Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIII, Western Europe Region

169. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany¹

Washington, May 23, 1966, 4:05 p.m.

3184. NATUS. Please deliver following letter from Secretary to Schroeder:

“Dear Gerhard:

I have been giving consideration to what we might most usefully attempt to accomplish in the forthcoming NATO Ministerial Meeting at Brussels.² The fourteen Ministers will, of course, be meeting separately on June 6 prior to the formal opening the next day. We hope that it will be possible in this meeting to get some basic decisions made on relocation of SHAPE and AFCENT and hopefully on the types of reorganization of NATO military structure which we might seek. I intend to stress strongly the US desire to move the North Atlantic Council from Paris, preferably to Brussels, due to our conviction that it must be collocated with NATO’s higher military direction. I hope that we can all do some preliminary work on the few of our colleagues who still seem to be reluctant to face this issue, so that a decision in principle can be made at Brussels. We have had extremely good meetings with George Thomson and Foreign Minister Harmel during the course of this past week. I found the attitude of both a cause for encouragement, and the aide-memoire produced by the British³ can be a useful vehicle for reaching decisions at Brussels.

I would like in my own remarks at Brussels to stress the theme that NATO should be developed further as an instrument for moving towards settlement of East-West problems. As some observers have pointed out, De Gaulle’s challenge to NATO is, in one important respect, based on the presumption that he, acting alone, can do more to promote European detente than can NATO and that NATO in fact, in its present form, is an obstacle to the promotion of more favorable East-West relations.

I consider this a most dangerous view. As you know, I believe that it is only by the Western nations acting in concert and by continuing to keep our defenses credible that the conditions for ultimate solution of East-West difficulties can be enhanced. We must, of course, be careful to combat the impression that NATO is merely a military Alliance, that its hour of need has passed and that defense of NATO is simply defense of the status quo. Therefore, I think we should demonstrate publicly at Brussels that NATO has an equal concern in moving towards improvement of relations with the East and that NATO, as an organization, is seeking an expansion of its political role in augmenting East-West contacts. I do not myself believe that there are major opportunities close at hand for securing fundamental changes in East-West relations or that the time is ripe for presenting basic new proposals. It will continue to be a slow and gradual process, but we should continue to work at it.

I feel quite keenly that one of our needs in the present crisis is to combat impressions of ‘immobilisme.’ NATO, if it is to survive and flourish, must demonstrate increasingly its capability to serve as a serious forum for the consideration of new approaches to the problems which still beset our common relations with the Communist world.

I believe it would be useful if a number of us could strike this theme in our remarks at Brussels, and I would welcome your views on this question.⁴

Sincerely, Dean Rusk”

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, NATO 3 BEL(BR). Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Spiers; cleared by Ball, Acheson, Schaetzel, and GER; and approved by Rusk. Repeated to Paris.
2. On May 21, the Department of State transmitted to the other NATO capitals its basic position for the Ministerial Meeting. The positions outlined here are the same as those transmitted on May 21. (Circular telegram 2296; ibid.)
3. See footnote 2, Document 168.
4. On May 27, Schroeder replied that he shared Rusk’s views, particularly on the role of NATO in resolving East-West problems. (Ibid., Presidential Correspondence: Lot 67 D 272)