side, he said it was vital that there should be advance understanding as to purpose of talks. Indos have learned this lesson well as result of New Guinea dispute itself. Purpose of talks should be to effect transfer of administration of West New Guinea to Indonesia and to discuss manner in which this should be accomplished. He had no objection to “two bite” approach but was not willing to enter formal negotiations which might turn into interminable discussion of what representatives were there for.

4. In commenting on point above paragraph, he noted that he had given up his original demand for Dutch recognition of Indo sovereignty over West New Guinea as precondition to talks.

5. He referred to emotional response to his address in Djogjakarta on 19th and to tremendous build-up of demands from all quarters for action on West New Guinea in again making point that “we haven’t much time.” It is, he said, “like a snow ball rolling down hill, getting bigger and bigger all the time.” To this, I commented that we felt momentum was building up for peaceful solution in this issue. It was important to preserve this momentum and I considered all parties were in agreement that time was of the essence.

I appreciate prompt and helpful Department response to queries raised in reference Embtel. Deptel 660 reached me in time yesterday to have advance discussion with Subandrio last night at his home which I am confident paved way for constructive Sukarno responses today. Subandrio during conversation (this is first time he or anyone else has been present at my talks with President) was most helpful lending support repeatedly to points made.

I opened conversation after usual exchange of courtesies by passing on substance points in Deptel 652 as oral reply to Kennedy/Sukarno exchange letters, then led into review of developing situation which I said I regarded as encouraging from standpoint of possibility bringing about peaceful solution. I stressed efforts being made by us and in reinforcing point of US objectivity and neutrality was able to quote Linc White’s helpful and timely statement on 6:30 VOA broadcast this morning.³ I then led into substantive points reftels. I emphasized apparent increasing flexibility in Dutch position and indicated it behooved Indonesians also to be flexible as they had repeatedly indicated they were prepared to be. Sukarno interjected caution that he was flexible as to method but not as to objective.

Both with Subandrio and President, I of course stressed vital importance of secrecy (with which they agreed) and desirability of tamping down inflammatory statements to which Subandrio readily agreed in last night’s conversation but to which Sukarno made no comment unless paragraph 5 may be taken in that context.

Jones

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 656.9813/12–2761, Secret; Niact. Repeated niact to The Hague and to London, Canberra, and CINCPAC.
1. In telegram 1120, December 25, Jones reported that he called on Subandrio to inform him of the Netherlands response to the U.S. démarche. Subandrio suggested that Jones see Sukarno since he had taken the issue “into his own hands.” (Ibid., 656.9813/12–2561)
2. In these telegrams to Djakarta, December 22, 22, 23, 25, respectively, the Department instructed Jones how to respond to Sukarno’s letter of December 18 and how to encourage Indonesia and Sukarno to begin negotiations with the Dutch. (Ibid., 656.9813/12–2061, 656.9813/12–2261, 656.9813/12–2361, and 656.9813/12–2561)
3. Not further identified.