Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume IV, Vietnam, 1966

146. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State¹

Saigon, May 25, 1966.

4952. For the President from Lodge. We are in such a fast moving situation here that I had just about decided not to send you a weekly telegram at all. On the other hand, I wrote what follows and thought it might interest you in the hopes that you would make allowances for the turmoil we are in.

A. Crisis

1. Following is an effort to put things here in proportion:

2. The troubles centering on Danang and Hue seem to be stabilizing with regard to the former city with fair prospects of reestablishing government authority in the second, although not without considerable uproar. Contrary to the press portrayals which I have seen, the rest of the country has been relatively quiet. The Buddhist inspired demonstrations in Saigon have not yet assumed political importance. I try to be alert to opportunities to bring the government and the “Strugglers” together by talks, and General Westmoreland has in fact, talked with General Thi, with no apparent result.² The “Strugglers”, in characteristic Southeast Asian fashion, having apparently been unsuccessful, seem now to be turning toward fanaticism. They evidently realize that the most influential segments of the U.S. press take all their fanatic actions—riots, stone throwings, fires, signs telling Americans to go home, and self-immolation—at face value, however cynical these same journalists may be about the U.S. Government. But if we assume that the government establishes its sway in Hue and Danang and then maintains order in Saigon and the rest of the country, the following could be in prospect during the next few months:

B. Military

3. Westmoreland and his Vietnamese colleagues may well inflict heavy losses on the North Vietnamese Army and the big units of the Viet Cong. He is extremely alert to the possibilities.

4. We have put it out to the press, but they have apparently taken no interest in the fact, that throughout this period of crisis, combat troops of the 1st Vietnamese Division in the Hue area have not behaved badly. I refer particularly to the 2nd Battalion of the 1st Regiment, and the 2nd Troop (Company) of the 7th Cavalry Squadron, an armored personnel carrier unit. The logistic and headquarters troops which have been demoralized by the Buddhist chaplains have behaved badly, but that does not justify the unmitigated gloom of recent days.

5. As far as chaplains are concerned, the government has put out an order that they shall cease and desist from talking politics and engaging in political activity. If they disobey the order, they are to be transferred. The government is talking about abolishing the Chaplainsʼ Corps, but I do not believe this will happen. There are about 70 Buddhist and 60 Catholic chaplains in the Vietnamese Army today.

C. Casualties

6. The following has been prepared by the staff regarding casualties:

“While U.S. casualties have exceeded those of the GVN for 9 of the past 16 weeks, not counting this week (U.S. figures are incomplete), in only two of those weeks have more Americans than Vietnamese soldiers been killed, and in those two weeks the total killed was very low compared to normal weeks. One reason why our casualties have been higher than Vietnamese is that we are much more thorough in counting wounded, with even small scratches being included in the totals, while the Vietnamese only include those who have to leave their units to be treated. We count all the ‘band-aid’ cases; they count only the ‘hospital’ ones. Over the long term, Vietnamese casualties have far exceeded our own. For instance, since the beginning of August 1965, when our forces began heavy involvement in combat, the Vietnamese have suffered 29,973 casualties, including 8,151 killed, while our soldiers have had 16,267 casualties, including 2,574 killed. When one compares the loss of life on the Vietnamese side to South Viet-Namʼs total population of about 15 million, including the Viet Cong, their suffering is seen to be far greater proportionately than ours. Roughly speaking, for each family in the U.S. which lost a son in the fighting in Viet-Nam in 1965, there were 200 Vietnamese families who suffered such a loss. And this leaves aside all those who suffered the loss of loved ones who were not soldiers through V.C. terrorism or by being caught in the cross-fires of this war. Thus there can be little doubt that the Vietnamese are carrying the major burden of suffering in this struggle, in both absolute terms and proportionate to our respective situations.”

D. Elections

8. The elections which should take place in September, assuming that this rickety government can hold together, may finally produce something which we can support on the basis that it represents the popular will, although it could be denounced as null and void by the Army or the Buddhists or by some other group. By no stretch of the imagination could it end the political uproar which can be expected to go on as long as Viet-Nam evolves into a modern nation-state. But it might establish a “standard to which the wise and honest may repair”—in short, something to show them where north is. This is a good thing to do—even if they donʼt always steer straight course.

