55. Editorial Note

On April 16 in Moscow, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko handed British Ambassador Sir Frank Roberts an aide-mémoire, a draft message from the 1954 Geneva Co-Chairmen (the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union) calling for a cease-fire in Laos, the text of a proposed message from the Co-Chairmen to the Government of India on convening an International Commission for supervision and control in Laos, and a text of a proposed message to participants to the prospective 1961 Conference on Geneva. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/4–1661) This package constituted the Soviet reply to the British demarche of April 4; see footnote 2, Document 48.

On April 17 in London, British Foreign Office and Embassy working-level officials discussed the Soviet reply and cited two major shortcomings: while the Soviets stated there would be a cease-fire prior to the conference they did not explicitly accept it as a precondition and the Soviet formula for convening the International Control Commission in New Delhi did not meet the Western requirement for an immediate ICC presence in Laos to verify the cease-fire. Two minor shortcomings were also noted: Soviet insistence that the conference should be at the Foreign Minister-level with the Ministers remaining at the conference until its end and Soviet introduction of a new element by stating that the conference should proceed on the basis of the 1954 Geneva Agreements. (Telegram 4199, April 17; Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/4–1761)

On April 18, Lord Home with the concurrence of the United States sent a message to Roberts for his use in discussion with Gromyko. Roberts was to stress again that the cease-fire should be effective by the time the conference met and to suggest April 20 as the date for issuing the appeal from the two Geneva Co-Chairmen. Roberts was to suggest revisions in the Soviet drafts to emphasize this fact. Roberts also was to point out that the original British proposals had the ICC verifying the cease-fire before the conference. While there was no mention of the ICC performing this role in the Soviet proposals, the Soviets had referred to the Co-Chairmen sending a commission to Laos. Roberts was instructed to stress to Gromyko that the commission should be sent to Laos immediately. Roberts was also to inform Gromyko that the United Kingdom had no objection to the conference being called a Foreign Ministers conference, but the Soviets must realize that individual foreign secretaries must decide how their time and other duties would allow them to be present at the conference. (Circular telegram 1614, April 19; ibid., 751J.00/4–1861)