Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume IV, Vietnam, 1966

123. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State¹

Saigon, April 16, 1966, 1140Z.

4033. 1. The results of the National Political Congress make the political situation in Viet-Nam calmer than it has been for several weeks. We can look a little farther ahead than was true a week ago. But there is still much uncertainty. There are many pitfalls. Explosive forces still exist particularly in the Hue-Danang area where the anti-government “struggle forces” remain in control.

2. The Political Congress appears to have been a success and well justified our faith in it. The government came out of it rather better than could have been expected, given the Buddhist boycott for the first two days. The issues between the Buddhist Institute and the government appear to be fewer in number and less angry in tone. The Congress changed the bilateral—and the dangerous—nature of the conflict and, by involving other groups, seems to have given the government a chance to develop some political allies to help it contain Buddhist demands.

3. The Buddhists find themselves, for the first time in the current crisis, unable to call the shots exclusively. The government gained time and it spared itself damage by using the shield of the Congress to deflect the direct impact of Buddhist demands.

4. While not yet certain, it appears tonight as though the danger of a complete turnover of the government has been averted. The Buddhists may be in the process of modifying, if not abandoning, their move to get rid of the Directorate and the military regime which flowed from it. Whether this probability will be sustained will emerge more clearly within a few days. It is still not clear what line Tri Quang will take and he could upset arrangements which have been laboriously and precariously achieved.

5. There are a series of factors which should operate to sustain a shaky, weakened, but nevertheless substantially unchanged regime for a transitional period. The Buddhists were not able to whip up a mass reaction in Saigon against the government. The Saigon demonstration did not get rolling as might have been hoped by their instigators. In fact, there was a visible reaction against agitation and violence, not only in the expected quarters, but among many Buddhists not associated with the Vien Hoa Dao.

6. Moreover, a reasonable solution has been agreed upon and is being put into effect, so that the government can defend itself against charges of unwillingness to work towards constitutional democracy.

7. A base of military power for political support for the government has been preserved outside of the Hue-Danang area. It is undoubtedly true that Kyʼs ability to count on a substantial military force in the Saigon area gave the Buddhists considerable pause. In addition, the relative solidity of the governmentʼs authority in II, III and IV Corps undoubtedly served to contain its adversaries. The governmentʼs control over the major military formations south of Danang is intact.

8. Finally, the arousing of Catholic fears of the Buddhists, and the support derived from the sects, minorities, and political party remnants, added momentarily to the governmentʼs ability to maneuver. There was also a Southern reaction, although unorganized and ill-defined, against what had become identified as a struggle dominated by Buddhist leadership from the so-called central provinces around Hue and Danang.

9. The government now faces a set of problems deriving from the events of the past month. These are:

A. How to bring Hue and Danang back under control now that the first steps towards a generally acceptable political solution at the national level have been agreed to and begun. The situation in I Corps is not good and it will take considerable time to correct it. Military involvement in the Struggle forces is extensive, as is participation by police and civil servants. The writ of the GVN in Saigon definitely does not run.

B. How to exercise authority in the transitional period while continuing to execute utterly vital military, economic and social programs.

C. How to develop political institutions which can canalize normal political disagreements in an orderly way and produce a rational constitutional convention free from intimidation which is able to do its assigned task.

D. How to find a way in which the present military leadership can play its most useful role in the political future of the nation.

E. How to mollify a potent reaction among younger officers (the so-called Baby Turks) who are on the verge of a radical revolt against civilian political ambitions.²

F. How to settle differences which have caused strains within the ruling Directorate, while fending off possible further threats to continuity of the government.

10. Attempts must be made to solve each of these problems. Their solution is going to keep this country in a state of sustained political ferment for months to come.

11. It now looks as if the elections for the constitutional assembly will be held in August, barring any sudden upsets. Fortunately, the fact that a total change, or even a major change, in the government has not occurred will make it less difficult to get through the process. If the Directorate and the Ky government had fallen (or will fall), the situation would have been (will be) much worse.

12. With all the above considerations and circumstances in mind we suggest the following as sagacious ideas for the immediate future:

A. We should work through the Ky government as much as we can—not in the sense that we are opposing its opponents and entering into domestic political contests, but because it is the established government.

