Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XV, Germany and Berlin

247. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State¹

Bonn, February 20, 1968, 1930Z.

8568. CEDTO, BUSEC. Subj: Ambassador’s call on FonMin Brandt. I called on FonMin Brandt today at my request. It was my first opportunity to see him—or for that matter any high official—since the German-French meeting in Paris on Feb. 15 and 16. Brandt departs on Feb. 22 for a four-day visit to Morocco. The following subjects were discussed. UK entry will be the subject of a septel.²

1. US balance of payments and offset—I reviewed briefly the presentations made by Under Secretaries Rostow and Deming and Amb Trezise during their recent visits on the US balance of payments and offset problems. I stressed the importance that the US Govt attaches to the success of the President’s program, announced Jan 1,³ to redress our adverse payments balance. We were considering in this connection a number of measures in the general area of border tax adjustments. It is our sincere desire that this be accomplished without restriction of trade, however, our ability to do so and at the same time to stave off the protectionist measures proposed in our Congress will depend in large degree on the assistance given us by our trading partners. In particular it is our hope that the surplus countries, including Germany, will as agreed in the OECD take appropriate measures to increase imports and encourage the flow of long-term investment capital abroad.

In connection with the offset, I expressed appreciation for the reception accorded our reps. The meetings in Bonn had revealed no serious difference of views between us on this issue, and Under Secretaries Rostow and Deming had been well received by Pres. Blessing of the Bundesbank. We had made clear that our objective during fiscal 68/69, which can be achieved largely through purchase of medium-term securities, is a full neutralization of our foreign exchange losses resulting from our forces in Germany—$775 million. Although the final negotiation, which lay ahead, would be between the Bundesbank and the US Treasury, I hoped that the German Govt would support our objectives with the Bundesbank in whatever way was appropriate.

In response, Brandt said that the Chancellor himself had, in their recent meeting, raised with de Gaulle the possible acceleration of the Kennedy Round tariff concessions. However, the French reaction was totally negative. French FonMin Debre had advised de Gaulle that such action would be “illegal”. German EconMin Schiller had difficult discussions on this point, to no avail, with his French opposite members.

2. East/West issues—I told Brandt that we are concerned by allegations recently made in the press of American misgivings over German Eastern policy. I assured him that this was not the case. We had stressed the importance we continued to attach to Four-Power responsibility in Berlin—and the risks of any bilateral Soviet-German negotiations on Berlin. However, Brandt had himself assured us quite adequately on this point. Apart from this issue we welcomed direct discussions between the Germans and the Soviets on issues outstanding between them, as well as continued German efforts to improve relations with the EE countries and the recent establishment of relations with Yugoslavia. We had every confidence that the Germans would continue to keep us advised of their discussions with the Soviets and would consult with us in connection with any matter involving Allied interests. I pointed out that I had in my contacts with German officials detected some uncertainty resulting from the article by Zbigniew Brzezinski, former member of the Dept’s Planning Council, in the January Foreign Affairs.⁴ I assured Brandt that this article did not reflect State Dept policy and that Brzezinski was no longer associated with the Dept.

Brandt expressed appreciation for the assurance given him on the American attitude toward German E/W policy. I asked Brandt what new moves he contemplated in the E/W arena, in particular what answer the German Govt proposed to make to the Soviet memo of Jan. 29 on mutual force reduction. He said that there is a draft reply to the Sov note with the Chancellor. They hope to discuss it in the Cabinet meeting tomorrow, after which they will contact the three Allied Ambassadors. In discussing the content of the reply, Brandt said that there was a view within the German Govt that they should in effect say: “Since there are so many issues on which we do not agree, we must exchange mutual renunciations of force in order to avoid conflict.” His own view and that of the FonOff is more to the effect that: “Because we disagree we must discuss the areas of our disagreement with a view to reaching some solution—not necessarily in the short-term but in the long-term.”

The Germans should, in his view, give the Sovs a complete and lengthy document giving reasonable German positions on all Eastern subjects. (Not, however, necessarily at the time of the German response to the Jan. 29 Sov memo.) There was always a danger that the Sovs might publish, with a view to making propaganda, their own interpretation of their exchanges with the Germans on E/W issues. If the Germans had presented them a paper giving reasonable positions, they would in this event be protected. The paper, moreover, could provide a basis for further exchanges of views.

