Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume I, Vietnam, 1964

201. Paper Prepared for the President by the Secretary of Defense (McNamara)¹

Washington, June 5, 1964.

SOUTH VIETNAM ACTION PROGRAM

I. Strengthen the situation within SVN by:

A. Expanding the U.S. and Vietnamese activities in the 8 Critical Provinces.

1. Move in additional Vietnamese troops.

2. Assign control over all troops in each of the provinces to the province chiefs.

3. Develop detailed hamlet by hamlet “oil spot” and “clear and hold” operational plans for each of the approximately 40 districts.

4. Introduce a system of population control (curfews; identification papers; intelligence network; etc.)

5. Increase the provincial police force.

6. Expand the information program (introduce approximately 40,000 radios; install transmitters at provincial capitals; provide taped programs; etc.).

7. Develop a special economic aid program for each province (distribution of medicines; school construction materials; etc.).

8. Add additional U.S. personnel (initially from within SVN):

a.	320	military provincial and district advisers.
b.	40	USOM provincial and district advisers.
c.	74	battalion advisers (2 for each of 37 bns).
	434

9. Transfer military personnel to fill existing and future USOM shortages where necessary (110 to 180 men).

10. Establish joint US–GVN teams to monitor the program at both the national and provincial levels.²

B. Intensifying the information program within the country.

1. Distribute between 100,000 and 200,000 radio receivers.

2. Increase the quantity and quality of in-country radio programs including “fireside” chats, etc.

C. Strengthen the administration of the Country Team.

D. Actions not taken:

1. Lodge opposed:

a. A shift from a government of politicians to a government of technicians.

b. A shift in the U.S. role from one of “advice” to one of “direction”.

c. Removal of dependents unless accompanied by military moves.

d. “Interlacing” [Interlarding?] of U.S. personnel within the national and provincial governments.

II. Near-term Forecast.

A. The actions referred to above will have little or no effect within the next 3 to 6 months.

B. At best, during that period, the situation will jog along about as it is (assuming Khanh is not assassinated)-it may continue to deteriorate slowly.

C. Because visible improvement is unlikely, we can expect increasing criticism of U.S. policy and U.S. operations by the public and by our allies.

III. U.S. Information Program.

To offset the expected criticism and to develop the “peace offense” theme (with members of Congress; the press; the public; foreign diplomats; etc.).

IV. Congressional Resolution.

About mid-July consider requesting a Congressional Resolution supporting U.S. policy in Southeast Asia.

V. Strike against North Vietnam.

A. Continue to prepare political and military plans for such operations, recognizing that all efforts to achieve our objectives by peaceful means must be exhausted before military action is undertaken. It is unlikely that a strike against the north would be desirable at any time within the next 3 to 6 months, although this estimate may be affected by events in Laos.

B. Carry on a dialogue with the DRV through the Canadians.

C. Initiate joint military planning with the Thais.

VI. Military pressures short of combat operations.

A. Periodically review a list of military moves designed to demonstrate the U.S. intention to prevent further communist advances in Southeast Asia and determine whether any of such moves are timely (see list attached).

RMcN

Attachment

Illustrative Military Moves Designed to Demonstrate the U.S. Intention to Prevent Further Communist Advances in Laos and South Vietnam³

1. Continue high and low-level reconnaissance over Laos.

2. Continue high-level reconnaissance over DRV (20 flights per month).

3. Introduce GVN recon. teams into Laos (with or without U.S. advisors)—4 approx. 6/15; 16 by 8/15.

4. Authorize hot-pursuit into Cambodia.

5. Initiate selective low-level recon. into DRV along supply lines feeding the Laotian corridor.

6. Re-introduce a MAAG into Laos (shift from Thailand).

7. Re-introduce White Star teams into Laos—(15 teams in 20 days).

8. Introduce GVN harassing forces into Laotian corridor (with or without U.S. advisors—60 days.

9. Send 500 additional military advisors to SVN to expand the counter-insurgency program (announce immediately; complete in 120 days).

10. Expand T–28 operations in Laos, then use of U.S. military pilots.

11. Accompany U.S. recon. flights over Laos with fighter escort.

12. Authorize VNAF air strikes against DRV activities in Laotian corridor.

13. U.S. Force movements:

a. 1 or 2 B–57 squadrons into SVN—24 hours.

b. 1 interceptor squadron into SVN—24 hours.

c. 1 or 2 fighter squadrons into Thailand—24 hours.

d. 1 Army Brigade (5150 men) into Thailand (5 to 12 days).

e. 1 Marine Brigade and Air Group (5700 men and 40 aircraft) into SVN on exercise or assignment (8 days).

f. 1 Army Brigade to Philippines from Hawaii (5 to 12 days).

g. 1 Army Brigade to Okinawa from Hawaii (5 to 12 days).

h. Reassign carrier task force from Pacific Coast to South China Sea (2 weeks).

i. 10 fighter squadrons CONUS to Philippines or WestPac (2 to 10 days).

j. 1 Marine Division and Air Wing (22,900 men) CONUS to Okinawa (40 days).

k. 1 Infantry Division (11,500 men) CONUS to Hawaii (45 days).

[Here follow a paper entitled “Memorandum for Discussion on Friday, June 5, 6 p.m., Laos,” and a paper entitled “Memorandum for Discussion on Friday, June 5, 6 p.m., Outline Information Program,” which summarized Document 197.]

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security Files, Vietnam Country File, Vol. XI, Memos. Secret. Published in part in Declassified Documents, 1978, 62C. A title page indicates that this memorandum was for the President’s use at a meeting at 6 p.m. on June 5. The President met with Rusk, McGeorge Bundy, and McNamara from 6:52 to 7:43 p.m., June 5. Johnson Library, President’s Daily Diary) No record of this meeting has been found.
2. These first 10 steps were sent to Saigon in telegram 2184, June 5, 8:01 p.m., as actions to be taken to expand U.S. and Vietnamese activities in the 8 “super critical provinces.” (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) Telegram 2184 is published in Declassified Documents, 1977, 147E.
3. Confidential.