Office of the Historian

277. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam1

Washington, October 19, 1966, 8 p.m.

69371. Eyes only for Lodge and Westmoreland from Rusk and McNamara. We are gravely concerned about continuing uncertainty over Cabinet situation and impressions of political disarray in Saigon on eve Manila Conference.2 It is obvious that if general impression is created that there is nothing in Saigon to support, main purposes of Manila Conference will be frustrated and allied efforts will look ridiculous. We appreciate your own personal efforts but it does not seem to us that it is enough that certain patchwork be accomplished to paper over a major political crisis for duration Manila Conference since everyone knows that the crisis exists and that no answer has been found. From point of view of American and international opinion, situation is very close to that of worst days of Tri Quangʼs efforts and we can expect strong revulsion against South Vietnamese who play games while Americans are getting killed to carry the brunt of the battle.

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We believe that we should weigh in strongly with all parties concerned, but especially with Ky, Thieu and the seven dissident Cabinet members. The seven Cabinet members should be shamed or shocked into full realization that American people will find intolerable moves which destroy sense of South Vietnamese unity at a time when Constituent Assembly is meeting to bring about the very kind of political order they seem to want. If they have legitimate grievances about personal harassment or intimidation, you can assure them that we are much interested in that kind of point and will do what we can to bring about corrections. Believe you should discuss with Ky and Finance Minister Thanh whether they really want to engage in gross discourtesy to the President of the United States by Thanhʼs failure to appear at Manila Conference just after the President has himself received Thanh and when the President is traveling half way around the world to support the freedom and safety of South Viet-Nam. The object would be, in consultation with Ky, to bring about the withdrawal of the resignations of the civilian Ministers immediately. This may have to be accompanied by a hair shirt talk with Loan about some of his Gestapo tactics.

This is a matter of such importance that a maximum effort should be made even if it means some delay in your own arrival at Manila. The object is to produce an international impression of solidarity in Saigon but this cannot be done unless there is in fact some resolution of the problem behind the scenes.

Believe you should see Ky before his press conference to alert him fully to the grave dangers we see in this situation to insure that he not make matters worse by any ill-considered statements and that he knuckle down to a solution of the problem. At press conference he perhaps ought to say a police state will not be tolerated in South Viet-Nam.

The American people are prepared to do what has to be done against the application of force by North Viet-Nam and their Communist allies but the South Vietnamese have the job of convincing the American people that the South Vietnamese themselves are interested in the result and are prepared to work together to achieve it.3

Rusk

  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 VIET S. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Rusk; cleared by McNamara, Katzenbach, and William Bundy; and approved by Rusk. Repeated to Canberra and Wellington, eyes only for the President through Rostow.

    The President left Washington October 17 for an extended trip through Asia. He visited New Zealand October 19–20; Australia October 20–23; the Philippines October 24–26, where he attended the Manila Conference (see Document 281); Cam Ranh Bay October 26 where he visited U.S. military personnel; Thailand October 27–30; Malaysia October 30–31; and Korea October 31–November 2. He returned to Washington November 2.

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  2. In his discussion of the Cabinet crisis in telegram 8838 from Saigon, received at 10:35 a.m. on October 19, Lodge indicated that even dissident Ministers were insisting on resigning. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)↩
  3. In telegram 8966 from Saigon, October 20, Lodge reported on his “lengthy conversation” with Ky pursuant to this telegram. (Ibid., POL 15 VIET S)↩