E. Revolutionary Development

9. As regards revolutionary development, Porter reports that 90 more teams are now being inserted into the villages and hamlets and that these should be followed about September 1 by 100 more. This infusion of personnel is concurrent with the insertion of the first police field force units who will work in the areas between the villages and hamlets, thus complementing the work of the revolutionary development teams inside those places. Together with the self-help programs, which are now functioning on a wide scale, it appears that by mid-September, we may, with luck, have some interesting progress to report. This is all brand new and highly creative. In fact, if it actually happens, it would not be too much to say that nothing more imaginative than this would be going on in the entire field of government.

F. U.S. Opinion

10. I have been mulling over the state of American opinion as I observed it when I was at home. I have also been reading the recent Gallup polls. As I commented in my Embtel 4880,³ I am quite certain that the number of those who want us to leave Viet-Nam because of current “internal squabbling” does not reflect deep conviction but a superficial impulse based on inadequate information.

11. In fact, I think one television fireside chat by you personally—with all your intelligence and compassion—could tip that figure over in one evening. I am thinking of a speech, the general tenor of which would be: “We are involved in a vital struggle of great difficulty and complexity on which much depends. I need your help.”

12. I am sure you would get much help from the very people in the Gallup poll who said we ought to leave Viet-Nam—as soon as they understood what you want them to support.

13. You and the administration have done big things in educating public opinion. When I consider the degree of information today compared to what it was a year or two years ago, I applaud. But there is still more to be done—and only you can do certain parts of it. Of course, I am glad to help in any way I can.

14. Your own statement to the press about Viet-Nam was excellent in tone and substance.⁴

G. Vietnamese Notes

15. Chieu Hoi returnees are up from the April slump but below the average during February and March. There was an increase in the number of veterans which were returned.

16. The newspapers Dan Chung and Thoi Su Mien Nam take issue with Fulbrightʼs brothel statement⁵ and write that though thankful for American help, we donʼt have to tolerate such inconsiderate remarks by a politician like Mr. Fulbright—remarks that no self-respecting Vietnamese can forget. Many papers carried the wire story that Senator Fulbright “regrets” his statement.

H. Economic

17. Retail prices in Saigon continued to rise, especially foodstuffs. The index is up 5 per cent from a month ago. These price increases are evidently due to not only the political unrest but also to rumors of devaluation of the currency.

18. The Saigon free market rate for U.S. currency and gold rose to an all-time high.

19. On May 19, General Ky and Porter signed a memorandum of understanding concerning the use of counterpart funds. This agreement should give us control over the use of part of these funds and increase our ability to exert badly needed influence.

20. One disturbing note is that the Saigon Special Court sentenced to death an iron and steel importer of Chinese origin whom it convicted of selling above official prices. If the sentence is carried out, it would have a seriously adverse affect on the business climate, which is greatly affected by the Chinese merchants. I plan to urge GVN to grant clemency in this case.

21. The Minister of Economy has announced that the GVN will make sure that sufficient personnel are available to operate the port 18 hours a day. This decision should help alleviate the problems we have had in moving cargoes through the port.

Lodge

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Nodis. The source text does not indicate the time of transmission; the telegram was received at 7:20 a.m. Rostow forwarded the text of the telegram to President Johnson at noon on May 25 under cover of a memorandum stating: “This is Ambassador Lodge at his best. There is a good deal to be said for the approach he suggests for a fireside chat.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President—Walt W. Rostow, vol. 6)
2. Lodge reported on Westmorelandʼs conversation with Thi in telegram 4966 from Saigon, May 25. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)2
3. Dated May 23. (Ibid.)
4. Presumably a reference to the Presidentʼs remarks on Vietnam at his press conference on May 21. For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1966, Book I, pp. 531–539.
5. At a speech delivered on May 4 at Johns Hopkins University, Fulbright stated that “both literally and figuratively, Saigon has become an American brothel.” (The New York Times, May 6, 1966) Fulbright publicly expressed his regrets about the statement on May 17. (Ibid., May 18, 1966)