Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XV, Germany and Berlin

103. National Intelligence Estimate¹

NIE 23–65

Washington, April 22, 1965.

PROSPECTS FOR WEST GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY

The Problem

To estimate the principal trends in West German foreign policy during the next two years or so.

Conclusions

A. West German leaders are becoming increasingly impatient to adopt a more self-reliant, distinctively German, foreign policy. Conscious of their country’s growing economic and military strength, they are eager to attain a more influential position within the Western Alliance and a greater share in the formulation of Western defense and nuclear policies. At the same time, they are anxious to impart momentum, if necessary on their own, toward the reunification of their country. Whatever the outcome of the national election this fall, we believe that during the next two years or so these tendencies will be reflected in a more assertive style and some differences of emphasis in foreign policy. Nevertheless, barring important external developments, the West German government will probably be constrained by practical considerations—notably the rigidity of the power relationship in Europe—from making any major changes in the basic lines of policy. (Paras. 1–11)

B. Specifically, we believe that West Germany will retain its present commitments in Europe and the Western Alliance for the period of this estimate, and will continue to depend on US nuclear power to protect the integrity of its borders and those of West Berlin. Though we expect sympathy to grow for de Gaulle’s idea of “Europe for the Europeans,” with some accompanying interest in a European nuclear force, West Germany’s strong defense ties with the US will almost certainly prevent a significant shift away from present defense policy during the next two years or so. (Paras. 12–19)

C. In policy toward the Communist world the new West German administration will be likely to make more vigorous attempts than its predecessor to take the initiative. This will almost certainly include further efforts to expand the West German position in Eastern Europe. It may also be reflected in moves to resolve the German question by direct discussions with the Soviet leaders and additional steps to “normalize” relations with East Germany. Yet substantial progress in any of these spheres is unlikely unless an important shift occurs in Soviet policy toward Germany; a marked acceleration in the trend toward independence or internal “liberalization” in Eastern Europe could also open up new opportunities for West Germany in the area. (Paras. 20–23)

D. Beyond the period of this estimate, we believe the potentiality for important changes in West German foreign policy will increase. In the event of rapid or fundamental changes outside Germany—e.g., in the Communist world or the Western Alliance—West German leaders may find themselves in a position to act independently in a way which would importantly affect the interests of their allies, favorably or adversely. For example, if the Soviets eventually are forced by events to reassess their position in Europe, this might open the way for a West German-Soviet agreement to resolve the German question at the expense of the East German regime and perhaps of Bonn’s Western allies. Or future West German leaders might be tempted to seek to exploit popular frustration over the absence of visible movement toward reunification and might thus tend to revive German chauvinism and the appeal of a boisterous and intolerant extremism.² (Paras. 26–28)

[Here follows the 9-page Discussion section.]

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, National Intelligence Estimates. Secret; Controlled Dissemination. The estimate was prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency, the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the National Security Agency and concurred in by the U.S. Intelligence Board.
2. The Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, feels that this Conclusion does not adequately represent either the negative or positive possibilities over the longer term. In particular, it fails to note such possible favorable developments as a post-de Gaulle softening of French opposition toward European integration, significant progress toward reunification consistent with US interests in a changed international context, continuing economic prosperity, and especially the attraction of a strong political-military tie to the US. Moreover, the Conclusion omits such critically important adverse possibilities (mentioned in Para. 27) as major disturbances in Alliance relations, which could cause Bonn to reopen fundamental questions of defense policy. [Footnote in the source text.]