Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIII, Southeast Asia

61. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

SecDel/MC/27

New York, September 27, 1963, 5 p.m.

SECRETARY’S DELEGATION TO THE EIGHTEENTH SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY

New York, September 1963

PARTICIPANTS

• US
  • Secretary Rusk
  • Robert L. Kinney, Far East Adviser, US Delegation
• Foreign
  • H.E. U Thi Han, Foreign Minister of Burma
  • H.E. James Barrington, Ambassador of Burma to the UN

SUBJECT

• Current Political Circumstances in Burma

After an exchange of pleasantries, in the course of which Minister Han emphasized that he had “no problems” with which to burden the Secretary, the Secretary confessed that he had felt a bit out of touch with developments within Burma for the past six months or so. He asked if the Minister couldn’t bring him up to date. He asked: “What causes Ministers to lose sleep these nights in Rangoon?”

He laughed and said that a major problem appeared to be the lack of progress in the Government’s “talks” with the Red Flag Communists, who had been up to some “monkey tricks”. They had talks with both Red and White Flag groups toward the end of gaining their acceptance of Burmese socialism, but there has been no real agreement.

The Secretary asked if the White Flag Communists were situated in one area or spread about. The Minister replied that they were in different areas but in touch with each other by radio.

Secretary inquired whether there had been any infiltration of Red Chinese through North Burma into India. Both the Minister and Ambassador Barrington denied this. They noted that the Kachens in North Burma were hostile to the Red Chinese. There had been a small problem with Nagas from Pakistan. The Burmese are quite aware of Indian sensitivities and are being extremely careful on this score. The Minister emphasized that the Government now maintains “traffic” with North Burma and has much improved capacity to keep informed. They are sure that if there were Chinese infiltration efforts they would learn of these.

The Secretary noted that Thai Foreign Minister Thanat had advised him with evident pleasure that relations between Burma and Thailand were now excellent.

The Minister agreed enthusiastically. He said “the first thing Thanat said to me when I came here was that he was pleased” about this.

The Secretary asked about the extent of the problem currently of Nationalist Chinese irregulars in the Burma border areas. The Minister replied that there is no problem now because of excellent Thai-Burmese cooperation. He amended this slightly with the observation that a small group of the KMT irregulars (the Secretary suggested that these might be in the number of two to three thousand and the Minister agreed) remained in the Laos border region. He implied that these were not of major concern.

The Secretary asked that the Minister let us know promptly if they had any trouble with the KMT remainders and promised to help if needed. He said that the United States could furnish aircraft for evacuation if required.

In response to a question from the Secretary about the effect of the Moscow–Peking division upon Burmese Communists, the Minister said that the effects were quite apparent. He noted that the Communists “above-ground”, e.g. those in Rangoon who had never joined the rebel movements in the country-side, had remained pro-Moscow.

The Secretary inquired about the status of Burma’s export trade. He observed that there appeared to be no lack of market for food-stuffs. He noted particularly that the Soviet Union was increasing such purchases abroad.

The Minister said that they had no difficulty in marketing rice. They had experienced some problems in production, but he spoke enthusiastically of Burma’s much improved foreign exchange position.

The Secretary asked about development efforts, such as housing.

The Minister said that some projects previously begun, such as housing in Rangoon, had been stopped in order to give priority to others. He said that roads and sewerage were considered more important at this stage.

The Government also was faced with a need to improve wages for civil servants and other workers who, he suggested, were restive. He said that there is considerable “labor trouble”. Ambassador Barrington noted that wages for civil servants had last been adjusted in 1947.

The Minister confessed that workers in factories in and around Rangoon had interfered with production and said labor problems were causing a major problem for the Government.

The Secretary asked whether the nationalization program had caused some slight economic “indigestion”.

The Minister noted that Burma had tried for fifteen years to encourage private initiative but that they had found that the Burmese entrepeneurs simply couldn’t “stand on their own feet” and that as a result the Chinese and Indians had kept all the profits for themselves. The Government had decided that nationalization was the only way “to help these people”. He said that they intended to eliminate the Chinese and Indian hold over enterprise and trade and put the Burmese in their place until they could at last “stand on their own feet”.

The Secretary asked if the Chinese were pro-Peking. Both the Minister and the Ambassador insisted that the wealthier Chinese were apolitical and would “change their color” with the wind. They said that they were uninformed as to the loyalties of the Chinese “masses”, however.

The Secretary asked permission to raise a delicate question. He said that he had not felt for some time that we had had adequate true communications with Ne Win and the Burmese leadership. He noted that it was highly important that we be able to understand each other and that without a capacity to communicate our diplomacy could not function effectively on either side. He emphasized that we were sending a highly able Ambassador in the person of Mr. Byroade and asked the Minister’s help in opening the way to a relationship of mutual confidence through the Ambassador for our two Governments.

The Minister said that about two months ago he and Mr. Schnee, our Chargé, had agreed to hold regular “talks” toward the end mentioned by the Secretary. He said that two such talks had been held to date and that he felt these were quite helpful.

In a brief discussion of the China–India clash of last year, the Burmese suggested that the Chinese may not have intended to engage in a major conflict. Ambassador Barrington said that he thought that the situation may have developed rather accidentally: a regional commander may have embarked upon a tentative adventure, found that the Indian opposition was crumbling before him and “decided to make a name for himself” until “he was called back”.

The Secretary speculated that the Chinese, might have decided to take advantage of the Cuban confrontation, thinking that the major powers would have their hands full elsewhere, and then, when the Russians retreated, pulled back.

Minister Han said that he was leaving within 24 hours. He said that his portfolios included that of Labor Minister and that there was labor trouble at the Burma Oil Company requiring his presence.

Before departing Minister Han warmly invited the Secretary to revisit Burma, where he would note many changes since his war-time days there. He said that his Government would be glad to arrange an extensive tour.

The Secretary said that he had a warm affection for Burma, which he had held for many years. He thanked the Minister and said that he hoped very much that he could take advantage of the invitation before long.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL BURMA. Confidential. Drafted by Kinney and approved in S on September 29. The meeting was held at the U.S. Mission.