Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis

134. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara⁰

JCSM–460–61

Washington, July 12, 1961.

SUBJECT

• US Actions in Respect to Laos (C)

1. The United States agreed to participate in the Geneva Conference on Laos subject to the proviso that an effective cease fire, verified by the ICC or other conditions satisfactory to the United States would prevail before the Conference on May 12.

2. No effective cease fire has been achieved and yet the United States has participated in the Conference from the start. Furthermore, the USSR has never agreed to providing adequate instructions to the ICC for supervision of the cease fire. The Communist assault on Pa Dong commenced on 22 April. When Pa Dong fell on 7 June, the United States restated its firm view to the USSR that the Conference should not continue until adequate provisions for the maintenance of a cease fire were assured. The US delegation temporarily boycotted the conference, but returned without altering the situation or obtaining an effective cease fire. On 12 June, following three days of mortar attack against FAL positions near the village of Hat Bo, Kong Le/PL infantry forced the retreat of the FAL units toward Paksane. On 14 June the rebel forces captured two villages in the Paksane area. The Communists continue to violate the cease fire in order to expand their control over new areas while the FAL is restricted to defensive action only.

3. Thailand is extremely critical inter alia of US actions with respect to the Geneva Conference, and on 13 June directed her delegation not to attend further conference sessions until and unless there is a satisfactory solution to the Lao delegation seating problem. On 27 June 1961, the Thai delegation resumed its place at the Conference, as a result of US urging and an RLG decision to fill the third Lao chair with representatives of the five Lao political parties supporting the RLG. Vietnam’s Foreign Minister Mau—who is under instructions from President Diem not to participate in discussions of substantive issues until an effective cease fire exists—has been advised to the effect that the US Government considers that we now have as good a cease fire as we will get until parties reached detailed agreement re a cease fire. It would appear that the US determination not to walk out of the Conference is dominating all other considerations.

4. Since the start of the Geneva Conference, the US negotiating position has been weakened by compromises made in drafting agreed tripartite position papers (US, UK and France)—positions which are subject to further dilution in the 14-Nation forum. The United States also acquiesced in the Lao delegation seating procedure, i.e., giving both the Pathet Lao and the Souvanna Phouma groups equal recognition with the RLG. After being goaded by the Communists for stalling on substantive discussions at Geneva, the US delegation, on 15 June, announced readiness to get down to work and stated that the West no longer insisted there first must be an effective cease fire. If present trends at Geneva and in Laos continue, the outcome will be a Laos more Communist than neutral. If this eventuality materializes, US prestige will have suffered another serious blow.

5. Some of our Southeast Asian allies are realistic enough to recognize the pressures brought to bear on the United States by the British and French. The situation we now face was not created in 1961. Its origins go all the way back to 1954 and before. Nevertheless, US failure to exercise active leadership of SEATO, particularly since August 1960, is not understood and is considered by many in Asia as a sign of weakness. Continued political retreat by the United States in the face of Communist challenges will surely immobilize the national will of those nations who have allied themselves with us, and it may induce many to seek an accommodation with Communism. There are some indications that Thailand is already considering plans for moving toward neutralism. Similar thinking is emanating from the Philippines.

6. Credibility in the US deterrent is waning. The challenge has been made in Southeast Asia. Khrushchev has indicated Berlin may be next. If we take a stand on Laos, we can not, of course, avert the potential dangers of escalation. Nevertheless, the probability of escalation into a war of nuclear exchange with the USSR over Laos is less than would be the case with a more direct confrontation with the Soviets over Berlin. Taking a firm political and military position on Laos could serve to enhance credibility in US determination to use its military force wherever needed to protect its interests. Such a course of action need not unhinge our general war posture to a significant degree.

7. A plan exists for intervention in Laos in the event of a breakdown of the cease fire. This plan has been approved at high levels in State and Defense, and involves forces of some SEATO nations as well as the United States. The Ban Pa Dong incident on 7 June provided an occasion of short duration wherein the United States would have been justified in sending military forces into Laos. The Communists’ operational pattern in Laos over the past several months makes it highly probable that such a situation will present itself again. The United States should be ready to respond immediately with political and military actions.

8. In view of the reasons set forth above, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the Secretary of Defense seek a high-level governmental decision that, upon the next occurrence of a proven Communist violation of the cease fire, the United States will:

a. Withdraw its delegation from the Geneva Conference on Laos.

b. Undertake military operations in Laos through SEATO, or with those SEATO members prepared to participate, or, if necessary, unilaterally. The objective of military action would be to achieve the necessary military position to permit successful political negotiation for a unified independent and neutral Laos.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

L.L. Lemnitzer

Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff

0. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD/A Miscellaneous Sensitive Files: FRC 71 A 6489, Laos 381 (Sensitive), Jan.–Dec. ′61. Secret. A note on the source text indicates that McNamara saw it.