Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume IV, Vietnam, 1966

150. Telegram From the Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Westmoreland) to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler)¹

Saigon, June 2, 1966, 1135Z.

MAC 4508. Subject: Meeting with Prime Minister Ky between 1600 hours and 1655 hours, this date, in his office at VNAF Headquarters.

1. Ky reflected his usual self-confidence and was obviously pleased with the success with the Buddhists yesterday.² The Buddhists now realize that their position is very weak since they have no issue, have gone too far, lost control over the demonstrators, have little public sympathy, and no real support from the press or international Buddhist groups.³ The Buddhists have admitted penetration by the VC. Today Ky received an official letter from a Buddhist leader asking the government to provide security to protect pagodas (Ky viewed this as a significant development). Most of the Buddhists are moderate people but there are a few “hawks” who have caused the trouble. Ky believes these “hawks”, led by Tri Quang and Thien Minh, are in the process of being isolated by the moderate monks who are in the majority. At the meeting yesterday the monks stated that Tri Quang would go along with their decision. The Buddhist chaplain problem is being handled according to plan and field commanders have been alert in dealing with the matter.

2. Enlargement of the Directorate to include 10 civilians for total of 20 has served to save face for the Buddhists. When Ky saw a Catholic leader this morning he was greeted with hostility since the Catholic was of the opinion that the government had again given in to Buddhist pressure. After Ky explained the situation, the Catholic leaderʼs attitude changed. The 10 civilians to join the Directorate will be as follows: one from the South, one from Central Vietnam, and one from the Northern refugee group, one from each of the four religious groups (Buddhist, Catholic, Hoa Hao, and Cao Dai), and three from the intellectual/professional group. The Buddhists have accepted this arrangement.⁴

3. General Tri, who now commands III Corps, is to replace General Chieu as Secretary General of the Directorate. It is planned for Tri also to take over as Minister of Information and Director of Political Warfare for the Armed Forces. Chieu will devote his full attention to political matters as leader of the Veterans Party. We discussed Triʼs replacement inconclusively.

4. The surprise movement of troops into Hue this morning did not go according to plan because it was compromised by Nhuan. Nhuan drove last night by jeep from Quang Tri to Hue and informed Tri Quang of the operation. Nhuan is afraid of Tri Quang. Colonel Toan who was all set to command the operation, on the assumption that Nhuan would stay in Quang Tri, had the rug pulled out from under him. When I inquired about Dinh, Ky classified Dinh as crazy and said that he was not worried about him.

5. Ky made the point that the big problem with senior officers was corruption and that temptations were great. He himself had been offered sizeable sums by many parties in return for requested favors. He had resisted these overtures realizing that once he had compromised himself there would be no turning back. He has recently talked to Thieu, Co, and Vien about selecting a number of promising young officers and grooming them for higher responsibilities with emphasis on leadership development and resistance to self aggrandizement.

6. As I left, Ky said he was going to the afternoon briefing at the 7th Air Force. I explained that we were particularly interested in showing him the results of the big strike at Yen Bay.

7. General Wheeler please pass to State at Embassy request.

1. Source: Center of Military History, Westmoreland Papers, COMUSMACV Message Files. Secret. Repeated to Admiral Sharp.
2. In telegram 5178 from Saigon, June 1, Lodge reported that Ky had reached an understanding with the Buddhist leaders at their meeting on May 31. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) Buddhist and Directorate leaders, including Ky, met again on June 1 to complete their agreement. (Gibbons, The U.S. Government and the Vietnam War, Part IV, p. 330)
3. In telegram 5124 from Saigon, May 30, Lodge indicated that Ky was “embarked on a campaign to isolate the extreme Buddhists and their supporters,” whose “current cynical campaign of hunger strikes, letters in blood and suicide” Lodge viewed as a “desperate effort to bring maximum pressure on the U.S. to force the Government of Vietnam into conceding to Tri Quang.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President—Walt W. Rostow, vol. 5)
4. In its Viet-Nam Situation Report, 0630, June 6, 1966, the Department of State reported that the enlarged Directorate had its first meeting on June 6. (Department of State, EA/VN Files: Lot 75 D 167, Viet-Nam Situation Reports)