Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIV, Soviet Union

305. Telegram From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson in Texas¹

Washington, September 22, 1968, 1623Z.

CAP 82463. I now rate the possibilities of a positive response from Moscow and enough from Hanoi to proceed as one in three or one in four—no higher, but no lower.

On that still highly contingent basis, I thought you might wish to look at a draft statement announcing your decisions and your movements, to see how certain key sensitive matters might be dealt with:

• —The GVN, whose stability and sense of confidence must be preserved;
• —The Czech question;
• —The NATO issue;
• —The nature and limits of our understanding on the bombing cessation, so that your hands would not be tied should you have to resume.

At some point the Norwegians would have to step before the world and say Hanoi promised them no violation of the DMZ and prompt, serious, sincere negotiations.

Also, once the bombing stops, we have to push Moscow very hard to press for peace and to take a firm, unambiguous position to clear up Laos.

I have given thought to Bangkok; first or last?

The advantage of seeing the troop contributors immediately is obvious; but we will not know then:

• —The immediate post–bombing state of the Paris talks;
• —What the Russians are—and are not—prepared to do post–bombing, towards peace in Southeast Asia.

Therefore, I now lean to: Geneva; Brussels; Bangkok.

The advantage of Geneva first is to hold the Soviet feet to the fire on delivering in Paris, on Laos, etc. they have always said they could do more if we stopped bombing. We’ve got to nail it down in the first flush of the event.

I calculate something like this:

• —By the end of this week we shall know whether Moscow and Hanoi will give us enough to proceed.
• —Once you make a decision, it will take a few days to work out the scenario here, a few further days to get Bunker, Thieu, and Abrams abroad; get dates set for the Russians; inform Hanoi, if we so decide, so they can get out military and diplomatic instructions;
• —I would guess you would want about three days in Geneva, two in Brussels, perhaps a stop in Paris: two days in Bangkok. With flying time, etc. perhaps eleven days. If talks opened in Geneva, for example, on October 7, you could be home for the weekend of October 19–20, I should guess.

Draft contingent text follows, which I have not showed to Sec. Rusk because of its highly tentative status.

DRAFT CONTINGENCY PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT

In recent weeks there have been intense private contacts, direct and indirect, with the authorities in Hanoi, including private meetings in Paris. There have also been a series of exchanges with the leaders of the Soviet Union. As a result of these exchanges, I have reached two conclusions.

First, I now judge that we have reason to believe the cessation of the bombardment of North Vietnam by U.S. forces could take place under conditions which involve no increase in the risk of casualties to the forces of the United States or to our allies.

I also have reason to believe that such a cessation of bombardment could lead to serious discussions which would move the war in Vietnam towards a settlement.

It is extremely important that the President not mislead our own people, our allies, or the world at large about these conclusions. We have made real progress, but I cannot guarantee at this stage the precise military or diplomatic behavior of the authorities in Hanoi after a bombing cessation. We shall have to assess that behavior with respect to military operations and diplomatic performance very carefully in the days ahead. But the other side knows well that our eyes will be focused on three specific matters:

• —First, on whether the demilitarized zone is respected by their side as well as by our side;
• —Second, whether there are attacks on the cities of South Vietnam. These could have the gravest consequences for the environment of diplomatic talks;
• —Third, whether, in the light of the diplomatic positions we have already conveyed to the other side at great length, there are very prompt, serious negotiations looking towards the earliest possible peace in Vietnam and Southeast Asia. There can be no political settlement in South Vietnam without the full participation of the Government of Vietnam. We appear to agree with the authorities in Hanoi that the political settlement in South Vietnam must be reached by the people of South Vietnam—and that means the elected constitutional Government of South Vietnam must play a leading role. There can be no definitive settlement of the Demilitarized Zone and other matters relating to the Geneva Accords of 1954 and 1962 without the full participation of the Government of Vietnam.

The bombardment of North Vietnam will cease on ——. We expect the new phase of serious, substantive discussion to open in Paris the next day, ——.

Let everyone be clear: The objective of what we are doing–the test–is prompt and serious movement towards peace. The bloodshed in Southeast Asia must end.

The second decision at which I have arrived is that it is my duty now to meet with the Soviet leadership to open discussions on offensive and defensive strategic weapons and to discuss other matters which might advance peace in the world.

