8. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National
Security Affairs (Bundy) to the President1
Washington, January 9,
1964.
SUBJECT
- Comments on Senator Mansfield’s memorandum on Vietnam2
On Monday3 you asked for short
comments by Rusk, McNamara, and myself on Senator
Mansfield’s memorandum on
Vietnam. These comments are attached—Rusk at Tab A, McNamara at Tab B, and Bundy at Tab C. The Mansfield memorandum itself is at Tab
D. I have two small additional comments, as an ex-historian:
The political damage to Truman and Acheson from the fall of China arose
because most Americans came to believe that we could and should have
done more than we did to prevent it. This is exactly what would happen
now if we should seem to be the first to quit in Saigon.
[Page 9]
Mansfield’s analogy with Korea
neglects the fact that a very solid anti-Communist base existed in South
Korea when the armistice was worked out in 1953. Moreover, the U.S.
presence has continued. There is literally no comparison between this
solution and proposals for “neutralization” and U.S. withdrawal in the
present situation in South Vietnam. When we are stronger, then we can
face negotiation.
Perhaps you can trade with Mike Mansfield: his support for the war effort
against our support, which is real, for new and energetic political,
social, and economic programs in South Vietnam.
Tab A
Washington, January 8,
1964.
Memorandum From the Secretary of
State to the President4
SUBJECT
I am attaching an unclassified statement on our policy toward
Viet-Nam which bears upon Senator Mansfield’s two memoranda to you.5
In addition, the following points should be made:
- (a)
- It has been made repeatedly clear to Moscow by me
personally that U.S. military activities in Southeast Asia
would cease if Hanoi would leave its neighbors alone.
Similar messages have been sent, through a variety of
channels, to Hanoi. We have made it clear that we are not
interested in U.S. military bases or a military position in
Southeast Asia.6
- (b)
- Peiping and Hanoi are defying the Geneva Accords on
Southeast Asia, both those of 1954 and the more recent
Geneva Accord on Laos.7 There is little reason
to suppose, therefore, that a diplomatic effort to obtain
still another Accord of that type would cause Peiping and
Hanoi to leave their neighbors alone.
- (c)
- The proposal for the “neutralization” of South Viet-Nam is
a phony. I have proposed to Gromyko, and he has rejected, the idea that
there be a neutralization of both parts of Viet-Nam, North
and South. He said that North Viet-Nam is a part of the
“socialist camp” and that that
[Page 10]
cannot be changed.8 What the communists
mean by “neutralization” of South Viet-Nam is a regime which
would have no support from the West and would be an easy
prey to a communist takeover.
- (d)
- I have discussed Viet-Nam with President DeGaulle and he
has no interest in the kind of “neutralization” which the
communists talk about. His attitude toward the eventual
settlement of Viet-Nam is very close to our own.
- (e)
- The argument is made that there could be no long-term
settlement of Southeast Asia without the agreement of
Peiping. But this depends upon what Peiping will agree to.
There has been no evidence thus far that Peiping would agree
to genuinely independent neighbors in Southeast Asia. If any
such possibility opens up, we would move promptly; our own
moves in that direction have been repeatedly rebuffed. We
are now studying whether Mr. Khrushchev’s most recent message on
“territorial disputes” can offer any fresh opening.9
Attachment to Tab A
U.S. POLICY ON VIET-NAM
When President Kennedy announced, in December 1961, that the United
States would increase our assistance to help the Republic of Vietnam
preserve its independence, he made clear that this assistance had a
limited objective. As he told the Vietnamese at that time “If the
Communist authorities in North Vietnam will stop their campaign to
destroy the Republic of Vietnam, the measures we are taking to
assist your defense efforts will no longer be necessary.”10
On many subsequent occasions, this government has reiterated its
desire to see genuinely established in the former Indo Chinese
states that truce which was negotiated in Geneva in 1954, but which
the North Vietnamese have arrogantly abrogated ever since. We have
stipulated that our intention in Southeast Asia is not to establish
a position of Western strength, but to see there a community of
independent states, with the confidence that they can develop free
from the constant terror of subversive warfare. We believe this goal
is very
[Page 11]
much the same as
Senator Mansfield has
described as “a Southeast Asia less dependent on our aid-resources
and support, less under our control, not cut off from China but
still not overwhelmed by China.”
