Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis

202. Telegram From the Delegation to the Conference on Laos to the Department of State⁰

Geneva, October 10, 1961, 9 p.m.

Confe 705. From Harriman. Following are highlights of almost 4-hour Pushkin-Harriman conversation Oct 9.

1. Pushkin read Soviet Govt message to Harriman on conference problems, which reported septel.¹

2. Pushkin stated he will leave Geneva at end week to attend Party Congress in Moscow and to see Khrushchev.

3. Harriman reminded Pushkin of his statement at a previous meeting that two co-chairmen should undertake to assure compliance of agreement, Soviets taking responsibility for Socialist states while UK our side. Harriman asked how Pushkin intended to formalize this understanding. When asked whether it should be a written agreement between the co-chairmen, Pushkin objected, but expressed readiness to add an additional sentence to article on co-chairmen which would give them responsibility for “seeing to observation of obligations” by 13 signatory states.

4. Harriman again reminded Pushkin of his statement to him at a previous discussion, to the effect that after the integration of the three Laotian Armies, the excess should be duly demobilized, leaving no private army to the Pathet Lao or anyone else. He asked Pushkin how conference could assure itself that this result would be achieved. Pushkin first adamantly maintained that this was an internal Laotian affair, whereas conference dealt with only international matters. However, Pushkin pointed out that ICC had responsibility for supervising cease-fire agreement and if a private army should start hostilities again, it would be a breach of the cease-fire, thereby giving ICC responsibility. Hence, ICC could stay in business, at least on this question, until Laotian Govt succeeded in disbanding all private forces. This was way in which conference could deal with this issue. Issue was left for further more detailed consideration.

5. Harriman expressed in strong terms concern of President and US Govt that Laos must cease serving as corridor for Vietminh incursions into South Vietnam, and consequent need for ICC to establish fixed teams and operating centers in south Laos. Pushkin remained unyielding on this issue and said US insistence could lead conference “to dead end.” US could not have ICC take preventive measures in anticipation of violation of Laos agreement by Vietminh and still expect latter to sign agreement and co-chairmen to assume added responsibilities of assuring implementation. USSR had agreed to well-equipped mobile teams which could stay in area of suspected violation as long as necessary, but it would not give way on fixed teams. Pushkin said the Chinese had shown special concern in opposing fixed teams.

6. Pushkin raised SEATO issue and refused to be satisfied with Harriman assurances that SEATO protocol on Laos would become inoperative if Laotian Government renounced protection its declaration and SEATO members conference accepted Lao declaration. Pushkin stated Chinese were particularly distrustful of SEATO and together with the Soviets insisted on the removal Laos SEATO protocol. After lengthy argument in which Harriman explained why impossible to eliminate Laos protocol from SEATO at this conference, Pushkin agreed to look at language we proposed for declaration.

7. Pushkin then raised ICC voting procedure. No agreement was reached. Pushkin indicated USSR might accept majority vote on procedural issues if matters of principle would require unanimous decisions, but he strongly objected to idea that undertaking of investigations would be only procedural matter. He insisted that ICC must be considered as unitary organ for investigations and reports; otherwise it would dissipate its energies chasing all over Laos to check up on rumors. Harriman said that US would never agree to unanimity on investigations; in fact, unless they could be undertaken at request of any member of ICC, whole control machinery would be mockery. ICC was not unitary body, but 3 men each of them had to be able to report what he saw. Therefore, right of majority and minority reports essential as in any court with several judges. Harriman reminded Pushkin he had previously told him that voting procedure was discussible, but since it was by then nearly nine o’clock, question was left for further discussions.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/10–1061. Secret; Priority. Repeated priority to Vientiane and Moscow and to USUN.
1. See Document 201.