B. We should continue to persuade the GVN to be calm, patient and persistent in its task of re-establishing its authority in Hue and Danang. A military campaign against that area should not be mounted. But should not mean supine acquiescence. Clever police-type steps should be taken to shrink, whittle and subdivide. We should also consider what political and possibly economic measures can be safely used. First moves should be in I Corps area of Hue-Danang. This could involve non-Struggle forces in the countryside, and should be part of the process of isolating Hue and Danang, reserving them for later action. There are signs of a difference between extreme Struggle forces and their less radical supporters, which can perhaps be exploited by the government. The problem of General Thi should be solved, probably by finding him a place in the government but removed from his base in I Corps. Little by little the gas should be let out.

C. We should divert the energies of the “Baby Turks” away from radical solutions to more normal political pursuits (see para H below), and continue to advise Ky to avoid recourse to their emotional support. It appears that Ky can control these elements, and needs to be influenced to do so. Given their temperament they will need to be watched very closely.

D. We should look for further and sustained involvement of various civilian elements with the government in the process of political evolution. The government would be wise to enlist their participation in the preparations for elections, using well-known methods of political organization, with specific allocation of a large number of small tasks to a large number of workers. This could be the nucleus of the presidential campaign to follow under the constitution.

E. If the situation looks as though it were becoming unglued again, we should immediately consider reconvening of the Political Congress in the hope that it can once again exert a moderating influence.

F. If possible, there should be little or no change in the Directorate. Whatever changes in the Directorate or cabinet may come about should be gradual and selected so as not to prevent the re-establishment of equilibrium. Every addition or subtraction must be worked out in sharp focus on its individual merits, be it military or civil. If a proposed change seems to threaten a chain reaction it should be dropped at once.

G. Political energies outside the government should be channeled into preparation for politics before and after the constitutional convention. They should not be focused on upsetting the transitional framework, but on working within it and gearing up for a longer term role.

H. We should consider what form of political organization could be fostered involving an alliance between civil and military elements, to include the “Baby Turks”. This could hopefully form the basis for a political successor to military government which would act as a check on any tendency to military coups. A political role for the military probably cannot be avoided. Nor should it be, seeing that the military is the only major group in Viet-Nam thoroughly imbued with a national spirit. Perhaps a combination of military leaders, veterans, cooperating political leaders and groups of certain sects and minorities will emerge with a national organization based on rural construction cadre. The purpose would be to build a strong pro-government party before the end of 1966. We would seek the emergence of a unifying political group made up of nationalist elements. We will need to examine this in some detail before a clear-cut answer can be given as to its feasibility. There should be an election law to encourage development of a two party system.

I. Finally, we should maintain the closest possible contact with all shades of political opinion, leadership, and groupings. Our ability to influence events needs to be strengthened and then exercised with prudence. Our contacts with unofficial Vietnamese must grow.

13. We are now faced with the prospect that political forces will be at work in Viet-Nam in great variety and without clear direction. The uncertainties are apparent. The consequences are not so visible. We must, as always, be pragmatic on method, while steadfast on the need to ward off the VC aggressors and to build an independent modern state.

14. We will undoubtedly not be able to control events but we should be able to influence them. We must expect that civil administration will suffer, particularly in the fields of economics and revolutionary development although there will be some progress. We do not believe that we need to suffer from lack of military progress where our own role is more definitive and where our influence can be brought to bear more directly.

Lodge

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL VIET S. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Repeated to CINCPAC for POLAD. Rostow forwarded the telegram to the President at 9:25 p.m. on April 18 under cover of a memorandum stating: “This is a first class stock-taking by Saigon which I commend to you for reading at your first relatively easy moment. It underlies the discussions we will be having later in the day and over the next week.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President—Walt W. Rostow, vol. 1) Also passed to Defense, CIA, USIA, and NSA.
2. On April 14 Raborn forwarded to Rostow a message received that day through CIA channels from Saigon summarizing Colonel Loanʼs description of the “Young Turksʼ” plans and intentions. (Ibid., Country File, Vietnam, vol. LI)