231. Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State0
1445, In one and one-half hour session with President Sukarno this morning, Attorney General Kennedy made strong plea for GOI to come to conference table without preconditions. Sukarno, who pressed for “greater assurance” that negotiations would not fail, said he would consider matter and advise us further on Sunday. Djuanda, Foreign Minister, and Ambassador were also present at conversation.
Attorney General made clear his understanding pursuant reftel that if Indonesians would drop their demands for preconditions to talks the Dutch would be willing to discuss any aspect of their difference, including transfer of West New Guinea administration to Indonesia. He said he was convinced that dispute could be resolved at conference table, emphasized that we had brought pressure on Dutch to drop their original precondition and that sympathy in US for Indo position which was strong few months ago had recently altered due fact people cannot understand Indos’ unwillingness to negotiate. Kennedy stressed that as a major world statesman Sukarno must appreciate utter absurdity of permitting question of peace or war on so important an issue to turn on procedural rather than substantive point and underlined continuing damage to Indonesian cause resulting therefrom.
GOI must “go last mile” as President Kennedy had said at disarmament negotiations in Geneva. Indos had everything to gain and nothing to lose from negotiations. In our opinion an acceptable solution would result from talks but if this did not happen and GOI felt it must take military action its position before world would be strengthened.
AttyGen also stressed President Kennedy’s personal friendship for President Sukarno and his feeling of confidence that important issues could be resolved through their mutual personal understanding. He pointed out that there was bad feeling in Holland against US as a result of our action on troop transport issue, said Indos must be willing to make procedural concession or we could do little more.
Sukarno asked direct question: “Are Dutch willing to transfer administration over WNG to Indonesia?”
AttyGen replied: “I do not know.” President Sukarno then pressed point that mere listing of topic of transfer of administration to Indonesia [Page 524] on agenda was meaningless unless Dutch were actually willing to do so and queried whether under these circumstances the US would support the Indonesian position at talks. AttyGen Kennedy replied in the negative, pointing out, however, that if talks were underway position of US as helpful friend would be strengthened.
Sukarno turned again and again to point as to whether we considered that if item of transfer of administration on agenda it meant Dutch would in fact transfer. In each case, Kennedy refused to commit himself.
Djuanda strongly disagreed with Kennedy’s statement that even if negotiations failed GOI position would be stronger. His view was that it was vital to enter talks with some assurance of success since only alternative then would be military action.
Kennedy commented that he would agree with Djuanda’s position if we did not think issue could be settled satisfactorily, understanding that satisfactorily meant that WNG should, in some way and in some form and at some date be transferred to Indo. He emphasized that Dutch have not told us they would be willing to turn over transfer of administration to Indo but (1) we were anxious to see a satisfactory solution to this question and (2) we recognized that solution satisfactory to Indos could not be obtained without territory in some way at some time going to GOI. If we did not think talks had chance of success we also would not be urging them.
Sukarno then asked whether US would guarantee that if Indos entered talks with preconditions, US would bring pressure on Dutch to transfer administration of territory to Indo.
In replying to this Kennedy said (1) US is vitally interested in success of talks; (2) if talks are held on the basis of our estimate of Dutch intentions of reaching satisfactory solution and we find we have been misled, obviously our position would change.
Attorney General stressed Indos were playing for big stakes here and had good chance of winning but that they must enter talks without preconditions. He said flatly that we could not get the Dutch to enter talks with preconditions, emphasized this was matter of prestige with Dutch and they could not be moved on this.
President Sukarno asked whether AttyGen could guarantee talks would not fail. Kennedy said he could not; best he could do was to say that in our judgment a satisfactory solution would be reached. If Indos dropped demand for preconditions he considered “possibility of an outcome acceptable to Indos seems good.” Sukarno said, “By satisfactory you mean transfer of administration to Indonesia?” Kennedy replied US is interested in peaceful solution, such solution must be acceptable to both sides; solution acceptable to Indos involves transfer of administration of WNG.
[Page 525]Subandrio queried whether this meant that the US sees that transfer of the territory to Indo is an essential part of any solution to the problem. Kennedy referred question Ambassador who said it was self evident that peaceful solution must be one satisfactory to Indos as well as to Dutch.
After final vigorous plea by Kennedy, Sukarno said he would consider matter and talk further on Sunday.
Subandrio then summarized two major points in talks as he saw it: 1) if Indos would go into talks without preconditions US could assure GOI that WNG would be agenda item, 2) that US considered negotiations had reasonable chance of success and would bend its efforts to that end.
Comment follows.1
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 656.9813/2–1462. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Attached to a copy of this telegram at the Kennedy Library was a note indicating that the President read it “with interest.” (Kennedy Library National Security Files, Countries Series, Indonesia, Vol. II, 1/62–3/62)↩
- Document 232.↩