221. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Indonesia0
753. Deptel 746;1Embtel 1224.2 If press reports emanating Hollandia that Dutch Navy has encountered and sunk at least one Indo torpedo boat true, seriousness WNG question has increased considerably. Dutch Defense Ministry spokesman has said, according reports, that Indo invasion force appears turned back.
[Page 507]In connection Deptel 7503 you should seek direct confirmation or denial from Sukarno or Subandrio. If reports confirmed by GOI or evidence encounter took place is beyond question, you should tell GOI US devoutly hopes further such clashes be avoided if disaster is not to occur. We fully aware Indo argument that presence cruising patrols both sides likely lead to inadvertent encounter but we on balance persuaded that Indo must bear, in view threatening posture, full share responsibility. We have made strenuous efforts avoid situation in which hostilities would occur and we have in recent days had cause for hope that with sincerity both sides and with cooperation SYG, way out of impasse might be found in terms tolerable to Indonesia. Although Dutch may have been intransigent in past, it has been clear for some time they wish leave WNG. If GOI object is to obtain WNG, peaceful means for accomplishing this clearly available.
You should tell Sukarno, even if this repeats what you have previously told him, that once hostilities, as opposed to an isolated clash, have begun, as result GOI initiative, US Government will have no alternative but to propose Indonesia in UN. Moreover, there can be no question but that US arms shipments will in such case have to be stopped. Sukarno should be given to understand clearly that US public will not tolerate continued arms aid to Indonesia in case of hostilities clearly initiated by GOI.
If on other hand, Sukarno affirms it not his intention expand or continue hostile action, you should use all material Dept has provided you to persuade him advantages and good prospects for peaceful settlement. You should make it especially clear to Sukarno that cooperation with Thant now seems essential to peaceful settlement.
Re final para ref Embtel,4Indo démarche on self-determination5 not conveyed Dutch (Deptel 746). You should strongly urge GOI bring their position to Thant’s attention.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 656.9813/1–1562. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Lindquist; cleared by Bell, Stone, Sisco, and McGhee; and approved by Rice. Repeated to The Hague, Canberra, London, USUN, CINCPAC/POLAD, Geneva FECON for Harriman, and Manila.↩
- In telegram 746, January 12, the Department explained to the Embassy in Djakarta the decision to seek U Thant’s cooperation to bring the two sides together. It believed he could do it more effectively than the United States because he was less vulnerable to charges of partiality and less subject to extreme pressures. As a prominent Asian from a neutral country, his participation would pave the way for future U.N. interest. The Department instructed Jones to counsel Indonesia to accept U Thant. (Ibid., 656.9813/1–1162)↩
- In telegram 1224, January 15, Jones told Rusk that secret Ambassadorial talks between the Netherlands and Indonesia “offer most immediate hope of delaying or preventing provocative acts” and he concurred wholly in transferring the initiative to U Thant. (Ibid., 656.9813/1–1562)↩
- In telegram 750, January 15, the Department asked for confirmation of wire service reports of clashes between Dutch and Indonesian naval vessels in the West New Guinea coastal waters. (Ibid.)↩
- In the final paragraph of telegram 1224, Jones reported that he was seeing Sukarno on January 16 to discuss Robert Kennedy’s upcoming visit. He asked if he could report to the President “some reaction to recent Indonesia démarche on subject of self-determination or some positive indication of Dutch willingness to proceed with Ambassadorial talks.”↩
- See footnote 4, Document 222.↩