243. Letter From the First Secretary of Embassy in Germany (Imhof) to the Director of the Office of German Affairs (Puhan)1
Dear Al:
I am giving you below a brief account of the conversations which Professor Henry Kissinger had here during a brief stay. Henry asked me [Page 618] to send a copy to Ben Read with whom he will discuss the matter further and requested that this account be closely held.
Henry was here on January 9 and left at noon on January 10. He said that during this period he saw, at his request, Finance Minister Strauss, All-German Affairs Minister Wehner, Parliamentary State Secretary Guttenberg, and, at their request, Chancellor Kiesinger and Defense Minister Schroeder. Chancellor Kiesinger left the Cabinet meeting on January 10 for 3/4 of an hour in order to see Henry. Guttenberg, whom Henry had seen earlier separately, was present during the meeting with Chancellor Kiesinger.
The NPT.
Mr. Kissinger said that both Strauss and Guttenberg remained adamantly opposed to an NPT in any form. Strauss said that he had once written to the Chancellor that he would resign from the Cabinet if an NPT was signed and that he continued to adhere to this position. If it came to that, there would then be the beginnings of a conservative party. Strauss observed that the opponents of the NPT and conservative elements in general were simply waiting for the moment when a nationally known figure would take the lead.
Barring such a development, Strauss said that he would adhere to his tactics of remaining silent on issues outside of his direct field of responsibility. He said he was frequently being chided by his adherents for maintaining silence but he was convinced that these tactics were sound. He observed that given Chancellor Kiesinger’s age and temperament the question of succession would eventually arise. It was clear that Strauss believed that by remaining silent his chances to become Kiesinger’s eventual successor would improve.
Mr. Kissinger said that Chancellor Kiesinger was more cautious on the NPT. He stressed that German views must be taken fully into account and that he would have to see the full text of the treaty before he could reach a final decision. Mr. Kissinger reported his impression during his talks in Moscow that the Soviets appeared interested in signing an NPT and were hinting at the possibility of a compromise. Since he had not been there in any official capacity it was difficult to evaluate the significance of these hints. Chancellor Kiesinger appeared to be somewhat concerned by this and emphasized again the need for German views to be taken fully into account.
Mr. Kissinger said that Wehner was the only minister with whom he had talked who had been positive with regard to the NPT.
Europe.
Strauss made it clear that the FRG would not undertake any cooperation with the UK and the other five that would antagonize the French. [Page 619] He said this was also the Chancellor’s position. Chancellor Kiesinger later confirmed this.
Both the Chancellor and Strauss said that in the next round of discussions with de Gaulle in February an attempt would be made to explore whether progress on greater European political unity could be made, presumably along the lines of the Fouchet plan. Strauss will accompany the Chancellor on this trip.
Schroeder, on the other hand, continued to be in favor of a tough line toward the French and cooperation between the FRG, the UK and the other five.
The Offset.
Strauss said that “not a cent” could come from the budget. On the other hand, it would be possible to make arrangements through the Bundesbank for the purchase of about 1 billion worth of medium, preferably short term, but under no circumstances long term bonds. Mr. Kissinger was not sure whether Strauss, when mentioning the 1 billion figure, was talking in terms of dollars or DM, but he believed it was the latter.
Schroeder said that regrettably no funds could come out of the defense budget. The situation had been easier when the FRG was still making massive arms purchases but this was now no longer feasible.
Vietnam.
The Chancellor told Mr. Kissinger that Foreign Minister Brandt had written to the Secretary about the recent SPD statement on Vietnam.2 The Chancellor said that he would be writing separately to the President, assuring him that the Federal Government had no intention of criticizing, or interfering with, US actions in this area and that the Government’s position remained as he had outlined it in his press conference after his return from his Washington visit. Mr. Kissinger said that it was erroneous to believe that a premature US withdrawal from Vietnam would lead to an increased US presence in Europe; the same forces which were advocating a withdrawal from Vietnam were also in favor of a reduced US role in Europe. The Chancellor took note of this.
Wehner expressed a certain degree of impatience with the SPD statement on Vietnam which he considered the result of short-sighted local politics.
Miscellaneous Observations.
Mr. Kissinger said that he was struck by Chancellor Kiesinger’s repeated references to German independence. The Chancellor had said at one point that he understood his role to be to “protect German interests [Page 620] rather than to execute Atlantic policies.” The Chancellor apparently made this remark when discussing attempts to turn NATO into an instrument for détente about which be showed some irritation. Mr. Kissinger said that the Chancellor showed much interest in ABMs and wondered why Germany could not have such a system.
Mr. Kissinger said that Schroeder looked physically fit. It was obvious from Schroeder’s remarks that he was strongly opposed to the Grand Coalition and the SPD, to whom he always referred to as “The Left.”
I think it was of particular interest that Strauss continues to adhere to the position that he will break with the Chancellor if the NPT is signed. The Chancellor is looking for a broad consensus within the CDU/CSU on this issue and would, I believe, not let it come to a break with Strauss over the NPT unless there were massive counter pressure from the SPD which cannot be taken for granted.
With all best wishes.
Sincerely,