Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume II, Vietnam, January–June 1965

351. Telegram From the Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Westmoreland) to the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Sharp)¹

Saigon, June 12, 1965, 4:38 p.m.

MACV 19912. Subj: Tactical employment of US allied ground forces in support of RVN. Ref—MACV 080700 Z May.²

In accordance with Reference A MACV has issued letters of instruction2 to the III Marine Amphibious Force and to the 173d Airborne Brigade after full coordination with the GVN which sets forth three stages through which US would progress. Stage 1 was related to the security of the base area and included active patrolling. Stage 2 included deep patrolling and offensive operations. Initial offensive operations were to be unilateral and then combined in order to iron out coordination procedures with the RVNAF. The III MAF has already conducted some such combined operations. The 173d Airborne Brigade was scheduled to conduct its combined operation on 11 June. However, this operation was postponed owing to the commitment of helicopters and III Corps troops to the relief of Dong Oai. Stage 3 involves commitment of US forces in reserve reaction operations in conjunction with RVNAF as necessary and also includes offensive operations or search and destroy operations in coordination with RVNAF.

2. In full coordination with RVNAF Headquarters, both the 173d and III MAF were to enter Stage 3 about 15 June. Instructions to this effect have already been issued by the RVNAF Joint General Staff to their corps commanders. In view of the statements made in Washington by the Secretary of State and at the White House,³ we have, of course, deferred the movement from Stage 2 to Stage 3 and, in addition, we have restricted US combat troops to their tactical areas of responsibility which are associated directly with the defense of the installations near which they are located.

3. The fact is, we have moved some distance down the road toward the active commitment of US combat forces and we have done so hand-in-hand with our Vietnamese ally. They now expect and anticipate this kind of participation. They and we recognize that the time has come when such support is essential to the survival of any government of South Vietnam and the integrity of the RVNAF.

4. Therefore, we recommend that the concept for employment and the letters of instruction be modified as follows and approved as a matter of urgency:

A. The tactical areas of responsibility around air bases and base areas where US troops are located will be extended or expanded into all adjacent VC concentrations or base areas which threaten the installations in question. This will permit offensive operations, combined or unilateral, in direct relation to the defensive mission. This seems to us fully compatible with para 1 of State Department Circular 2483 of 10 June⁴ in which the Secretary of State is quoted as follows: “Now obviously we don’t expect these men to sit there like hypnotized rabbits waiting for the VC to strike. They are now in the surrounding countryside to be sure that the VC are kept off balance and a strong striking force is not organized in the neighborhood to strike these installations.”

B. We will organize and plan with the Vietnamese for the commitment of US reserve reaction forces to be called upon by the Vietnamese when in their opinion and ours the general reserve of RVNAF has been committed or is not immediately available. This we regard as entirely compatible with the statement issued from the White House on 9 June which says: “General Westmoreland also has authority within the assigned mission to employ these troops in support of Vietnamese forces faced with aggressive attacks when other effective reserves are not available and when in his judgment the general military situation urgently requires it.”

5. We have reached a point in Vietnam where we cannot avoid the commitment to combat of US ground troops. Our objective is to maintain intact the Government of South Vietnam and its armed forces. They can no longer cope alone with the increased VC DRV threat. They (the Vietnamese) are fully aware of this fact and need and expect US support. We see no difficulty in explaining the actions described above in accordance with the terms set forth in the White House and the State Department messages.

6. Ambassador Johnson has read and concurs.⁵

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XXXV, Cables (B). Secret; Immediate;Limdis. Repeated to JCS and to the Department of State.
2. Not found.
3. See Document 339.
4. Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)
5. On June 13 Admiral Sharp admonished Westmoreland not to press for explicit authority defining the combat role of the ground forces under his command. Sharp noted that the mission of those forces had been carefully defined in March to include “counterinsurgency combat operations.” (See Document 208.) This flexible directive was “deliberately designed to authorize you to conduct operations necessary to achieve our objectives.” Sharp added that “it seems inevitable that further definition may serve to clarify the legal language in your combat directive, but only at the risk of imposing new restrictions which neither of us would have desired.” (CINCPAC telegram 130025Z to COMUSMACV, June 13; Johnson Library, Westmoreland Papers, Eyes Only Messages)