Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume IV, Vietnam, 1966

41. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Ball) to President Johnson¹

Washington, January 25, 1966.

SUBJECT

• The Resumption of Bombing Poses Grave Danger of Precipitating a War With China

In my recent memorandum to you² I expressed the conviction that—if the war is to be won—it must be won in the South. In my view, the bombing of the North cannot win the war, only enlarge it. The most important item on the balance sheet against resumption of bombing is the danger of escalation.

I recognize the difficulty and complexity of the problem and I do not wish to add to your burdens. But before a final decision is made on this critical issue, I feel an obligation to amplify and document my strong conviction: that sustained bombing of North Viet-Nam will more than likely lead us into war with Red China—probably in six to nine months. And it may well involve at least a limited war with the Soviet Union.

This is necessarily a view based on personal judgment. It cannot be proved as one proves a mathematical proposition. But I have not arrived at it lightly. It stems from a conviction that there are forces at work on both sides of the conflict that will operate in combination to bring about this result.

I have tried in this memorandum to describe these forces as I see them.

I.

Why Our Bombing Will Escalate

No matter how firmly we intend to limit our air offensive against North Viet-Nam, we will move inexorably toward the destruction of increasingly sensitive targets. This is not a question of bad faith on anybodyʼs part. It is part of a process demonstrated over time: that a sustained bombing program acquires a life and dynamism of its own.

There are several reasons for this:

A. Our philosophy of bombing requires gradual escalation.

Admittedly, we have never had a generally agreed rationale for bombing North Viet-Nam. But the inarticulated major premise has always been that bombing will somehow, some day, and in some manner, create pressure on Hanoi to stop the war. This is accepted as an article of faith, not only by the military who have planning and operational responsibilities but by most civilian advocates of bombing in the Administration.

Yet it is also widely accepted that for bombing to have this desired political effect, we must gradually extend our attack to increasingly vital targets. In this way—it is contended—we will constantly threaten Hanoi that if it continues its aggression it will face mounting costs—with the destruction of its economic life at the end of the road.

B. We have given effect to this philosophy in the pattern of bombing so far.

In the eleven months that we have been bombing North Viet-Nam, we have gradually shifted from military targets located in the southern part of North Viet-Nam and directly associated with infiltration to targets in the Northeast Quadrant associated more with the economy of the country and its lifelines to China than with the movement of men and supplies to the South.

This progression is graphically shown on the attached chart.³ As the chart discloses, we have been bombing closer and closer to the Chinese border. At the same time we have been closing in on the Hanoi-Haiphong area, steadily constricting the geographical scope of immunity.

C. Chinese-Soviet and DRV action will force escalation.

The inevitable escalation of our bombing will result not only because of the dynamics of the process but because the enemy will not stand still.

Our bombing of North Viet-Nam cannot be conducted in a vacuum any more than it has been in the past. We began bombing as an act of response to an incident of terror in the South. More of those incidents will occur—presumably at an increasing pace as our deployments grow larger.

Chinese and Soviet aid will also tend to increase the pressures for bombing escalation. As more SAMs are installed, we will be compelled to take them out in order to safeguard our aircraft. This will mean killing more Russians or Chinese and putting greater pressure on those two nations for increased effort.

Each extension of our bombing to more sensitive areas will increase the risk to our aircraft and compel a further extension of bombing to protect the expanded bombing activities we have staked out.

D. The pressures to bomb sensitive targets will increase.

Unless we achieve dramatic successes in the South—which no one expects—we will be led by frustration to hit increasingly more sensitive targets:

1. to mine Haiphong harbor;

2. to destroy POL supplies;

3. to destroy the system of power stations; and

4. to attack airfields.

Each of these target objectives has already been recommended to you by one of your principal military or civilian advisers in Washington or Saigon; each has a special significance for the major Communist capitals.

