184. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State1

23330/Delto 923. From Vance.

1.
I met with Ha Van Lau and Nguyen Minh Vy at our place in Secaux for two hours afternoon November 3. Habib and Negroponte accompanied me. They had an interpreter and notetaker on their side.2
2.
I said that we were meeting to consider the next steps and we had a practical suggestion which we would like to outline. In order to approach the problem of arrangements and procedures in an orderly fashion, I proposed that Lau and I meet next Wednesday, November 6, at 10:30 at the Majestic Hotel accompanied by any of our advisors that we need. We could then discuss arrangements and rules of procedure which will be applicable to the substantive meetings which will be held in the new format. I said our meeting on Wednesday should be a working session in which we exchange views on various questions of arrangements and procedure in an effort to reach agreement. I asked for Lau’s response to my proposal.
3.
Lau said that before commenting on our suggestion he was authorized by Minister Xuan Thuy to express the DRV’s views about President Johnson’s October 31 speech.3 Lau said that as it had been previously agreed, the President would at such-and-such a time issue the order to stop all air, naval and artillery bombardment and all other acts involving the use of force against the entire territory of the DRV. But, Lau said, the President’s speech did not contain such a sentence as had been agreed upon and, therefore, the President’s statement was not fully consistent with the agreement which had been reached.
4.
Secondly, Lau said, in regard to the date of a meeting for the four delegations, the DRV side noted that the President’s statement was not consistent with our agreement. We no doubt recalled that at our last private meeting the US representative had made the proposal that the first meeting of the four representatives be held not before November 6. Therefore, the date of the meeting had not been agreed upon and, at [Page 530] that same meeting, Vance and Lau had made an appointment for November 2 to fix a date for the first meeting. Thus, the date of November 6 had not yet been fixed and yet, Lau said, the President fixed it unilaterally in his speech. This Lau said, was another element of the President’s speech which was not consistent with our agreement. Lau said it was regrettable that the President had announced a date without agreement of the DRV side and it was on this basis that he came to discuss with me today the holding of a meeting on November 6.4
5.
Lau said that as far as he understood it our meeting today was to discuss how the first meeting with four delegations will be held on November 6. As for the procedures of this conference, that will be decided by the meeting of the four delegations. At this point Lau noted parenthetically that the DRV side understood the forthcoming meetings between the DRV, the NLF, the US and the GVN would be a conference, although whether we use the word “meeting” or “conference,” it made no difference to the DRV.
6.
Therefore, Lau said, my suggestion of today had surprised him a little because he found it inconsistent with the agreement we had reached the other day. Lau said that the purpose of today’s meeting was to discuss at what time the four-delegation meeting would take place on Wednesday, what the formalities would be, how the delegations would take the floor and so forth. As for rules of procedures, that would be discussed and agreed upon by the four delegations.
7.
Why, asked Lau, did he have such an understanding? It was because the DRV had agreed that after the cessation of bombing we would shift into a new phase of negotiations in which a conference to find a peaceful settlement to the Viet-Nam problem would take place with the participation of representatives of the DRV, NLF, US and RVN. Therefore, Lau said, the DRV side believes that at the November 6 meeting the representatives of the four above-mentioned participants should be present. Lau said he knew that the NLF representative would be in Paris before November 6. It was possible that full delegations of the NLF and the RVN might not reach Paris in time. Therefore, the representatives would be present to discuss procedures of the conference. Lau said that the representative of the NLF will be Mrs. Nguyen Thi Binh, a member of the NLF Central Committee.
8.
Therefore, Lau continued, the time of the meeting was to be fixed here today between us. As for the date and the participants, President Johnson had already mentioned them in his speech. Lau said he thought the whole world is now looking forward to such a meeting and, as far as the DRV side was concerned, it was prepared to carry out its agreement. As far as Lau knew, the NLF was also prepared to do the same. Lau said he had finished and at my request we recessed briefly.
9.
Upon resuming, I said that I would first like to deal with the two points that Lau had made regarding the President’s speech. The order issued provided for the cessation of all bombardments and all other acts involving the use of force against the entire territory of the DRV. That order was issued at the time we said it would be and that those actions became fully effective within 12 hours of the order, as we had said they would be. The important fact is that the order was issued and there is no inconsistency between what the President said and that order.
10.
