Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis

415. Memorandum for the Record⁰

Washington, July 28, 1962.

SUBJECT

• Highlights of Meeting held 28 July 1962 Between Prince Souvanna Phouma, Mr. John A. McCone, Governor Harriman, [2–1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

1. The meeting was cordial and covered all subjects projected for discussion. (Support for his newspaper, his political action program, the Meo problem, and the North Vietnamese Communist presence in Laos.) Considerable success was achieved in securing understanding if not agreement with our points of view. Additional subjects covered were his relations with neighboring countries, specifically Thailand, his plans for the current administration of Laos, and Kong Le. Unsatisfactory from our point of view, though not unexpected, was Souvanna’s vagueness on the North Vietnamese Communist problem. In sum, we believe the meeting diminished Souvanna’s distrust of the CIA and contributed to his confidence in the intentions of the U.S. Government.

2. Souvanna was pleased when the Director promised support for his paper. Souvanna commented that General Soukan, head of the Lao Neutral Party, has asked him to request support for the paper from the Quai d’Orsay. Souvanna said that because the French had already given him considerable support for the Lao students in France and otherwise, he had been loath to go to the Quai d’Orsay, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. Souvanna explained that Soukan had acted because his paper was shoddy compared to others in Laos. [1–1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

3. Souvanna at this juncture mentioned that he was disturbed by the possible division of effort represented by Phoumi’s new political groupment. Though Phoumi has asked him to be honorary president, he believed it better to unite all non-Communist forces around his and Soukan’s Lao Neutral Party. The Director stressed the importance of exploiting the potential of all non-Communist groups and uniting them behind Souvanna. Souvanna commented that it was unthinkable that the Lao would be taken in by Phoumi and his new group because Phoumi had become overnight a neutralist for his own advantage whereas the people knew that he, Souvanna, had always been neutral. In passing, he added that he had always advised Phoumi to wait until he was sufficiently politically mature and strong before attempting to play an important role in Laos. Souvanna did not believe that his problem was basically with Phoumi but with Phoumi’s entourage of generals and officers to whom he was beholden and whose personal interest and advantage dictates that Phoumi not act on the good advice he is receiving (advice from American and other sources to follow the Souvanna line understood). Souvanna believed that if members of this entourage were around him for several months they would be converted.

4. When asked to clarify his earlier remarks to the Secretary of State on his designs on the NLHS, Souvanna replied that he intended to include eventually in his party (LPK) discontents from the NLHS. He had not attempted this yet, because until his party combined with other Vientiane elements, it was not sufficiently strong to risk absorbing elements of the NLHS that might attempt to take over. He had neither the intention nor wish to incorporate the whole NLHS in his party.

5. He needed two types of aid. One, our representatives in Laos should influence the youth of Laos to join his movement; second, materiel—paper, ink, printing presses, food, blankets, clothing distribution to villages and refugees who have suffered from recent dislocation. He did not want money but materiel. Such money as his party needed would come from dues.

6. Meo Problem. We urged the importance of the Meos to Souvanna and admitted our feeling of responsibility toward them. We urged that Souvanna make a public declaration of confidence in the Meos. Souvanna did not have to comment on this as the question of the continued air supply of rice and non-war material was raised before he could. Souvanna agreed to the continued air supply and was not concerned by possible NLHS static. He would establish mixed inspection teams to insure no arms or ammunition went on the air drops. This would forestall NLHS complaints. He would take up the Meo question immediately on his return but was prone to view it from a long term viewpoint of their resettlement in the Plains rather than in terms of the immediate problem. He was unworried about the Meo problem because Touby, the Chief of the Meos, was loyal to him, indeed had been brought up by him.

7. North Vietnamese Communist Problem. He agreed that the North Vietnamese Communists should leave. He had assurances from Pham Van Dong, President of North Vietnam, that the North Vietnamese would support him and accede to his requests. However, as these still remain promises, he has reservations. He stated it was no great problem. All Lao villagers hated the North Vietnamese. They would keep him informed if the North Vietnamese remained but he did not explain how they would communicate with him, and what he would do if North Vietnamese promises were broken.

8. Souvanna agreed that the ICC should play an important role in assuring the evacuation of the North Vietnamese Communists from Laos.

9. Intelligence Support. When asked if he would like to be supplied regularly with intelligence briefings, he answered he would not only be happy to but he asked to be so supplied. He told us he had received these regularly from the French even when in Xieng Khouang. He inferred that he wanted to hear other sides of some questions and that the French briefings occasionally may have been slanted.

[1 paragraph (3 lines of source text) not declassified]

11. Questions raised by Governor Harriman. When asked how he intended to administer Laos, he replied that a direct answer was not yet possible but that now each sector of the country was run by the group in place when the new cabinet was installed. However, as far as the government, all ministers had access to every part of Laos. Harriman stressed that this was very important. When questioned as to Kong Le, Souvanna did not believe that the Communists had gotten to him. Souvanna admitted that there was continued tension between his and the Pathet Lao forces.

12. Souvanna’s Relations with Neighboring Chiefs of State. Souvanna stated that he was on good terms with Ne Win, Sihanouk, and even U Nu. However, Laos, a former Thai vassal, had suffered much in past as well as recent history from the Thais. The Thais look down on the Lao. The importance of good relations with Thailand being urged, he agreed to keep a somewhat open mind toward Sarit and the Thais but would keep a jaundiced eye peeled on their actions. Harriman praised the statesmanship of Sarit in recent events and explained what Sarit contributed to Phoumi’s acceptance of the current solution. Harriman stressed that Sarit was not against Souvanna but was afraid of the Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese Communist operations in Northeast Thailand.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.51J/7–2862. Secret; Eyes Only. No drafting information appears on the source text.