The mining of Haiphong harbor would impose a major decision on the Soviet Union. Could it again submit to a blockade, as at the time of the Cuban missile crisis, and thus lose its only link with Hanoi that does not cross Chinese territory or air space? Or should it retaliate by sending increased aid or even volunteers to North Viet-Nam or by squeezing the United States at some other vital point, such as Berlin?

Would North Viet-Nam accept the blockade of its harbor without launching some kind of attack against the crowded harbor of Saigon? Or would the Soviet Union feel compelled to provide surface-to-surface missiles with conventional warheads targeted on Saigon harbor or US fleet units?

The bombing of POL would put great pressure on North Viet-Nam (with the possible assistance of China) to launch some kind of attack against the exposed POL in Saigon harbor.

Any attack against Saigon harbor or our POL supplies would in turn put enormous pressure on the United States to retaliate with some further act of escalation.

The bombing of the airfields would very likely lead the DRV to request the use of Chinese air bases north of the border for the basing of North Vietnamese planes, or even to request the intervention of Chinese air. This would pose the most agonizing dilemma for us. Consistent with our decision to bomb the North, we could hardly permit the creation of a sanctuary from which our own planes could be harassed. Yet there is general agreement that for us to bomb China would very likely lead to a direct war with Peiping and would—in principle at least—trigger the Sino-Soviet Defense Pact, which has been in force for fifteen years.

To bomb the energy sources of North Viet-Nam would threaten the industrial life of the country. Yet, as noted by the Special Memorandum of January 19, 1966⁴ approved by the Board of National Estimates, none of these attacks—on the harbor or POL or the power stations—“would, in itself, have a critical impact on the combat activity of the Communist forces in South Viet-Nam.”

It would not, in other words, impair the fighting capabilities of the Viet Cong. But it would profoundly affect the pressures on the major Communist powers to engage themselves more deeply in the war.

II.

How the War Can Start

We must judge the possibility of war with China not only in light of the forces that are at work to enlarge and intensify the bombing on our side, but the forces at work on the other, as well.

Quite clearly there is a threshold which we cannot pass over without precipitating a major Chinese involvement. We do not know—even within wide margins of error—where that threshold is. Unhappily we will not find out until after the catastrophe.

We did not measure the threshold adequately in Korea. We found out how low it was only after 300,000 Chinese descended on us.

I think it quite clear that both China and the Soviet Union recognize a major distinction between the loss of a War of National Liberation and the capitulation of a sister Socialist state under direct air attack by an “imperialist” power. We can do almost anything we like in the South, with little if any danger of directly involving the big Communist powers. But there are several things that we cannot, in my judgment, do in North Viet-Nam without the practical certainty of involving at least Red China.

a. I do not think that China can stand by and let us destroy the industrial life of North Viet-Nam without increasing its assistance to the point where, sooner or later, we will almost certainly collide with Chinese interests in such a way as to bring about a Chinese involvement.

b. At some point our bombers are likely to be so harassed by MIGs that we will feel compelled—to save the lives of pilots—to take out the North Vietnamese airfields and the planes that are on them. Recently, we have received reports of MIG–21s in North Viet-Nam. I cannot believe that we can go on much longer bombing more and more sensitive targets without increasing MIG encounters.

Yet when we do take out DRV air bases, we can reasonably expect Hanoi to ask assistance from the Chinese, either in the form of airfields in China or the actual use of Chinese planes and pilots. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recognize this possibility. They have already requested permission to engage in hot pursuit over Chinese Communist air space “in light of the increasing Chicom MIG threat” and because of “the likelihood that other hostile air forces will utilize Chicom bases as a sanctuary.”

III.

Both the Soviet Union and Red China are Increasing Their Commitments to North Viet-Nam and Red China Is Making Active War Preparations

A. The Soviet Union

Mr. Shelepinʼs visit to Hanoi resulted in promises of increased aid. The exact nature of the aid was not specified. Less than a month before, on December 22, the Soviet Union had promised increased economic aid. Almost certainly Shelepinʼs promise contained a substantial component of military assistance. Our intelligence indicates that large ships are already en route.