Our basic objectives, therefore, coincide with those suggested by
Senator Mansfield. But we
differ sharply with him on the means by which these objectives can
be achieved. We do not believe that North Vietnam’s terrorism can be
called off by “an astute diplomatic offensive” at this time. While
diplomacy may eventually play a role, we believe this will happen
only after the North Vietnamese become convinced that they cannot
succeed in destroying the Republic of Vietnam by guerrilla warfare.
“Political and social acts of popular benefit” are an essential part
in preserving the Republic against destruction. But these acts can
only become possible if military successes against the marauders
make feasible an unfettered exchange of confidence between the
people in the villages and the government in Saigon. We believe the
fight against the Viet Cong can be won without major and direct
United States involvement provided the new South Vietnamese
Government takes the proper political, economic and social actions
to win the support of the rural people and uses its armed forces
effectively.
We further believe that only such a victory will give the people of
Vietnam and of all Southeast Asia the confidence they need to
establish that community of states which both we and Senator
Mansfield desire. As General Duong Van
Minh, Chairman of the Military Revolutionary Council
in South Vietnam recently stated, neutralism cannot be considered
until South Vietnam is strong. And peace will not prevail in
Southeast Asia until aggression is frustrated.
Any “truce” which might be “won now in Vietnam” would be bought at a
price which I am convinced would eventually prove far more costly to
us than the peace which we hope to see established there by the
action of the new South Vietnamese Government. I am also convinced
that the overwhelming majority of the American people agree with
me.
[Page 12]
Tab B
Washington, January 7,
1964.
Memorandum From the Secretary of
Defense (McNamara) to
the President11
SUBJECT
- Comment on Memoranda by Senator Mansfield
I recommend the following points in your conversation with Senator
Mansfield.
- 1.
- We should certainly stress that the war is essentially a
Vietnamese responsibility, and this we have repeatedly done,
particularly in our announced policy on U.S. troop
withdrawal.12 At the same time we cannot disengage U.S.
prestige to any significant degree. U.S. news reports are bound
to place a heavy U.S. cast on the action. Moreover, the whole
history of our support of South Vietnam going back to 1954 makes
it inevitable that the U.S. is deeply involved, and this would
have been true even if we had not made the decision to intervene
on a substantial scale in the fall of 1961.
- 2.
- The security situation is serious, but we can still win, even
on present ground rules. The government has experienced extreme
turmoil incident to the coup d’etat. Almost every key official
from the head of State to the village mayor has been changed, as
well as most of the military leaders. Order, cohesion and
direction are only now beginning to appear. In the past few days
there have been early evidences of strength and resolution. The
military command structure has been further streamlined, more
combat forces have been concentrated in the critical provinces
and there is direct response to our urging to consolidate and
strengthen strategic hamlets on a systematic basis. In any case,
the current dry season in the Delta is the critical time, and
the next four months will disclose whether the new government
can establish its presence in terms of a cohesive base of
popular confidence. During that period anything other than
exhibitions of resolution and encouragement on our part could do
serious hurt to the Vietnamese cause.
- 3.
- Senator Mansfield’s
suggestion about dividing South Vietnam by present areas of
control is impractical. The GVN
exercises some degree of control throughout the country. The
same is true with the Viet Cong. In much of the country the
people are more committed to peace and security than to any
political organization, and there could
[Page 13]
be no negotiated division which would be a
meaningful reflection of political control. More basically,
although the present government has popular support—probably
more than any predecessor—it could not survive a partition. Any
deal either to divide the present territory of South Vietnam or
to “neutralize” South Vietnam would inevitably mean a new
government in Saigon that would in short order become
Communist-dominated. By hypothesis, any such “division” or
“neutralization” would involve complete U.S. withdrawal, and the
situation would then collapse.