I first raised the question of limiting the arms race in strategic weapons with the Soviet Union in mid–January 1964. There is no single more important question before the Soviet Union and the United States. There is no single matter on which progress would contribute more to a sense of confidence and the possibility of peace throughout the world. In addition, success would free vast resources for productive purposes. I went into this question with Premier Kosygin at very great length at Glassboro in June 1967. He agreed then, in principle, that such talks would take place; but there was a long delay in fixing the time and place for the opening of these talks. We have now agreed that the talks shall open on——in Geneva. I shall lead the American delegation, using the occasion, as I indicated, for conversations on other critical matters bearing on peace throughout the world. These other matters will include peace in Southeast Asia–where the Soviet Union bears important responsibilities as co–chairman of the Geneva Conferences of 1954 and 1962—and the Middle East, where it is my hope that in the weeks ahead all governments will contribute to the limit of their capacity and imagination in backing the mission of Ambassador Jarring and achieving a breakthrough towards peace in the Middle East.

In making this decision, two factors have weighed heavily on my mind.

The first was the future of the people of Czechoslovakia. As I have said before, the entrance of Warsaw Pact forces into Czechoslovakia was a tragic event and a setback to men’s hopes everywhere for peace, moderation, and the gradual easing of tensions in Central Europe. It was a dangerous event because it brought into Central Europe substantial additional Soviet forces threatening to upset the military equilibrium. Events of recent days have somewhat eased, but not ended the tensions and danger in Central Europe.

I have had, therefore, to ask myself this question: would talks with the Soviet Union on strategic missiles and other matters hurt or help the people of Czechoslovakia—and, in a larger sense, would they help or hurt the men and women throughout all of Europe? I have concluded that the issue of curbing the strategic arms race and carrying forward the struggle to lift from mankind the threat of nuclear war is such an overriding issue that we should now go forward. The future of the men and women and children of Czechoslovakia is as much bound up in this matter as the future of the human beings in every corner of the world.

The second consideration which has weighed upon me, bore on my responsibilities and those of my successor. I have asked myself this question: would it be right to open these talks when it is likely that the negotiations will stretch out into the time when another man bears the responsibilities of the Presidency?

I have concluded that it is right to carry forward to the stage of initial negotiation this enterprise which I launched almost five years ago. I am comforted in doing so because the position our negotiators will take to the discussions is one agreed in detail by the military and civil authorities throughout the United States Government. We are going in on solid ground. My successor will be in a position—should the negotiations proceed into his time, as I expect—to lay his hand on critical matters that may have to be faced before a final agreement is reached.

We have, of course, kept our fighting allies informed of the course of the negotiations in Paris. They have been informed also of the circumstances which have led me to conclude that it is now worth taking the risks of a total cessation of bombardment of North Vietnam. Nevertheless, we are seven governments which have been in the trenches together. We shall be fighting side by side still in the weeks ahead, while working shoulder to shoulder equally for a stable, honorable peace in Southeast Asia. And beyond that we shall be together—with many others—in helping build the security and prosperity of the whole region in the postwar years.

Therefore, after consultation with the governments concerned, I have thought it wise to meet with the leaders of South Vietnam, Korea, Thailand, Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand. We shall be gathering in Bangkok on——to share our thoughts on the war, on negotiations, and on the future stability and prosperity of Southeast Asia.

The evolution of events in Central Europe, the Middle East, and Asia are, of course, of great concern to our NATO allies. They also have a vital interest in the problem of seeking to limit strategic weapons between the United States and the Soviet Union.

We have been in the closest consultation through NATO since the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia, examining together the implications for the defense of the West of that action. In the light of those consultations and in the light of developments I am describing to you tonight, I have suggested to the NATO leaders that we might all meet in Brussels on ——.

We have clearly come to a critical moment in the history of this very small planet. As your President, I have made the pursuit of a stable peace—with honor and dignity for all—my first concern since my first day in office. As I set out now to these three meetings, on my final pilgrimage for peace, I ask for your support and your prayers.

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Chlodnick File. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only; Literally Eyes Only for the President. The telegram is marked with a “ps,” indicating that the President saw it. The President flew to his Texas ranch on September 19 and returned to Washington on September 24. (Ibid., President’s Daily Diary)