186. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow) to the President’s Military Representative (Taylor)0

Nolting’s anguished telegram (373, Saigon, September 18)1—urging that we seek a split in Laos rather than a unified settlement—deserves serious thought.

If we cannot negotiate a unified Laos on respectable terms, I think it is clear that we should seek to negotiate a split; although we should not underestimate the real difficulties of protecting the Laos-Viet-Nam border in a split Laos given the terrain involved. But it may be—despite the common skepticism that we have all shared—that terms will be offered for a unified Laos which we cannot refuse.

What, then, would be our reply to Nolting and to Young?

First, of course, we shall have to put maximum pressure on both a new Lao government and on the ICC to protect the Viet-Nam border as well as the Thai border; but I think we should begin imaginative contingency planning now on how the Viet-Nam and Thai borders might be better protected from inside those two countries than at present.

It may be that if we look at the problem closely, its solution does not hinge on the question of a unified or split Laos; it may hinge on the fact that we have not worked out good methods for detecting and dealing with infiltration of relatively small numbers through bad terrain. Put more bluntly—and without any criticism—it may be that Nolting is giving excessive weight to the advantages of a split Laos, and underestimating [Page 426] the inherent difficulty of stopping infiltration by present military methods in Southeast Asia.

This proposed review of the problem of infiltration in both Thailand and Viet-Nam might include the lessons to be learned from our cumulative experience, including the experience in Malaya, to which Thompson referred in his talk with you. It might also include the possibilities of light aircraft and helicopter patrols, and various means for detecting small group movements (including night movements) which modern science might afford.

  1. Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Southeast Asia, National Planning, No. 2. Secret.
  2. See vol. I, pp. 301304.