275. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to Attorney General Kennedy0
At the moment we’re rather optimistic over the revived New Guinea talks. The reports from Middleburg are that Van Roijen and Malik are making progress.1
More important, the Indos seem to have pulled back from their recent demand for a direct transfer of WNG, instead of the two-year transition period in the Bunker Plan. Subandrio still wants, however, to talk about “accelerating” this transition and there may be some possibilities here if Indos are forthcoming on other issues.
The other potential fly in the ointment is that Sukarno will pull some new WNG landings in order to push the Dutch along. The Dutch were most reasonable about renewing talks without insisting on a cease fire, but it might not take much to start Luns off again on his “can’t do business with Sukarno” line. We intend to keep leaning on the Indos not to upset the applecart. One thing is, certain, however; if the talks break down again, Sukarno will move to military action. Our reports indicate that he’s poised to do so, even if he has to use subs and planes with Soviet crews.
Our job now is to move the talks along to a compromise agreement. We’ll have at least a few more ticklish moments before we get one. But we can’t afford to let the talks break down again, or we’ll have another Far East war on our hands. Therefore, we’ve go to do whatever is necessary, including Presidential intervention, to forestall it.
I’m attaching a selection of the latest cables to give you the current flavor of the problem.2
- Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Staff Memos, Komer, 7/62. Secret.↩
- The complete memoranda of conversation prepared by Lindquist, who was assisting Bunker, for each session of the discussions in Middleburg, Virginia, are in Department of State, Central File 656.9813.↩
- The cables were not attached, but they were telegram 54 from Djakarta, July 10 (see footnote 1, Document 274); telegram 87 from Djakarta, July 13, in which Jones reported that Subandrio claimed that Indonesia was poised on the verge of a major attack and the negotiations represented the last chance for a peaceful settlement; telegram 92 from Djakarta, July 14, in which Jones reported Subandrio was considering joining the negotiations in a day or two; telegram 94 from Djakarta, July 16, confirming Subandrio’s departure on July 18; telegram 59 to Djakarta, July 13, reporting on the first day of the van Roijen-Malik discussions; and telegram 60 to Djakarta, July 14, reporting on additional discussions July 13–15. (All ibid., 656.9813/7–1362 to 656.9813/7–1662)↩
- Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.↩