Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume VIII, International Monetary and Trade Policy

356. Telegram From the Embassy in Japan to the Department of State¹

Tokyo, May 15, 1967, 0435Z.

8224. Subject: Kennedy Round. Ref: State 194134.²

1. Following telecon with Secretary early this morning and receipt of reftel, I immediately telephoned Foreign Vice Minister Ushiba (who is GOJ expert on these matters) and told him that unless he could assure me that GOJ delegation in Geneva had accepted cereals agreement I desired, under instructions from Washington, immediately to see Prime Minister or Foreign Minister. Ushiba said that he would call Geneva to determine facts of situation and immediately get in touch with me. During several subsequent telephone conversations with him, there appearing to be confusion on what the facts of the situation actually were, I called Ambassador Roth who informed me that GOJ delegation had not accepted the principle of food aid within the KR.

2. Accordingly I saw FonMin Miki at 10 A.M. just prior to our scheduled SCC meeting and gave him an oral statement substantively drawn from text reftel (Ushiba and Tsurumi were also present). I stressed the highest level concern with Japan’s role at this crucial point in the KR. I urged a reconsideration of the Japanese position and pointed to the relatively small amount of aid involved. Miki said he appreciated the importance and significance of my representations. The amount of money involved is not the question, he said, but rather the issue for the GOJ is how to implement a food aid arrangement within the cereals agreement. Ushiba said the GOJ accepts the principle of food aid and questioned what was meant by food aid being part of KR. Having accepted this principle the Japanese del is working out with WW the language of a reservation on how to implement. The actual negotiating situation at Geneva is not clear with a different situation minute to minute. Ushiba indicated that the issues could be resolved if Japan could implement the arrangement with provision of, for example, fertilizer. I pointed to the two aspects of the cereals agreement—food aid and trade interest for US; if the GOJ contemplated resolving the matter with a reservation as suggested by Ushiba we would not, I said, find it attractive at all. Tsurumi interrupted and argued hotly that when we withdrew our demand for access to obtain our trade interest through food aid Japan was set upon unfairly. Miki concluded the discussion by saying that the FonOff would get in touch with Miyazawa immediately and inform him of our representations (and the Secretary’s personal intervention) and ask him how things stand at Geneva. If Miyazawa feels he needs additional instructions and asks for them Miki said he would send them.

3. We urge USDel press Miyazawa to point where he will be obliged to seek further instructions.

Johnson

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, FT 13–2 US. Secret; Immediate; Limdis-Potatoes. Received on May 15 at 1:27 a.m. and repeated Flash to Geneva, and passed to the White House.
2. Telegram 194134, May 14, asked that telegram 3661 from Geneva be repeated to Tokyo. (Ibid.) Telegram 3661 from Geneva, May 14, recommended that because of the stubbornness of the Japanese negotiator, Kiichi Miyazawa, Director-General, Economic Planning Agency, the President should send a message to Prime Minister Sato urging Japan’s contribution to food aid. (Department of State, Eyes Only Reels)