43. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany1
1251. MLF. Following Noforn, FYI only, is summary discussion NATO nuclear matters and MLF during talks British Foreign Secretary Patrick Gordon Walker had with Secretary, Under Secretary, and other officials October 26–27.2
[Page 94]Gordon Walker emphasized what he had to say represented preliminary thinking Labor Government and should not be regarded as concrete proposals. Labor recognized time had come for decision on nuclear matters within alliance and HMG had no intention create delay. He thought by time of anticipated Wilson visit to U.S. HMG would be prepared for more definitive discussion.
What HMG was thinking of was, Gordon Walker said, a larger nuclear force consisting of British V-bombers, British Polaris submarines, if HMG decided to buy a certain number of them (three or four), an equivalent number of American Polaris submarines, and a mixed-manned element (MLF), which would play a less conspicuous role than originally planned. UK element would be committed unconditionally with no “national interest” withdrawal clause. Whole force would be co-targeted with U.S. national nuclear deterrent. Britain would like veto in new force but considered American veto essential.
Gordon Walker went on to say HMG would prefer not to participate in mixed-manned MLF element of proposed new force except perhaps on token basis. He thought Labor Government would be able to cope with political opposition in UK to MLF if MLF part larger force. On other hand, Labor was opposed to MLF as isolated step and would be most unhappy if U.S. went ahead alone with Germany on MLF. Gordon Walker also repeatedly stressed his conviction that Germany would not be satisfied for long with participation in MLF unless it part of larger force he had outlined.
Secretary and Under Secretary in turn emphasized our aim was to draw Germany permanently to West. While there was little present German insistence on nuclear capability, future pressures could bring about dangerous change in German attitude unless solution reached which Germany could reconcile with her national interest. MLF would give Germany both propinquity to weapons and share in control which should satisfy German aspirations for long time to come. Our preliminary reaction was that even though UK were to commit its Polaris submarines to proposed new force, this would fall short of minimum degree participation by UK required. Failure UK participate substantially in MLF could be taken by Germans as form of discrimination—MLF was considered by British as being good enough for Germany but not good enough for UK.
Exchange of views between Gordon Walker and U.S. officials did not clarify exact reason Labor Government’s opposition to British participation in mixed-manned element. Both financial and political considerations were mentioned by Gordon Walker. Point he stressed most repeatedly as real problem with MLF was that it would not satisfy Germany in long run.
[Page 95]Gordon Walker agreed at end of conversation that it was highly desirable that initiative for creation of new force, if British decided to put forth firm proposals, should come from UK and Germany, rather than U.S. and UK. No direct or implied commitment was made either by U.S. or UK participants in view mutual recognition UK thinking still tentative. Secretary welcomed “ferment of ideas” on nuclear matters taking place in Labor Government.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF(MLF). Secret; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by Thomas M. Judd (EUR/BNA), cleared by Tyler, and approved and initialed by Ball. Also sent to London, Moscow, Paris for the Ambassador and Finletter, and Rome.↩
- Memoranda of Gordon Walker’s conversations are ibid., Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 2439–2440.↩