B. Red China

Our resumed bombing will almost certainly bring stepped-up Chinese aid to the DRV. The Board of National Estimates has recognized this. They state, in their memorandum of January 19 (page 9), that “It is likely that [the Chinese]⁵ would respond to enlarged air attacks on the DRV with greatly increased logistic support, including large additional numbers of engineer and supply troops and, possibly, anti-aircraft units.”

Peiping has steadily increased its covert cooperation. It has sent regular army engineer units into North Viet-Nam, is sending Chinese Communist fighters over North Viet-Nam, and is improving both sea and land communication routes to North Viet-Nam.

War Preparations in China

Even more significant than its stepped-up aid to Hanoi are the increased signs that China is making materiel as well as psychological preparations for war, particularly in the South and Southwest parts of the country.

The Weekly Intelligence Digest (WID) 52–65 December 24, 1965, of the Pacific Command states (page 11):

“Current activities include increased military use of the railroads with concurrent restrictions on civil use, stepped-up efforts to complete vitally needed rail links in Yunnan Province, recall of railroad personnel to duty, military build-up, intensified indoctrination of the population and evacuation of women and children from the cities. Curfews and travel restrictions are in effect. Efforts to speed the development of air warning and installations of air defense systems, including emplacement of anti-aircraft guns, have been indicated. Some key industries are reportedly being relocated and the government is said to be developing contingency plans for the emergency evacuation of its offices from the cities. New airfields are also being built.”

Air Fields and Air Defense

Communist Chinaʼs military preparations since the Gulf of Tonkin have focused upon the correction of its major weaknesses, notably air facilities and air defense in South China.

The focal point of this effort has been an all-out drive to construct or radically improve half a dozen large airfields in South China. Some of these are clearly not positioned solely for the defense of China but appear related to the Vietnamese war. (See accompanying map.)⁶

Simultaneously with this construction program, a high proportion of Peipingʼs advanced jet fighters has been deployed to South China. Eighteen months ago there were virtually no MIG–19s or 21s in this area. As of January 1966, more than one-half of Chinaʼs estimated 230 MIG–19s and one-third of its 35-odd MIG–21s were based in South and Southwest China. In all, some 350 jet fighters are based on Chinese Communist fields within two hundred miles or less from North Viet-Nam.

Accompanying these twin developments has come evidence of growing coordination between the air defense systems of North Viet-Nam and South China as well as of more aggressive air patrolling by Chinese fighters, not only along their southern border, but over North Viet-Nam as well.

Troop Deployments

Chinese ground forces already in South China are not only adequate for local defense, but they exceed the number that can be readily transported over existing lines of communication into mainland Southeast Asia. An estimated 151,000 troops are in the Kunming Military Region (Yunnan and Kweichow Provinces) opposite Burma, Laos, and western North Viet-Nam. Another 317,000 are deployed in the adjacent Canton Military Region (Kwangtung, Hunan and Kwangsi Provinces) bordering North Viet-Nam.

The Weekly Intelligence Digest of 24 December estimates that for a Chinese attack into Southeast Asia in conjunction with North Vietnamese forces, less than half of the nearly one-half million troops now located in the Canton and Kunming Military Regions would be required. Reinforcing divisions could be provided from elsewhere in China. Though there have been no indications of large-scale redeployments of Chinese forces toward Southeast Asian borders, this could be accomplished in a relatively short time with little strategic warning. The flow of military supplies to South and Southwest China is believed to have increased in recent months.

Improvement of LOCs

The same Weekly Intelligence Digest also points out (page 11) that it is the capacity of lines of communication for logistic support into Southeast Asia, not the size of forces available that control the magnitude of a Communist invasion. In Yunnan Province, the Chinese are improving logistic lines to provide better access to North Viet-Nam and to the China-Laos and China-Burma border areas.

Similarly the rail construction program in Southwest China has been greatly intensified in the past year. A new line between Kueiyang (Kweichow Province) and Liuchou (Kwangsi Province) which connects with the main railroad between the DRV and Central China became operational in late 1965.

