Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis

139. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos⁰

Washington, July 18, 1961, 9:35 p.m.

71. CINCPAC 031845Z, CHMAAG ML–OPT 3010, Embtel 68.¹

1. These messages reporting conversations with Phoumi reveal his interpretation of situation in Laos in light of his conversations in Washington. He appears to have fastened on selected portions of what President and Secretary told him and built unwarranted edifice upon them. He also appears to have somewhat distorted spirit of these conversations.

2. These distortions reflect certain deep-seated characteristics of Phoumi. He is man who understands and relies primarily on the use of force. He has no real appreciation of political action except in terms of force. He does not understand political process based on cooperation but only one based on authoritarian rule. (Best of non-Communist Lao elements have been put in shade by Phoumi.) At same time his appraisals of his forces and of his opponents have generally not been realistic. (FAL to initiate “strong military campaign” on or about 1 November.)

3. Thus he appears to consider that:

a) Peaceful solution, in which he has never believed, can only be brought about by coalition government.

b) No coalition government can be formed under existing circumstances except one dominated by PL.

c) US will not support Communist-dominated government and is prepared to take military action if necessary to preserve Laos.

d) Therefore it most likely that hostilities will be resumed and in fact this only way of eliminating Communists from Laos.

4. Both President and Secretary specifically avoided making any commitment whatsoever re possible US military intervention. In fact Secretary explicitly told Phoumi that we could not make such commitment as this would turn over to RLG decision which US alone must take.

5. Phoumi’s evaluation of situation therefore may lead him to dangerous conclusions and actions. If he becomes convinced of US support regardless of developments, he may do little to try to negotiate any settlement with Souvanna and indeed may even insure failure of these negotiations. He might then trigger FAL offensive in firm belief that Vietminh response would be countered by US action. He does not appear to have in any way measured difficulties involved. Danger of his misinterpretation is all more real in that in past US has always supported Phoumi when chips were down.

6. Our problem is that we want to keep him firm but not encourage him to take rash actions based on serious misconceptions.

7. Therefore stating this being carried out on instructions from Washington and perhaps in company of General Boyle, you should make clear to Phoumi that:

a) His claims of 25 or 30 Viet battalions are simply not borne out by any known evidence and thus tend to cast discredit on all RLG claims.

b) Although we fully recognize importance of Vietminh participation in PL, FAL has serious inner problems on which US can help but which in final analysis RLG alone can resolve. These problems are lack of training, lack of leadership, and lack of motivation.

c) In sum he for time being should negotiate patiently and in good faith, he should not seek military solution, he should concentrate his energies on improving administration and Army, he should work to win over population to RLG.

8. While you should keep in mind that we did not give Phoumi blank check nor any promise of military intervention in event negotiations failed, we fear that to make this point too flatly might completely discourage him. However, you should clearly indicate that his military planning based upon resumption of hostilities cannot assume US agreement nor intervention which are prerogatives of Presidential decision. CINCPACs 152335Z² contains guide lines for CHMAAG re assistance to Phoumi on planning.

9. In view this situation we would like again to emphasize importance closest continuing contacts with Phoumi.

Rusk

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/7–1861. Top Secret; Priority. Drafted by Chapman; cleared by Cleveland, Usher, Steeves, and Evans of DOD/ISA; and approved by McConaughy. Repeated to Geneva for Fecon and priority to CINCPAC POLAD.
1. See footnotes 6, 1, and 3, respectively, Document 137.
2. In this telegram, July 15, CINCPAC instructed the Chief of the MAAG to obtain from Phoumi in writing an outline of a plan in sufficient detail to permit a reasonable review and evaluation of his proposed military plan of action. Phoumi’s outline should set forth as a minimum, details such as assumptions, military objectives, concepts of operations, estimated forces required, and tasks. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/7–1561)