Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIV, Soviet Union

144. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State¹

Moscow, December 13, 1965, 1645Z.

1924. Embtels 524 and 1893, Deptel 1461.²

1. There is nothing in the minor realignment of Soviet leadership occurring here last week which leads me to see any prospective changes in Soviet policy. I doubt that Mikoyan any longer had important part in policy formulation, and his not unexpected retirement therefore of little significance. We all seem agreed that Podgorny’s assumption of titular presidency probably means he is less effective rival for Brezhnev’s power, and that Shelepin’s restriction to party work has brought him more immediately under Brezhnev’s control, even though latter’s long-term potentiality for eventual power may prove to have been enhanced. Indeed, net effect of these and other changes suggests a moderate strengthening of present leadership as result of apparent improvement of Brezhnev’s position and fact that Kosygin’s status does not seem to have been affected.

2. Nor is there anything in economic and political statements accompanying these changes which suggests any important shift in Soviet foreign policy. Gromyko’s long speech to supreme Soviet was restatement of familiar arguments, mainly against FedRep, and charted no new ground. We can perhaps take some comfort therefore from expectation that Soviet leaders’ present deliberate policies will remain in effect, and that one of their chief continuing concerns will be to avoid military conflict with U.S. in Southeast Asia.

3. At same time, there has been disturbing increase in level of noise directed against us in last few weeks. We are now in midst, of another series of public meetings being staged throughout the country in protest against our “aggression” in Viet Nam, and I am sure we were spared another massive demonstration and perhaps attack against Embassy premises last Wednesday³ only because of lesson learned when the last one on March 4 got out of hand and Soviet authorities decided to hold these demonstrations in safer sections of Moscow. Kosygin’s intemperate interview with Reston, uncompromising line he and others are taking toward U.S. in their talks with Stewart and other visitors, arbitrary travel ban in effect on our entire military staff, expulsion of Washington Post correspondent, continuing blight on exchanges-these are fairly stark features of our bilateral relations today and they are unrelieved by actions or statements looking in other direction.

4. It may be that one element helping to account for this sharper tone is Moscow’s concern that we may be on eve of another escalation in Viet Nam war and its possible extension to Laos, which would give Soviet leadership yet another painful dilemma in terms of its putative leadership of world Communist movement, on one hand, and its reluctance to increase both scale and scope of aid to its Communist allies, on the other. Moscow’s dispute with Peking, however, continues to be mainspring governing Soviet behavior, and it seems to be as true as it is irrational that the harder Peking presses Moscow, the more violently Moscow lashes out at us. Since it is also true that the more powerless the Soviet leaders feel themselves to be in affecting the outcome in Viet Nam, the greater their manifestation of hostility toward us, I fear we have nothing to look forward to but a great deal more of the same in the foreseeable months ahead.

Kohler

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 15 USSR. Confidential. Also sent to all East European posts, Berlin, and Hong Kong, and repeated to Saigon, Paris, London, Bonn, and Rome.
2. Telegram 524 has not been found. Telegram 1893, December 10, offered comments on recent changes in the Supreme Soviet requested in telegram 1461, December 9. (Both ibid.)
3. December 8.