464. Memorandum From Michael V. Forrestal of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy0
The United States and Marshal Sarit
I understand that you have asked what we are doing or intend to do in light of the reports from Bangkok that Marshal Sarit has been becoming disenchanted with U.S. policy.1
The best explanation of Marshal Sarit’s behavior seems to be that he has become angry at us for not having fought his war in Laos for him. He seems to feel that he was badgered into signing the Geneva Accords and is now having some second thoughts. There are also indications that some of the Thai military leaders are jockeying for power or at least a redistribution of the spoils of office. In such a situation Sarit may need an issue behind which he can unify squabbling factions. In any event there is no doubt that he has temporarily chosen the United States as a whipping boy.
It is difficult to foresee how far he will go on his present line of threatening to “reorient” Thailand’s foreign policy. Much of what he has been saying may be intended to frighten us into increasing our military assistance to him and modifying our policy toward Cambodia and Laos.
Averell’s reaction, which I share, is that we must not permit ourselves to become Sarit’s satellite. He feels that Ambassador Young may not be taking a detached enough stand with Sarit and is in the process of cabling him to that effect.
There will be several opportunities in the near future to observe whether Sarit is just barking or whether he intends to bite. We are in the process of negotiating with him on several practical matters, such as the radio station in Bangkok and the police program in North Thailand. His attitude in these negotiations should telegraph to us his real intentions. In the meantime we do not intend, unless you disagree, to react to bombast from Bangkok.