224. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Indonesia0

838. Present lull in developments re West New Guinea, moderate tone statements from Djakarta, and increasing indications of Dutch desire to find accommodation with Indonesians lead us to believe there might be some benefit in Ambassador having frank discussion with Subandrio along following lines:

1.
Differences separating Dutch and Indonesians on this subject now narrowed practically to continued Indonesian insistence that Dutch [Page 511] agree before entering negotiations that administration will be turned over to Indonesians. It is very difficult for us to see how Dutch or anyone else could give way beforehand to such demand as it in effect amounts to complete surrender by Dutch and leaves no real point of substance for negotiations.
2.
We believe Dutch are very close to point where they would negotiate on transfer of administration to Indonesia if negotiations open on “no condition” basis. (Both Subandrio and Sukarno have over considerable period of time stated Indonesia would be ready to engage in “face-saving” arrangement for Dutch if Indonesia assured of getting the territory)
3.
We do not see what Indonesians have to lose if they talk now and they certainly have much to gain. If they do not enter negotiations, there is possibility present efforts will fail and there will be no constructive results.
4.
In such event Indonesian international moral position would be weak. On other hand, their international position would be greatly strengthened if they enter negotiations in good faith even were negotiations to be unsuccessful.

Would appreciate Djakarta’s assessment of desirability and probable effect such an approach at this time.1

Would appreciate The Hague’s estimate of Dutch willingness to compromise on Indonesian demand for administration of WNG if Indonesia were to agree on negotiations without preconditions.2

Rusk
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 656.9813/2–162. Secret. Drafted by Bell, cleared by Stone and Buffum, and approved by Rice. Also sent to The Hague and repeated to Canberra and London. Although Komer is not listed as a drafter, he suggested to Kaysen that the actions described in this telegram be undertaken. (Memorandum from Komer to Kaysen, February 1; Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Indonesia, Vol. II, 1/62–3/62)
  2. In telegram 1366 from Djakarta, February 4, Jones responded: “If the Department could obtain clear signal from Dutch that they were in fact willing to negotiate subject transfer of administration, GOI could find some way of entering negotiations without appearing to have backed down from its public posture.” Jones considered the two sides “so close” that if the Department could obtain an assurance from the Dutch that they would discuss transfer of administration without a precondition, the “gap might be bridged.” (Department of State, Central Files, 656.9813/2–462)
  3. According to telegram 572 from The Hague, February 3, Luns informed Ambassador Rice that the Netherlands would not turn over administration of West New Guinea to Indonesia no matter what guarantees there were for eventual exercise of self-determination by the Papuans. (Ibid., 656.9813/2–362)