Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIII, Southeast Asia

270. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy⁰

Washington, May 23, 1962.

[Here follows discussion of the Azores base negotiations with Portugal.]

SUBJECT

• West New Guinea

I agree with your comment, in paragraph three of your memorandum of May 21, that the Warren Unna article in the Washington Post of that date appears to have been inspired by a Dutch source.¹ While we have now reached the critical point with the Dutch over West New Guinea, I do believe we have made some progress in the last six months. I think the Bunker proposals can provide the basis for an agreement.

At Athens, Dr. Luns expressed skepticism that Indonesia would agree to any guarantees for the Papuans that would satisfy Dutch requirements. However, on being pressed, Luns did admit that agreement might be possible. He handed me a statement which expressed Dutch willingness to discuss all aspects of the Bunker plan with the understanding that either side would be able to raise any item it deemed relevant. This statement was passed by us to the Indonesians with our interpretation that it constituted acceptance in substance of the Bunker formula.

Sukarno has neither accepted nor rejected the Luns statement but, stressing that he is not concerned with specific wording, points out that the statement leaves Dutch intentions unclear. He is unwilling to resume talks therefore until the Dutch either have clearly stated or have given some other tangible evidence that it is their intention to negotiate on the basis of the Bunker proposal. Meanwhile, he appears to have made a decision that only further military pressures on the Dutch will bring them to acceptance of the formula.

Yesterday we pressed the Dutch to accept a reformulation of Luns’ statement to make clear its acceptance in principle of the Bunker Plan.² We are awaiting the response from The Hague. If the Dutch response is affirmative, we will go to Djakarta and urge immediate resumption of talks.

If, however, as is likely, the Dutch refuse to resume talks unless the Indonesians also accept the statement Luns gave me at Athens, we can only conclude that Mr. Luns is not prepared to move decisively on this issue unless subjected to greater domestic political pressure. Luns has withheld the text of the Bunker proposals from the Parliament, reportedly because he feels Parliament would accept them overwhelmingly (he has admitted they would receive 120 out of 150 votes). Accordingly, we believe it would now be useful for the text to be made public.

Mr. Bunker agrees that it would be useful for the “Bunker proposals” to be made public and is prepared to take the risk that their publication would make it necessary to find another “moderator” for the later stages of this exercise. Mr. Bunker is talking today with Secretary General U Thant about the possibility of the proposals being published as a part of a short interim report Mr. Bunker would make to the Secretary General, at whose request, he undertook his mission of conciliation.³

We would anticipate that publication of this plan would cause a political uproar in The Hague.

At the appropriate moment after the Bunker Plan is known, we will probably recommend that you send a letter to Prime Minister de Quay urging the Dutch to resume talks with the Indonesians on the basis of the Bunker formula, without reservations. We may then have to make our efforts in this matter public at that time; we believe there is sufficient opposition to Luns within the Netherlands to justify our approach.

For the next few days, while we see how our latest approach to the Dutch and Mr. Bunker’s discussion with the Secretary General come out, we do not think it would be useful for the U.S. hand to show in public any more than it already does.

Dean Rusk⁴

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Portugal, Azores Base. Secret.
1. In this memorandum, the President asked Rusk three questions of which the third was on West New Guinea. He asked for the reason for the lack of progress toward a settlement of the issue, as well as making the observation about Unna’s source. (Ibid.)
2. Recorded in a memorandum of conversation, May 22. (Department of State, Central Files, 656.9813/5–2262)
3. The formula was released as U.N. Note No. 2600, May 25, 1962. It is printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, pp. 1120–1121.
4. Printed from a copy that indicates Rusk signed the original.