As far as a naming of the date for the meeting, I agreed that we still have to come to an agreement on this subject. At the time of the President’s announcement, it was assumed that the date was reasonable for all concerned. Now it appears that the representatives of the GVN cannot make that date. In that connection, the indiscriminate rocketing of Saigon on November 1 complicated the problem, making it difficult for the GVN to come along promptly. Therefore, to proceed with the necessary matters, I had made the suggestion outlined above.
11.
The suggestion I had made was not inconsistent with our agreement of the other day, because we both recognized at that time that we would have to make the necessary arrangements for that meeting to be held in an orderly manner. These are complex matters requiring full consideration and necessary consultation. We think these matters can be handled efficiently in the same manner as the beginning of our official conversations. This is properly something that the DRV and US sides should do. As I recalled our previous conversation, the DRV side recognized the need for full consideration and discussion of the manner in which the first meeting would be conducted. And by “full discussion” I meant discussion between the US and DRV.
12.
I said that a matter which we might also usefully discuss Wednesday would be the state of affairs along the DMZ. It would be helpful to know what each side is doing there so as to avoid any misunderstanding or incidents. Therefore, I suggested again that Lau accept the proposal that I had outlined at the beginning of our meeting this afternoon.
13.
In response, Lau said that the DRV side had taken note of Harriman’s and my communication on October 315 regarding the order to be issued by the President. The DRV side recognizes that this order has been issued and carried out. But whether it is effective over the entire territory of the DRV has not yet been confirmed. As for the inconsistency, Lau said that he was referring to the wording used by the President in his speech. The President had only mentioned the order to stop all air, naval and artillery bombardment. Therefore the DRV side maintained its remark regarding the inconsistency between the President’s announcement and our agreement. Whether the order of the President has been realized in accordance with the agreement, this cannot be affirmed now, Lau said. He would have to await a report from the DRV. The DRV was following the situation closely.
14.
Lau remarked that I agreed with him that the date of the first meeting should be agreed upon between us. Lau said that since the President had named a date, the DRV accepted it. However, according to what I had said, it appeared that the representative of the Saigon government cannot come in time, and I had mentioned the rocket attack against Saigon as the reason. This question Lau said is related to the NLF. Lau said he did not feel this question was the substance of our discussion today and, as for the rocketing of Saigon, he did not feel that this was the reason for the Saigon representatives being unable to come to Paris in time.
15.
Lau said that he was prepared to discuss with us the matters regarding the convening of the first meeting, but he would like to say that our proposal is not consistent with our agreement that the four delegations would meet on November 6. Lau then said that he would like us to tell him formally whether we can have a meeting with the four representatives on November 6 and, if not, when could such a meeting be held? He said he would like to repeat that he was prepared to discuss the manner of holding the first meeting, but that procedures for the conference should be discussed by the four delegations.
16.
Lau said he agreed with me that the problem has its complexities and it is necessary to have full discussions and considerations, but the full discussions should be by the four delegations. Lau said he thought that if the four representatives and all parties concerned had good will he believed we could come to agreement on procedural questions. If the representatives of the Saigon administration can come here November 6 he saw no problem.
17.
Lau then said he had the following concrete procedural proposals that the two of us could discuss. He proposed that we discuss what [Page 533] we shall do at the first meeting of the four representatives, how each side would take the floor regarding procedural matters, and the order in which they would take it. On May 13 when the official conversations began, it was a simple matter because there were only two delegations. But now there were four delegations and the order in which they spoke should be discussed. It was not a very important matter, but there should be agreement in advance so that the meeting would be orderly and disciplined.
18.
Next, Lau said, was the question of physical arrangements. How many people would be in each delegation and what would be the seating, so that we can propose to the host government that it make the necessary arrangements. We should also think about the question of press representatives attending the meeting. These Lau said are practical questions we could discuss today and come to an agreement. If the others concerned come and agree, then we can begin. Lau proposed that we begin the discussion and that if we could not finish today, then we could continue tomorrow. In any event, we should reach agreement before November 6.
19.
I said I had some preliminary comments. First, I wanted to ask whether Lau had any information that the orders issued by the President had not been complied with. Lau said that he had no word that it had not, but, as he had said, he could not confirm this now because he had not yet had any report from Hanoi.
20.
I then said that the representatives of the GVN simply would not be able to get here by November 6. I said that as I had previously said the rocketing of Saigon had complicated the problem and made it difficult for the GVN representatives to come along promptly. I said we still believed the appropriate place and time of discussion of the matters Lau had just listed would be at the meeting on Wednesday between Lau and myself and any advisors we wished to have in the same form as we had followed at the outset of our official conversations.
