Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIII, Western Europe Region

181. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson¹

Washington, June 27, 1966.

SUBJECT

• Bilateral Negotiations with France on Reentry Rights and Facilities

Ambassador Lucet, in his June 6 talk with Mr. Ball,² said France is ready to discuss and to conclude an agreement with the United States on the wartime use of facilities in France.

Discussing reentry rights—under what circumstances, with what rights, and into what facilities we can reenter—will enable us to determine whether and to what degree France will agree to reentry provisions that are dependable in crisis and operationally adequate. Such a determination is essential in military planning in order to assess the risk of relying on France. Perhaps more important, it will give the United States and its thirteen allies a gauge to measure the degree, if any, to which the French Government is willing to cooperate in an emergency. Properly handled, it should clarify thinking and unify action.

The normal way to conduct such a negotiation would be to ask the French Government to grant the United States, in case of emergency under Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty, the rights covered in our bilateral agreements in the manner provided therein. This would provide the French with an opportunity, if they desire it, to narrow the rights offered, which this Government can then appraise.

If you concur, I therefore propose to commence conversations with the French on reentry rights and facilities as soon as our representative is prepared; we have consulted with our allies and have coordinated the timing with other negotiations between the fourteen and France and the FRG and France.

Ambassador Bohlen should be our representative to conduct the talks; I plan to call him in to discuss the problems in detail, both with the State and Defense Departments, to instruct him generally in accordance with the attached Memorandum of Guidance, which can of course be modified in light of subsequent developments, and to reinforce him with the necessary experts.

Secretary McNamara has approved both this Memorandum and the enclosed Memorandum for Ambassador Bohlen.

George W. Ball ³

Enclosure⁴

MEMORANDUM OF GUIDANCE FOR AMBASSADOR BOHLEN IN DISCUSSIONS WITH THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT ON REENTRY RIGHTS IN NATO EMERGENCY

The Problem

Evacuating U.S. military personnel and installations in France, in response to the French aide-mémoire of March 10 [11],⁵ will degrade somewhat our military posture in Europe, and will also impose substantial financial loss.

Such reduced effectiveness and financial loss can be limited if the French will agree to dependable and timely rights of reentry and operation, effective in time of NATO emergency, into bases and facilities that are adequately maintained and supplied, and with the rights of access, movement, transport, communications and personnel status needed to allow immediate operations.

On the other hand, if the Government of France should refuse reentry and operation provisions which are sufficiently reliable for the U.S. to depend on them for the support of forces in combat, the agreements that might be reached would be hollow. In this case, we should establish conclusively, both to our own satisfaction and that of our allies, that meaningful reentry agreements are not possible under the present French policies.

Objectives

To conclude satisfactory agreements with France for reentry and operation rights to bases and other facilities in France for U.S. forces, in case of NATO emergency.

Failing that, to make clear to the NATO countries how and where French policy makes agreement useless, and the magnitude of the resulting losses.

Basic U.S. Position

If agreements reached between the U.S. and France on the reentry and operation rights are to be dependable, they must include:

a. Timing and Nature: The facilities are needed, fully operational, when hostilities commence. The use⁶ of the bases and installations placed at the disposition of the U.S. Government by the Government of France was, by the Dillon-Bidault Agreement, made in time of emergency “a matter for joint decision by the U.S. and France in the light of circumstances prevailing at the time.” The reentry and operating rights sought, however, should become effective at the time the NATO commands whose missions depend upon the availability of the facilities assume an operational status. The rights must include access, communications, transport, nuclear transit, overflights, status of forces, etc., as appropriate.

b. Conditions: rights must apply to any NATO crisis.

c. Facilities: required facilities must be identified, available, stocked and maintained. The right to construct new facilities after war commences is worthless.

Anticipated French Position

The following elements of the French position have emerged:

a. Termination of the existing U.S.-France bilateral agreements⁷ by “mutual consent.”

b. Initial discussions to deal with an overall wartime reentry and utilization agreement, to be followed by a series of technical agreements covering the facilities that would be made available to the U.S. in time of war.

c. There is no reason to oppose continued use of the pipeline, but its operation should be under unilateral French control at all times.

d. No stocked storage depots will be permitted in France.

e. Reentry rights will be restricted to “a conflict in which both countries would participate under the Atlantic Alliance.”

f. Reentry rights will depend on a decision by the French Government taken at the time of the emergency.

1. Source: Department of State, Bohlen Files: Lot 74 D 379, US-Fr Bilateral Discussions. Secret; Nodis.
2. No further record of this conversation has been found.
3. Ball signed for Rusk above Rusk’s typed signature.
4. Secret; Nodis. The source text bears no drafting information.
5. Document 142.
6. The history of the Dillon-Bidault Agreement makes clear that the “use” of facilities in France relates only to use for launching air attacks with nuclear weapons. The agreement asked for and given was described as “a U.K.-type of assurance” (i.e., President-Prime Minister exchanges on use of U.K. facilities at which U.S. nuclear weapons are maintained; the U.K. is entitled to be consulted before the U.S. uses such weapons). [Footnote in the source text. The Dillon-Bidault agreement, signed on April 8, 1954, at Paris, confirmed assurances given by the French Government that the use of French bases and installations would, in time of emergency, be a matter for joint decision by the United States and France.]
7. (1) Chateauroux Depot Agreement of February 27, 1951; (2) Paris Air Bases Agreement of October 4, 1952; (3) United States Military Headquarters Agreement of June 17, 1953; (4) Pipeline Agreement of June 30, 1953; and (5) System of Communications Agreement of December 8, 1958. [Footnote in the source text.]