118. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State0
2316. In certain of our position papers partition is suggested as a fall back position preferable to an unsatisfactory coalition government controlling the entire country.
At the risk of stating the obvious I would like to give my reasons for believing after the further reflection promised Bangkok’s 2185 to Dept1 that a partition acceptable to our side would be difficult if not impossible achieve simply by negotiation in view of the present power realities on the ground.
A map presented by Xieng Khouang to the ICC shows the areas claimed to be under control of the other side. This area embraces the entire country except for pockets of varying sizes around Luang Prabang, Vientiane, Paksane, Thakhek, Savannakhet and Pakse.
On our own appraisal, we can confidently claim as firmly in RLG control a) all of Sayaboury, b) most of Nam Ha, c) an enclave of about twenty miles width around Luang Prabang city, d) an area ranging from 20 to 50 miles in depth running from about thirty miles west of [Page 255] Vientiane, along the southern/western border of Laos to the Cambodian border, e) a pocket about twenty miles in diameter around Saravane, and f) a number of small pockets scattered throughout the country.
RLG has 7,000 to 9,000 troops in various parts of Xieng Khouang and Sam Neua, but these cannot be said to control more than local areas. They can for a long time provide effective guerrilla harassment, if they could be supplied, but could not hope alone to regain control of centers such as PDJ. They could eventually probably be picked off one by one by the enemy, though this would take time and much effort.
Running east and north from the area of firm RLG control there is a further area of from 15 to 75 miles in depth in which RLG has predominant, but uncertain control for the moment, a control, however, which it would be difficult for it to maintain against aggressive attack without help of outside forces.
The situation is precarious in the south. Let us not delude ourselves into thinking that we have a firmly held southern redoubt into which to withdraw. The PL, for example, are very strong around Nape, the area of Laos near the 17th Parallel, and for a depth of 20 to 30 miles inside Laos along the south Vietnam border south of the 17th Parallel. It would require a considerable military “nettoyage” to clean this out.
It is unrealistic to think that the PL would honestly abide by the terms of a proposal for both sides to withdraw their forces from behind each others’ lines. The Communists will want to keep open the Ho Chi Minh trail at all costs.
The RLG by itself has no greater capacity to hold any partition line sufficiently extended to protect the whole Lao/Thai border than it has to hold present cease-fire line. To do so effectively would probably require assistance in form of combat troops from US and/or SEATO.
If we should decide to abandon the effort to maintain a buffer along the whole Mekong border with Thailand and divide the country say at the Nam Ca Dinh/Nape line, and if the FAL could be largely concentrated in the southern area, it could probably achieve necessary nettoyage. I would assume however that this would be unsatisfactory as it would involve abandoning important northern areas including both northern and western reaches of the Mekong, Luang Prabang and probably Vientiane and Paksane.
Under these circumstances, and for the reasons suggested paragraph “second” of Bangkok’s 2185 to Dept, it seems unlikely that our adversaries will accept any partition satisfactory to US simply as a matter of negotiation.
The suggestion of a three way division with a neutral buffer zone is ingenious, but seems to me quite unrealistic under the present power [Page 256] position latest developments at Zurich and known attitudes of Souvanna and Souphanouvong especially in view of the area contemplated for the neutral zone.
It follows, therefore, that to gain and hold an acceptable partition, we would have to be prepared to fight for it if necessary with troops from outside Laos.
Thus it seems to me that partition would present us with the same grave choice that military intervention posed for us in the pre-Geneva days. It would probably also involve problems with our Western Allies.
In considering alternate courses of action, therefore, we must recognize that partition does not now offer us any easy and peaceful way out.
One possibility in this connection which cannot be entirely excluded is that Phoumi may decide, regardless of foregoing considerations and any position we may adopt, to attempt to withdraw the RLG and FAL to the South. This might or might not be attempted in connection with similarly independent Thai occupation of Sayaboury and/or Vietnamese action in southern Laos. We have no present indications that he is actively contemplating such action.
Country Team concurs.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/6–2361. Secret. Repeated to Paris, London, Bangkok, Saigon, CINCPAC for POLAD, Geneva for Fecon, and Canberra.↩
- Document 109.↩