Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIV, Soviet Union

213. Special National Intelligence Estimate¹

SNIE 11–11–67

Washington, May 4, 1967.

SOVIET ATTITUDES AND INTENTIONS TOWARD THE VIETNAM WAR

The Problem

To examine the USSR’s policies toward the Vietnam war and its views of relevant US policies, and to estimate Soviet intentions in relation to that conflict.

Conclusions

A. While the Soviet leaders see the war as advantageous to them in many ways, they also see disadvantages which make their options unpromising and hazardous. They probably believe that there is no prospect of movement toward a political solution for several months at best and appear to have concluded that for the time being they have no alternative but to help Hanoi to carry on the war, hoping that changes of attitude in either Hanoi or Washington, or both, will make a political solution possible later.

B. The Soviet leaders fear that the US, in its impatience to get the war over, will escalate the conflict in a way which will increase the risks and costs for the USSR; in an effort to forestall this they are currently stressing their intention to move to more vigorous support of North Vietnam. We believe that during the coming months they will continue to supply equipment designed to strengthen air and coastal defenses in North Vietnam and to increase the firepower of both the regular North Vietnamese forces and the Communist forces fighting in the South.

C. Whether or not there are formal arrangements covering the transit of Soviet supplies across China, we believe that Peking will not pose serious obstacles to such transit. But the relations between Moscow and Peking are still fundamentally hostile, and their attitudes toward major issues of war and peace in Vietnam will continue to differ profoundly.

D. The North Vietnamese at some point will probably press the Soviets for more sophisticated equipment than those types now arriving on the scene or in the pipeline. These might include cruise missiles and tactical rockets which could be used to support North Vietnamese operations in the DMZ area and against US warships. The USSR might believe it had to respond to such pressure, although it would be concerned that the use of such weapons would provoke a still more dangerous US response.

E. If the intensity of the conflict were to be increased by the US, we believe that at some point the USSR would create an atmosphere of heightened tension with the US. The Soviets might take certain actions designed to bolster North Vietnam and to warn the US, such as the provision of limited numbers of volunteers or crews for defense equipment or possibly aircraft. They might also break off negotiations with the US on various subjects and suspend certain agreements now in effect. The mining or the blockade of the North Vietnamese coast would be most likely to provoke these responses, since this would constitute a direct challenge to the Soviets, and there would be little they could do on the scene. We do not think the Soviets are prepared to resort to strong and direct threats of general war as a means to protect North Vietnam or to preserve Soviet face.

F. There would also be a good chance that at some juncture the Soviets would exert strong efforts toward a political solution, but they would probably not make Hanoi’s acceptance of talks an explicit condition of continued material support.

[Here follow 5 pages of Discussion and a 4-page Annex.]

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, National Intelligence Estimates, 11–67. Secret; No Foreign Dissem; Controlled Dissem. Submitted by the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence and concurred in by the United States Intelligence Board. An explanatory note indicates that the SNIE was prepared at the request of the Department of State. In telegram CAP 67378 to President Johnson at his Texas ranch, May 5, Walt Rostow transmitted the full text of SNIE 11–11–67, noting that the President had already received the summary of “this thoughtful report” that morning. The telegram is marked with an “L,” indicating that the President saw it. (Ibid., Country File, Vietnam, Vol. LXX)