21.
I said that, without abandoning that position, I would listen to any suggestions Lau had regarding the items he had listed and how his side would organize itself.
22.
Lau replied that first of all, if we insisted on the proposal we had made at the outset, then the DRV side feels that it is not consistent with our agreement, that is to say, that a meeting of four delegations will be held to find a peaceful settlement to the Viet-Nam problem and the first meeting will deal with items such as procedure and agenda. In the spirit of that agreement, Lau said he would like to await the arrival of all four delegations and then discuss these matters.
23.
Lau said he remembered that we had told him at previous meetings that we would like to have prompt meetings and that the DRV representative [Page 534] was already in Paris. As for the full delegation of the Saigon administration, it could come later because it needed time to make the necessary arrangements. In that spirit, the DRV side had accepted that the NLF representative come to Paris first to discuss procedural items pending the arrival of the full NLF delegation. Lau said that he understood that the full-fledged Saigon delegation may be late, but a GVN representative was already in Paris and, therefore, there was no problem if we have to meet immediately. Moreover, Lau said, he would like to recall that at our last private meeting we had said that we were good for our word and that we would do what we promised. Lau said he hoped we would keep our word.
24.
As for the first meeting, Lau said that he would propose that we inform him of what date it could be held if that date was not November 6. At that meeting will be present the NLF, the RVN and our two delegations. As for procedures, each side may express its views as a basis for discussion, because each side has the right to make proposals on what the procedures should be.
25.
As for the location of the meeting, Lau suggested that for the first meeting we propose to the French Government that it let us use the largest conference room in the Majestic. Lau said he also proposed that we allow the press 10 or 15 minutes at the beginning of the first meeting to take photographs, and have correspondents present, as had been done on May 13. Lau said the DRV side had received many requests from the press to do this. The foregoing, Lau said, were his preliminary views.
26.
I said that I wanted to point out first that the important thing was that all bombardment and all other acts involving the use of force against the entire territory of the DRV have stopped. We said this would happen and it did, and at the time we said it would.
27.
Second, we have run into complexities regarding the first meeting. These complexities are matters beyond our control. On matters over which we have control, we have complied with our word. I then suggested that we recess again briefly.
28.
Upon resuming, I said I would like to summarize the situation. Before we can hold the first meeting in an orderly manner, both sides recognize the necessity of reaching agreement on arrangements and procedures for that meeting. It is further agreed that these matters should be discussed between us. This is precisely what we proposed to do in an orderly manner in a meeting between us at the Majestic on November 6. These matters can be appropriately discussed in such a meeting under regular circumstances. Regarding Lau’s suggestions, I said I had taken note of them and would be in touch with him and I asked that he do the same regarding our suggestions.
29.
Lau said that he had provisionally come to the conclusion that we can not yet hold the first meeting as agreed on November 6, that is to say, a meeting including the representatives of the DRV, NLF, the US and the RVN. The reason for this is the complexities beyond the control of the US.
30.
Lau said it was necessary to prepare for the first meeting, that discussion between our two delegations be held and for this reason he had come to meet us today. Now we were making a new proposal. Lau said he would report it to Xuan Thuy and he would get in touch with us.
31.
I concluded by saying that for the purpose of clarity, as of today I can not say that the representatives of the GVN will be present November 6 because of the complexities to which I had referred.
32.
Comment follows septel.6
Harriman
  1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, HARVAN/DOUBLE PLUS, Vol. V. Secret; Flash; Nodis/HARVAN Double Plus. Received at 3:42 p.m. Repeated to Saigon.
  2. Rostow transmitted a summary of this meeting in telegram CAP 82664 to the President, November 3, which was received in the LBJ Ranch Communications Center at 12:55 p.m.
  3. See Document 169.
  4. In a note to the President, November 4, 10:20 a.m., Jones wrote: “Walt Rostow reports on your question—we acted unilaterally with the DRV. He says we did not clear November 6 with the Hanoi delegation in Paris. We went to that date because Bunker said we should give Thieu a little more time than three days. Rusk and others, based on the history of the negotiations, said we could do this because we had been crowding Hanoi to three days. Therefore, we presumed the additional time would be agreeable to Hanoi.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Memos to the President/Bombing Halt Decision, Vol. IV [1 of 3])
  5. See Document 158.
  6. Document 185.