While ninety percent of Chinaʼs bulk storage of POL is in the eastern and coastal provinces, a separate military reserve storage program was recently identified of which a large proportion is in South China. Construction was begun on these facilities several years ago, but it was considerably increased in tempo during the past year.

Political Preparations

In contrast to military and civil defense contingency preparations which have been undertaken behind a curtain of secrecy, the psychological preparation of the population has been, in large part, out in the open. “War preparation” conferences and neighborhood briefings have been held in secret; apparently, however, they tend to take their cue from public pronouncements. Since Spring 1965, there has been a barrage of propaganda on the “peopleʼs war”. These preparations and the level of warning have tended to increase in recent months.

Since year-end, there are indications that Peiping considers the prospects of war with the United States have increased. Chen Yi acknowledged that the Third Five-Year Plan to begin in 1966 would have to take into account both the war in Viet-Nam and its implications for China. Another regime spokesman, Liao Cheng-chih, in a January 20 message to overseas Chinese, stated: “We are planning all our tasks on the basis of the assumption that US imperialism will forcibly impose a war upon us.” And a Peiping radio domestic broadcast on January 18, describing a recent military political work conference, stated in regard to the US imperialist threat: “A test of strength with us is inevitable and this will come only in a matter of time.”

IV.

We Cannot Count on the Chinese Thinking as We Do

We face the real and present danger that we may miscalculate the threshold of Chinese intervention as we did in Korea by assuming that the Chinese think as we do. In dealing with a people as complicated and remote as the Chinese, logic is not enough, since it may rest on quite mistaken premises. We must look at the evidence as well.

This becomes sharply clear when we consider the usual arguments against the possibility of Chinese intervention.⁷

A. “If Peiping were intending to intervene it would have done so by now.”

It is constantly argued that since—by escalating slowly—we have got away with our bombing attacks so far, we can continue to escalate with relative impunity.

The argument runs, in a more sophisticated form, that if Peiping were prepared to intervene it would have done so long since. By standing down it has suffered loss of prestige—particularly in the face of increasing Soviet help—and has permitted North Viet-Nam to suffer severe damage.

The answer to this is that until recently—after the arrival of our massive deployments—we were taking a licking in South Viet-Nam. Now the situation has changed and the need for Chinese intervention has greatly increased.

Moreover, one should never forget the behavior of the Chinese during the first five months of the Korean War. No Chinese troops came to give North Korea the punch necessary to push UN forces from their toe hold at Pusan. The Chinese erected no defenses along the 38th parallel to stop a UN invasion when the Inchon landing turned the tide. Even Pyongyang was sacrificed, as was virtually all of the industrial and agricultural area of North Korea. The general estimate in Washington by October 1950 was quite logical: if Peiping had intended intervention it would have done so by then.

Yet Chinese Communist troops crossed the Yalu October 14, engaged UN forces October 26, and massively counterattacked General MacArthurʼs armies November 26.

Today only the most reckless will assure you that we know when Peiping will feel it necessary to intervene to safeguard its own military and political interests.

B. “Peiping fears war with the United States and seeks to avoid it.”

Another popular contention is that the Chinese are unwilling to expose their hard-won industry and nuclear capability to US air attack. They, therefore, will avoid any measures that might lead to such retaliation.

The Chinese have, however, watched the slow escalation of our bombing for eleven months and they must assume that if bombing is resumed it will be at an increasingly higher level of intensity. If they were fearful of being put in a position where they might be compelled to intervene, one would expect them to encourage measures (a) to bring about a prolongation of our pause, and (b) to facilitate negotiations.

Instead, Peiping has done everything possible to prevent such measures being taken. It has denounced the pause as a “peace swindle”. It has vehemently and incessantly attacked each of our Fourteen Points. It has gone much farther in vilifying United States actions and intentions than has Hanoi.

