Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XV, Germany and Berlin

132. Memorandum From Henry Kissinger to the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bator)¹

Cambridge, Massachusetts, November 22, 1965.

At your request, I am sending you some observations on Schroeder and Von Hassel.

Psychoanalyzing foreign statesmen is a notoriously difficult task. In the Federal Republic it is complicated further by the fact that the political spectrum has been distorted by the defeat in World War II and the trauma of the Nazi period. Traditional nationalism has had to find a home in middle-of-the-road parties and must be pursued with more embracing slogans—of which Atlanticism is one.

Schroeder and Von Hassel seem to me to fit this generalization: Schroeder as an active manipulator, Von Hassel in a more passive role. Both are North German, Protestant, Prussian—distrustful of France, nostalgic towards Britain, profoundly national in orientation. Strauss is a condottiere: he wants the maximum influence of whatever unit he represents and he will be brutal in pursuing it. But he has no particular interest where the frontiers of this unit are. Schroeder and Von Hassel feel personally unfulfilled as long as Germany remains divided. Schroeder told an absolutely reliable acquaintance of mine once: “Not a day goes by but that I think of Koenigsberg (now the Soviet city of Kalinengrad) as a German city.”

These primary objectives must always be kept in mind in explaining Schroeder’s—and to a lesser extent—Von Hassel’s nationalism. Schroeder is anti-French because he considers it foolish to subordinate Germany to a second-class European power and a traditional enemy to boot. In building up Germany he wants to rely on the most modern technology. His vision of Atlanticism may go something like this: If the United States supports German national aims, Germany will have the backing of the strongest country in the West. If the United States fails to do so, the Federal Republic will have become the strongest European country with American help. It will be in a position to be the dominant country in Western Europe. German national interest—not the integrationist concept of Atlanticism—may thus be the driving force.

Schroeder’s record indicates that he is a cool operator, proud of his tactical skill, determined not to be in an exposed position. Every gaffe of Erhard’s has been accompanied by press leaks from his Foreign Minister absolving himself of responsibility. It is also well to remember that until 1961 Schroeder as Minister of Interior stood on the Right Wing of the CDU. He was detested by the SPD; indeed grouped by them with Strauss as their arch-enemy. He was a staunch supporter of Adenauer. Within months of being appointed Foreign Minister in 1961—on the basis of his presumed loyalty to Adenauer—he began undercutting the Chancellor and wooing the Socialists. Schroeder is not an ally on which to count when the going gets tough—as Hallstein is learning now.

As for Von Hassel, it is well to remember that he returned to Germany from East Africa at the height of the Nazi period. This does not make him a Nazi—it can be explained in a non-Nazi only by very strong nationalism.

To sum up: We are playing recklessly with fire. France is difficult but it has no unfulfilled national aims. Germany is in a different position. Its goals must be revisionist. Its leaders are growing increasingly assertive—partly because of American encouragement. We are substituting a German for a French problem, one that will prove much more dangerous in the years ahead.

1. Source: Johnson Library, Bator Papers, Erhard Visit 1965. No classification marking. According to notes attached to the source text, which is marked “For White House Use Only,” Bator passed the memorandum on to Bundy who “noted” it.