352. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation1
PARTICIPANTS
- Ambassador William M. Roth
- Honorable Francis M. Bator
Bator began by reporting that the meeting with the President went well. The President had been fully briefed and went into the issues in considerable detail during the 90-minute discussion. At the end of the meeting the President asked all the participants whether they were in favor of initialing the agreement by Sunday night2 on the basis of the offers presently on the table. All voted yes. However, Bator emphasized that the President had not given his final decision. Nevertheless, Bator was confident that it would be affirmative and that he would be receiving it some time tomorrow or Saturday.
Subject to receiving the President’s final okay, Bator said that Roth could in the final analysis settle on the present basis, assuming that there was no further deterioration in the offers of the other countries. In particular, Roth could finally agree to 50/20 in the first ASP package if all efforts to move the EEC up fail. Moreover, Roth could go as low as 28% on dyes if something valuable could be bought in return. Roth said he appreciated this, but that he was going to try to do better than 50/20 and that he would not go to 28% on dyes unless be could get something very valuable in return.
Bator stressed that perhaps the key element in the affirmative vote at the Presidential meeting was the fact that we were just about in balance overall with the EEC. He therefore stressed how important it was that there be no slippage in the next three days. Roth said he understood this very well but pointed out that we would have to accept some disparities which might create a final imbalance of about 100 million. Bator asked whether such a figure included the grains arrangement and Roth said it did not because, unlike the U.K., the EEC exported as well as imported grains and therefore the Delegation had not been giving a value to the grains arrangement in our balance with the EEC.
Bator urged Roth to push very hard to try to reduce the imbalance with the U.K., Japan, Canada, and the so-called borderline countries, pointing out that imbalance with the U.K., for example, was quite large. [Page 924] Roth said that they would make a serious attempt to do so, but he could not see much give. He said that he was surprised that the imbalance with the U.K. was that great, and Bator said that he would immediately send out a cable setting out the two tables we had worked up in the last several days, and which were used at the meeting with the President.3 The first showed our balance with the EEC, and the other the balance with all the major participants. Roth said that would be useful.
With respect to the U.K. in particular, Roth said that they had been completely unhelpful recently and that he was going to make a very strong attempt to get them to improve their offers. Bator asked whether there was anything we could do in Washington about this. Roth explained that he was expecting to receive tomorrow morning a reply to a personal note he had sent to Sir Richard Powell.4 He thought it best to wait until he got the reply and then he would be in touch with us some time tomorrow. We could then decide what steps might be taken to make a very high political approach on this matter.
Bator stressed that the most serious domestic political problem facing us during the negotiations concerned textiles, and, in particular, man-made fibers. He therefore urged Roth to do everything he could to reduce our man-made offers without pulling down the house. Roth said he understood the problem completely and that he would have his people look at all offers on man-made fibers in this light.
Bator said that the groundwork was being laid for extensive Congressional consultations and a general press campaign following the completion of the negotiations on Sunday. Roth thought that was fine.
Bator asked Roth if he had any news with respect to the EEC Council meeting in Brussels other than that which had been reported over the ticker. Roth said that he did not and we would have to wait until he saw Rey before he knew just what the Council had done.
In conclusion Bator said that the scrambler had worked well and they should try and talk again tomorrow some time early in the afternoon Washington time, and Roth agreed.
- Source: Johnson Library, Bator Papers, Kennedy Round, May–June 1967, Box 12. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Rehm on May 12 and approved by Bator. Ambassador Roth was in Geneva; Bator was in Washington.↩
- May 14.↩
- Reference is to telegram 192864 to Geneva, May 11, 9:26 p.m. (Department of State, Central Files, FT 13–2 US)↩
- Roth’s note to Sir Richard has not been found.↩