C. It would make no sense for Communist China to intervene with air support.”

Another popular argument is that if China intervened it would use its massive ground forces and would not risk its relatively small obsolete air force against United States air power. Thus, it is contended, there is little chance that Peiping would either use its air to attack US aircraft over Viet-Nam or would provide safe haven for DRV fighters.

The logic of this analysis was shared by almost the entire Washington intelligence community until recently. Now, however, the increasing evidence that Hanoi and Peiping are preparing to cooperate in defending North Viet-Nam against air attack has led the representatives of NSA, INR and the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, to conclude:

“That the chances are about even that the Chinese, if requested by the DRV, would permit DRV aircraft to intervene from Chinese bases, or would even do so with their own aircraft in the event of continued US air attacks near the Chinese border. They would not expect any of these measures, of themselves, to repel the US attacks militarily, but would hope to make our operations increasingly costly and possibly deter further US escalation while running high but acceptable risks of being bombed themselves.” (SNIE 10–12–65, Probable Communist Reactions to a US Course of Action, 10 December 1965, p. 6)⁸

D. “Even if the Chinese did intervene with air support we could take out the bases in South China with little trouble.”

The consequences of our attacking Chinese bases would be far-reaching. In calculating Communist responses to such attacks, the United States Intelligence Board has stated:

“There is an almost even chance that the Chinese choice would be to break off the air battle and make political moves designed to dissuade the US from continuing its bombings of the DRV. On balance, however, we think it somewhat more likely that they would make a major military response to the continuation or expansion of US strikes against China.The exact combination and timing of military moves would vary greatly. If they had not already done so, Chinese Communist forces would probably move into North Viet-Nam. Chinese or additional DRV forces would probably move into Northern Laos. The DRV armed forces, with Chinese support, would probably open an offensive against South Viet-Nam. Thailand would be threatened, especially if its bases were used in air attacks against China.” (SNIE 10–5–65, Communist Reactions to Certain US Actions, 28 April 1965, pp. 8–9)⁹

V.

Have Been Burned Once Before

In October, 1950, in Korea, we faced a similar question as to Chinese intentions. The intelligence community at that time was confident that the Chinese would not intervene. We should never forget the implications of the following colloquy between President Truman and General MacArthur:

“‘In your opinion,ʼ President Truman asked General MacArthur, ‘is there any chance that the Chinese might enter the war on the side of North Korea?’

“MacArthur shook his head. ‘Iʼd say thereʼs very little chance of that happening. They have several hundred thousand men north of the Yalu, but they havenʼt any air force. If they tried to cross the river our air force would slaughter them. At the most perhaps 60,000 troops would make it. Our infantry could easily contain them. I expect the actual fighting in North Korea to end by Thanksgiving. We should have our men home, or at least in Japan, by Christmas.’

“At the very moment that President Truman and General MacArthur were talking, there were already more than 100,000 Chinese Communist troops in North Korea, and another 200,000 were ready to cross the Yalu. By mid-November at least 300,000 Chinese would be poised to strike—and the ROK, American and other UN forces would not even be aware of their presence. Before the war was over, the Chinese Communist armies in Korea would reach a peak strength of more than a million men.” (Lawsonʼs “The United States in the Korean War,” pg. 79).

George W. Ball

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, vol. XLVI. Secret; Nodis. During a telephone conversation at 9:20 a.m. on January 26, President Johnson discussed this memorandum briefly with Ball and Rusk and indicated that he had read it. (Department of State, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telcons)
2. See footnote 4, Document 32.
3. Attached but not printed.
4. See footnote 4, Document 32.
5. Brackets in the source text.
6. Attached but not printed.
7. In analyzing the “usual arguments,” Ball drew heavily on a January 24 memorandum from Allen Whiting of INR. (Department of State, Ball Files: Lot 74 D 272, Viet-Nam)
8. Not printed. (Ibid., Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240, WPB Chron)
9. Not printed. (Ibid., INR/EAP Files: Lot 90 D 99, SNIE 10–5–65)