Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XV, Germany and Berlin

161. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State¹

Bonn, August 17, 1966, 1740Z.

2012. Subject: The state of German-American relations seen from Bonn.

1. A calm has descended over Bonn. The captains, kings, and just plain politicians have departed on their summer holidays, and most items in the press are likely to be a regurgitation of the old rather than a revelation of the new. Against this setting, it may be useful to attempt some assessment of where we now stand in our relations with the Germans and what we may expect when political activity resumes in September.

2. It is realistic, I believe, to describe the present German state of mind with respect to the United States as clearly unhealthy. We are not experiencing one of those sharp crises of confidence in which there was always an element of the synthetic. The old Chancellor himself helped to generate and stimulate these periodic eruptions by leaks, statements to the press and public maneuvering, until at last some point of resolution was reached and the whole thing subsided. The present difficulties, I would judge, run somewhat deeper, are more widespread than in the past, and reflect in part the general sense of change Europe caused by limited détente with the Soviets and de Gaulle’s challenge to the post-war institutional structure. What we now have in Germany is a nagging concern about the United States and a fading confidence in the clarity of our purposes in Europe, added to a feeling that the Germans are being victimized and are being treated by us in a way not consonant with their primary role as loyal allies or their future importance to a realization of U.S. policy objectives in Europe.

3. The term “Pruegelknabe” (whipping boy) is frequently heard when Germans describe their current international position. They believe that their behavior in recent years has been good, both comparatively and absolutely. They see themselves as having fought the good fight in the EEC and for the Kennedy Round, even in the face of strong pressures from German agricultural interests. In NATO they believe that they have done well militarily and have generally been at our side on Alliance issues, despite the divisive internal effects which too strong a line against the French inevitably brings with it. They feel they have done more than any other country officially to support our position in Viet Nam. Yet they see themselves singled out and criticized for anticipated, though not yet actual, failure to meet an offset which we obtain from no other country; they believe their security to be threatened by alleged plans for large-scale American troop withdrawals, and are only confused when a denial one day is followed the next day by a new and to them more horrendous press report from Washington. At the same time their primary national objective of reunification remains as much of a will-o-the-wisp as ever, and they see little enthusiasm anywhere to do anything about it. However, exaggerated these views may be, this is the way the Germans, with their capacity for self-pity, size up the situation.

4. It is problematical how widespread such sentiments are. The average German has other preoccupations, but we would guess that most politicians, journalists and other molders of opinion share them to a greater or lesser degree. The SPD is in a relatively confident mood at present. The CDU and the government, on the other hand, are uncertain, fearful of their political future, and therefore extremely sensitive to anything, such as U.S. words or actions, which can become the basis of further internal criticism. There is fairly reliable evidence that Chancellor Erhard himself, harassed as he is on a number of fronts and struggling to maintain control over a fluid political situation, is feeling abused and nursing a certain sense of grievance over “disappointing” U.S. conduct. Stories reach us that certain of his advisers openly express anti-U.S. sentiments, and a general querulousness seems to prevail in evaluating U.S. policies.

5. Such a psychological atmosphere encourages a number of reactions, all of them unfavorable to our interests. It enables the Gaullists to argue that, since the U.S. is proving unreliable in Europe, the Germans should come to terms with France at any cost. The Chancellor is criticized as a stooge of the United States, who not only does not get anything for Germany, but has his own political position undermined by U.S. threats and actions. Hence he must lean over backwards to avoid the charge that he is being subservient to the U.S. A few politicians are now beginning to go so far as to react irrationally, exclaiming that if the United States is going to be so unreasonable, to insist on its offset pound of flesh and to make threats of troop withdrawals, despite its own clear security interests in Europe, then let the United States get out and let the Europeans look to their own interests.

6. There is an essential state of confusion about American intentions during this transitional era in Europe, which has been fed in recent months by almost daily and frequently conflicting press reports from Washington. During 1966 the Germans have received a heavy dose of rumors and reports about American plans for massive troop withdrawals, complicated by misunderstandings about the temporary shortfall of 15,000 troops in the 7th Army, frequent U.S. Senatorial statements about the need to pull our troops back from Europe, and the whole complicated issue of the offset which has now achieved the dubious role of being the single most upsetting factor in German-American relations. This has coincided with American attacks on the quality of the Bundeswehr; American criticism of German transactions with the Red Chinese, including a Senate resolution; German fears about U.S. intentions on non-proliferation; continuing differences over Allied defense strategy which have received much publicity in the Federal Republic; the NATO crisis precipitated by France which has put the German Government under heavy strain; and finally the growing conviction that the U.S. is being drawn more and more away from Europe into Asia or into a form of neo-isolationism.

7. The U.S. is on the receiving end of most uniformly unfavorable press and TV coverage of Viet Nam—chiefly from American news sources—which, despite continuing official German gestures of support, is bound to damage our reputation. Viet Nam is not, however, an essential factor in the present malaise, except in the sense that it is considered to have distracted us from our responsibilities in Europe.

8. As good a friend of the United States and of our post-war policies as Bundestag Deputy Kurt Birrenbach recently called on me to air his concerns. He said that he and those who stood for the same things were very discouraged. They simply could not understand what the United States was up to. If the present trend continued, this group would have no choice but to remain silent in the face of the opposition to American policies which would dominate in the Federal Republic.

9. I do not wish to dramatize a situation which is in no sense out of control. Psychological moods in Germany are mercurial, and given a few good breaks this fall, Erhard’s confidence could be restored and much that now seems black would quickly become gray. However, I do think we have reached the point where we have to be conscious that statements which we make and actions which we take will have magnified causal effects within a very troubled atmosphere.

10. If this analysis is correct, then a major U.S. objective in the months to come should be to restore that feeling of trust and confidence which is basic to the achievement of our own policy interests in relations with Germany. The forthcoming Erhard visit to Washington could play a crucial role in this process. The agenda outlined in Bonn 286² continues to be pertinent. A conscious effort will be required on our part to right the situation, for we have little to gain and much to lose if we allow the present drift to continue. With such an effort, it should be possible to restore German-American relations to a healthier condition without which we can scarcely face confidently those developments in Europe which the next few years are likely to bring.³

Hillenbrand

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files,POL GER W–US. Confidential; Limdis.
2. Document 156.
3. Ambassador McGhee endorsed the analysis in this message in telegram 2478 from Bonn, August 29. (Department of State, Central Files, POL GER W–US)