286. Editorial Note
On January 31, 1962, the intelligence community released SNIE 58/1–62, “Relative Military Capabilities of Opposing Forces in Laos.” The estimate summarized SNIE 58–62; see Document 268. It then described recent military clashes between FAR and anti-government forces in which FAR was forced to retreat every time. The SNIE stated that although its estimate of actual numbers was inconclusive, North Vietnamese cadres and combat troops played an important part in these operations. The estimate continued:
- “3. We now estimate that there are about 9,000 North Vietnamese troops in Laos (6,000 combat; 3,000 cadre and support) as compared with about 5,000 estimated in SNIE 58–62. Two battalions of North Vietnamese (as many as 1,000 men) may have entered Laos in recent weeks; the balance is attributable to a reassessment of indications previously available, and to new evidence. Our estimates of the numbers of North Vietnamese in Laos are highly tenuous because of the various possible interpretations of the available evidence. Moreover, the numbers may change quickly; the North Vietnamese are well organized and prepared to move units easily to and fro across the Laotian-North Vietnamese border.
- “4. The performance of FAR units in recent skirmishes was not as unsatisfactory as it generally was immediately before the cease-fire. It is clear, however, that problems of morale and leadership are still critical. We now believe it was too optimistic to estimate in SNIE 58–62 ‘that the government forces would have a slight edge if fighting were resumed on a pattern comparable to that prior to the cease-fire but intensified as a consequence of the strengthening of both sides over the past several months.’ In particular, we believe that the FAR is unable to deal with any substantial number of North Vietnamese forces, whom they greatly fear. The Communists are able to bring these forces into play where they wish or need to do so.
- “5. Although outnumbered by the Lao armed forces, the antigovernment forces now in Laos have a superiority in artillery and armor. They are generally capable of maintaining their main forward positions and of conducting local operations to counter aggressive actions by the government forces. Without further external reinforcements, they could, by concentrating their forces, seize and hold certain key positions now held by government troops. If reinforced by additional combat units from North Vietnam, they could quickly overrun the remainder of Laos.” (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Laos: General, 1/1/62–1/15/62; full text in Declassified Documents, 1978, 16D)