Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIII, Western Europe Region

129. Letter From the Ambassador to Germany (McGhee) to Secretary of State Rusk¹

Bonn/Bad Godesberg, February 7, 1966.

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I appreciated receiving the frank comments in the Department’s telegram No. 1865,² but was frankly a little surprised. You seemed to have read into my telegrams 2266³ and 2275⁴ views which I had not meant to put there. This letter is intended, therefore, to clarify several points on which there appears to have been misunderstanding.

I did not intend to suggest in the referenced telegrams that we seek to improve German-French relations “at any cost”, nor that we urge upon Erhard that he try to improve relations with De Gaulle by “concessions or accommodation”. Neither did I wish to recommend that we permit or urge the “compromise” of any policy consideration important to us, including what we really want to come out of the NATO nuclear sharing affair and our offset agreement with Germany. Indeed, one of the arguments in the reference telegram was that, since no accommodation on important outstanding issues between France and Germany is now possible, emphasis should be placed on atmospheric and secondary policy considerations. I share the view that De Gaulle cannot be permanently bought by such concessions, which would merely enhance his appetite.

On the other hand, it will be easier for the Germans to stand firm on important issues if they have a good record of meeting the French half-way on the less important ones—where there would be justification, irregardless of whether De Gaulle or someone who sees Europe as we do, was President of France.

I agree that the apparent victory achieved by the Five over France at Luxembourg is an isolated illustration of the fact that De Gaulle will change his attitude when he comes up against a stone wall. There can, however, be no permanent solution to the European problem through the Five. Germany cannot take the place of France, nor the Five the place of the Six. The other four cannot live with Germany alone for deep-rooted historical reasons. Until the time actually comes that Europe can be enlarged to include England and others—which does not now appear likely—the Five, and particularly Germany, are thrown back on the necessity of dealing with France.

I agree that the ultimate resolution of the relations between Germany and France, as between all of the European countries involved, should lie in a multilateral context. This has been the thrust of American policy in the entire post-war period. French-German relations, however, because of their very weight among the Six, and historic French-German rivalries, assume a significance far beyond that of other European bilateral relations. We cannot fail to recognize, moreover, that, largely as a result of De Gaulle’s and Adenauer’s efforts, French-German relations have been deliberately lifted out of their multilateral context. To use a physical term, they have become polarized. The attractive polarity which was first thought to exist between the two countries and which, had it progressed at the same pace as the development of unity efforts generally in Europe, might have contributed to European unity, has now become a repellent or reverse polarity. It constitutes a new drag on European unity, and must, I believe, be dealt with.

The question I raise is not one of “taking sides”, either as between Germany and France or the Five and France. Everybody knows which side we are on without our saying so. Indeed, we did not hesitate to advise the Five privately about such matters as the importance of the Commission, which was one of their disputes with France. The question I raise is rather one of seeking to remove ourselves, without sacrificing our own vital interests, as one of the sources of aggravation between Germany and France. It is not a question of paying for a transient friendship between Germany and France out of those vital interests, but of avoiding the defeat of our own concepts of a long-range partnership with Europe by actions which, in themselves, could foreclose the possibility of European unity. Naturally, we should not under any circumstances “encourage French nationalistic ambitions or accommodation with French policies which would fragment the Atlantic world”. However, it is not only French ambitions, but the deteriorating French-German relationship itself, which could result in this fragmentation. De Gaulle may be in for a long time, and it is entirely possible that he could, in his present mood, drag French-German relations to a low point of no return.

There are many contradictory elements underlying the concept of European unity and the Atlantic partnership. If we are to succeed in both, I believe we must not let one get ahead of another. Compromises must be effected all along the way. An uncompromising Atlanticist attitude which leaps over Europe altogether, such as that van der Beugel proposed at the Bilderberg Meeting in Como last spring and which was turned down unanimously by the Europeans present, could I believe only end in our failure on both counts.

Given these considerations, I would, as indicated in my telegram 2343, hope that further consideration could be given to the broader reconsiderations on Franco-German relations made in my 2266. The problem is a serious one requiring, I believe, our closest attention.

Sincerely yours,

George C. McGhee

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL FR–GER W. Confidential.
2. Document 128.
3. See footnote 2, Document 128.
4. Dated February 4. (Department of State, Central Files, POL FR–GER W)