Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XV, Germany and Berlin

108. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State¹

Bonn, May 4, 1965, 1824Z.

4349. Embtels 4347, 4348.² Subj: “Meeting with FonMin Schroeder: Initiative on the German problem.”

In my conversation today with FonMin Schroeder, he expressed himself as follows in response to a question I put to him regarding his intentions on a reunification initiative. I asked whether, for example, he would press for an initiative before the German elections.

The FonMin said that he disliked the term “initiative without substance.” The Germans do not have in mind any such initiative, which could he thought be severely criticized. The German position is that they still have tabled before the AG their revised peace plan of August 1963,³ with subsequently agreed revisions. Following discussions in the AG it was the FonMin’s impression that at the NATO meeting before last, held at The Hague, the other three powers had “almost” agreed to the German publication of their proposal as a German plan. It had been his expectation that the plan, moreover, would be given some type of separate national support by the other three, although the FonMin did not seem clear just what this would constitute.

Rather than proceed virtually alone, however, the FRG had subsequently proposed at the Paris NATO meeting in December 1964,⁴ that the Four-Power Council proposal be put forward as an initial step which would hopefully lead to the ultimate acceptance of their revised 1963 peace plan in its entirety. They considered this substitute initial proposal also still to be before the AG. Following the Secretary of State’s backgrounder of last December, however, and the subsequent explanation of the US position by the US representative on the AG, the Germans concluded that they would be expected to agree in advance to concrete positions on such vital questions as boundaries and security measures, before we would be willing to proceed with their Four-Power Council proposal.

The Germans are, according to the FonMin, ready for frank discussions on these questions at any time there is an indication of real interest on the part of the Soviets. Since the Soviets at present display no interest, he does not consider it feasible for the Germans to agree to proposals in the AG which would probably become known and merely serve to solidify the status quo. The Germans are forced into a position of “rebus sic stantibus.” As a result, the Germans’ immediate objective is to revive the concept of Four-Power responsibility for Germany as a whole. In the Four-Power Council proposal they see a way of forcing a statement of the Soviet position on this question.

For tactical reasons they are not, however, pushing this proposal at the present time, but have withdrawn to the position of asking what proposals the other three have to offer. In the meantime, however, they consider that both the peace plan and Four-Power Council proposals are still before the AG. In the meantime, having Gromyko’s remarks on frontiers and denuclearization⁵ go unchallenged in Paris greatly weakens the German and Western positions. If these concepts spread to Eastern Europe, there will be a psychological deterioration in the status of the FedRep even before it becomes a united Germany.

McGhee

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files,POL GER W–US. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to Paris, London, and Moscow.
2. Telegram 4347 from Bonn was not found. Telegram 4348 from Bonn, May 4, reported Schroeder’s assessment of French attitudes on German unification. (Ibid.)
3. For text, see Europa Archiv, 1963, vol. 2, pp. 437–438. A copy is attached to an August 10 memorandum from Klein to Bundy in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Germany.
4. See Document 75.
5. Reference is to April 30 remarks at conclusion of Gromyko’s visit to France. For text, see Current Digest of the Soviet Press, May 26, 1965, p. 29.