- 4.
- The consequences of a Communist-dominated South Vietnam are
extremely serious both for the rest of Southeast Asia and for
the U.S. position in the rest of Asia and indeed in other key
areas of the world.
- a.
-
In Southeast Asia, Laos would almost certainly come
under North Vietnamese domination, Cambodia might
exhibit a facade of neutrality but would in fact
accept Communist Chinese domination Thailand would
become very shaky, and Malaysia, already beset by
Indonesia, the same; even Burma would see the
developments as a clear sign that the whole of the
area now had to accommodate completely to Communism
(with serious consequences for the security of India
as well).
Basically, a truly “neutral” Southeast Asia is very
unlikely to emerge from such a sequence of events,
even if the U.S. itself tried to hold a firm
position in Thailand, if Malaysia too tried to stand
firm and even if such remote and uninvolved powers
as France backed the concept of
“neutrality.”
- b.
- In the eyes of the rest of Asia and of key areas
threatened by Communism in other areas as well, South
Vietnam is both a test of U.S. firmness and specifically
a test of U.S. capacity to deal with “wars of national
liberation.” Within Asia, there is evidence—for example,
from Japan—that U.S. disengagement and the acceptance of
Communist domination would have a serious effect on
confidence. More broadly, there can be little doubt that
any country threatened in the future by Communist
subversion would have reason to doubt whether we would
really see the thing through. This would apply even in
such theoretically remote areas as Latin America.
- 5.
- Thus, the stakes in preserving an anti-Communist South Vietnam
are so high that, in our judgment, we must go on bending every
effort to win. In the final analysis, Senator Mansfield is challenging what
he regards as the gross imbalance between the extent of our
involvement in Southeast Asia and our narrow self-interests in
the area. My assessment of our important security interests is
that they unquestionably call for holding the line against
further Communist gains. And, I am confident that the American
people are by and large in favor of a policy of firmness and
strength in such situations.
[Page 14]
Tab C
Washington, January 6,
1964.
Memorandum From the President’s
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to the
President13
SUBJECT
- Senator Mansfield’s
Views on South Vietnam
- 1.
- To neutralize South Vietnam today, or even for the United
States Government to seem to move in that direction, would mean
the following:
- a.
- A rapid collapse of anti-Communist forces in South
Vietnam, and a unification of the whole country on
Communist terms.
- b.
- Neutrality in Thailand, and increased influence for
Hanoi and Peking.
- c.
- Collapse of the anti-Communist position in
Laos.
- d.
- Heavy pressure on Malaya and Malaysia.
- e.
- A shift toward neutrality in Japan and the
Philippines.
- f.
- Blows to U. S. prestige in South Korea and Taiwan
which would require compensating increases in American
commitment there—or else further retreat.
- 2.
- We may have to move in these painful directions, but we should
do so only when there is a much stronger demonstration that our
present course cannot work. If we neutralize, it should not be
because we have quit but because others have. Today a move in
this direction would be regarded as betrayal by the new regime
in Saigon and by all anti-Communist Vietnamese. There are enough
of them to lose us an election.
- 3.
- The right course is to continue to strengthen our struggle
against the Communist terror (which is exactly what it is). For
this we need new and stronger leadership in the U.S. effort. In
particular, we need a wholly rejuvenated military command and a
rapidly stepped-up political effort of the sort which Lodge has
at last recommended.14
- 4.
- I take it from his memorandum that Senator Mansfield would agree with this
recommendation but would add that we should engage in diplomatic
feelers with the French and should show more sympathy to the
Cambodians. I disagree about the French because such feelers
[Page 15]
would inevitably stir
talk of neutralization at the wrong time. I agree about soothing
the Cambodians and believe that we have been heavy-handed in
this area in recent weeks.