Brandt pointed out that he considered it significant that Sov Amb Tsarapkin had in their talks never made it a condition for mutual force renunciation that all of the issues raised by the Sovs in their note be first resolved in their favor. Brandt thought that there was an opportunity for progress which could, even in the absence of an over-all agreement, reduce the potential danger of existing differences. For example, he thought it possible that the Germans might be able to tell the Poles they would accept the present western Polish border, until the matter could be considered in connection with a peace treaty. I informed Brandt that such an approach certainly seemed to be in the right direction.

3. Berlin—I reminded Brandt that, in addition to the note they had received from the Sovs on Berlin on January 6, the three Allies had also received notes on Feb. 16.⁵ The French note, however, was quite different from that given the Brit and ourselves. Indeed, the Sovs appeared to consider the French to be on their side. I hoped that Brandt would help urge the French to join with the Brit and ourselves in making a reply along orthodox lines, otherwise there would be a considerable strain on the excellent Three-Power solidarity which has existed in Berlin.

Brandt advised that the draft FRG reply to the Sov memorandum on Berlin was now before the All-German Affairs Committee of the Cabinet. Approval was expected tomorrow, and the text would be shown to the three Allies immediately. Brandt hoped that we could give our reaction quickly, since he considered it important to get the reply to the Sovs before the Bundestag committees begin their Berlin meetings on March 4.⁶

I asked Brandt if a final decision had been made as to whether the Defense Committee would meet in Berlin. He raised his hands in obvious disapproval. He had raised this issue with Bundestag Pres Ger-stenmeier and found that the decision that it would meet had already been made. The committee would, however, meet only during the day and would not discuss military matters, which would be reserved until they returned to Bonn. He did not like this decision and assured me that this would not happen again. I pointed out that, although we had not advised the Germans not to have the meeting since we as well as they would not wish to appear to be backtracking in the face of Sov threats, I thought his own attitude toward the matter was a wise one.

4. NPT—I referred to the Sec of State’s letter to Brandt of Feb 17 on the NPT,⁷ which had been in response to his own letter of Feb 9. Did he feel that this letter was sufficiently responsible. I also asked what if anything the French had said about NPT in their recent meeting in Paris. What were the next moves the Germans proposed to make on the NPT? Brandt replied that he considered the Secretary’s letter to be quite positive. They themselves had favored the Swedish proposal to which the Secretary’s letter referred. His inclination is not to answer the Secretary’s letter although State Sec Duckwitz will raise the NPT issue when he is in Washington next week. Some of his assistants in the FonOff are in favor of forwarding a paper to the ENDC with the full German position on NPT. He is aware, of course, that any such paper will probably be included with the ENDC report made to the UN. He would, therefore, like to show it to us first. State Sec Duckwitz will bring it with him to Washington, and they would appreciate any suggestions we might have.

The German side had raised the nuclear issue with the French during the recent meetings only in connection with EURATOM. French FonMin Couve had (not to Brandt but to someone else a day or two before) criticized French DefMin Messmer’s negative public position on NPT (reported Bonn 7612).⁸ Brandt appealed to the French to “agree or at least to acquiesce” in EURATOM to discussions between IAEA and EURATOM on verification. Couve had made no comment other than to say that, “he saw the problem.” The Quai Political Director Beaumarchais had said, however (in a separate conversation with FonOff Asst Sec Ruete) that although the French would not support such a move he presumed they would “let it go”.

I advised Brandt of the contents of the first para of Moscow’s 2843⁹ regarding Sovs consultations on NPT. Brandt indicated, however, that he was already informed.

McGhee

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files,POL GER W–US. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to London, Paris, Brussels, USNATO, Geneva, and USUN. McGhee summarized and commented on this telegram in At the Creation of New Germany, pp. 243–245.
2. Telegram 8569 from Bonn, February 20. (Department of State, Central Files, EEC 6 UK)
3. For text of President Johnson’s announcement, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1968, Book I, pp. 8–13.
4. “The Framework of East-West Reconciliation,” Foreign Affairs, January 1968, pp. 256–275.
5. The January 6 Soviet note is summarized in The New York Times, January 17, 1968. For text of the February 14 note handed to the United States, see Documents on Germany, 1944–1985, pp. 986–988.
6. For text of the March 1 German note, see ibid., pp. 988–989.
7. Transmitted in telegram 116563 to Bonn, February 16. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18–6)
8. Not found.
9. Dated February 19. (Ibid., TP 7 UK)