Office of the Historian

48. Memorandum of Conversation1

Washington, June 12, 1964, 10:30 a.m.

SUBJECT

  • East-West Relations

PARTICIPANTS

  • Germans
    • Chancellor Erhard
    • Foreign Minister Schroeder
    • Ambassador Heinrich Knappstein
    • State Secretary Ludger Westrick, Office of the Chancellor
    • State Secretary Karl Carstens, Foreign Office
    • State Secretary Karl-Guenther von Hase, Federal Press Office
    • Assistant Secretary Franz Krapf, Foreign Office
    • Horst Osterheld, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Office of the Chancellor
    • Karl Hohmann, Assistant Secretary, Office of the Chancellor
    • Berndt von Staden, Counselor, German Embassy
  • Americans
    • The Secretary
    • Governor Harriman
    • Ambassador George C. McGhee
    • William R. Tyler, Assistant Secretary of State
    • Robert J. Manning, Assistant Secretary of State
    • Robert C. Creel, Director, Office of German Affairs
    • Charles K. Johnson, Office of German Affairs

The Secretary began by welcoming Chancellor Erhard to Washington and assuring him that the United States wants to do all it can to make his visit useful. Chancellor Erhard expressed his pleasure at being in Washington and said that these talks were taking place at an appropriate time, particularly in view of the treaty between the USSR and the “GDR.”2

Erhard continued that although this treaty would give rise to a feeling of insecurity among some people, it would certainly not upset the West German government. US/FRG relations are unshakeable and through a strong NATO, peace and security will be guaranteed. Erhard then remarked that inevitably some people in Germany will ask whether the treaty is not the fruit of a policy of détente. As far as Erhard is concerned, Khrushchev is making a treaty with himself which may serve the [Page 109] purpose of giving some compensation to Ulbricht. Nevertheless even though no spectacular consequences can be anticipated from the treaty, the German Government must take into consideration that there will be a certain increase in uneasiness. Thus the Chancellor felt that his meetings in Washington were most opportune. He felt that the statement at The Hague on German reunification was a very good one, but still there will be questions raised in Germany asking when there will be action on the German problem. There will be questions as to why in an atmosphere of relaxation one cannot do something or take an initiative on the German problem. Chancellor Erhard said that he would be happy if these questions could be answered. He said that he had in mind a statement that could be issued today.

Secretary Rusk replied that we do not regard this treaty as a helpful step and that it will undoubtedly raise anxieties within the West. He said our commitment on German reunification is clear. As far as a détente is concerned, we do not feel it has gone very far. We see two immediate dangers at this moment. One relates to Cuba where the Soviets are turning over to the Cubans surface-to-air missile sites. If the Cubans shoot down our overflights, we will have to shoot back hard. There is clearly a very explosive situation involved in having Cuban fingers on the missiles. The other explosive situation exists in Southeast Asia where there are gross violations of the 1954 and 1962 accords by Hanoi and Peiping. The United States is not going to get out of Southeast Asia. The situation there does not smell of détente but of great danger.

The Secretary said that we are interested in Erhard’s impressions of important moves now going on which are affecting the status quo. How do they relate to the German question and what long-range trend can result from improved relations between the FRG and Eastern Europe? What is the significance of Ulbricht’s nervousness stemming from his isolation in Eastern Europe? Concerning reunification, there is no problem for US policy in view of our commitment to the objective of self-determination for the German people. We are prepared to take a hard look at this matter to see what we can do to meet the Chancellor’s needs. Our main concern is that whatever we do, we do together; that we not start something on which we are going to separate once we get started. We are prepared to work hard on German reunification.

The Chancellor said he did not think that the USSR-“GDR” treaty will affect Berlin since that would contradict Khrushchev’s policy of reducing tension. What has gone on so far is no real détente. Our policies must move toward the core of the problem. At the same time, the FRG did not want to pursue a single-minded interest in the German problem to the exclusion of other critical problems in the world such as the Cuban situation. The Chancellor then said that the policy of neutralization in [Page 110] Indo-China initiated by de Gaulle was not possible.3 He questioned whether the Chinese could be won over and whether they would be prepared to withdraw from Southeast Asia if they were admitted to the UN.

With regard to Eastern Europe Erhard said he was convinced that Khrushchev was concerned about the movement toward greater independence by the Eastern European countries. He then referred to the Seebohm speech4 as a “somewhat unpleasant episode.” He said he had done his best to make his government’s position clear: Hitler had torn up the Munich Agreement and the FRG has no territorial claims against Czechoslovakia. Nevertheless the speech had been a “great blow” to the FRG since it had raised new doubts in the Eastern European countries about the FRG. He asked for understanding for the German position on this matter.

On the German reunification initiative, the Chancellor said he would welcome it if the Ambassadorial Group could work out something which could be implemented at an appropriate time. He acknowledged that this effort must be coordinated and that each side had its own problems to consider. The important thing is to act together. He said it was regrettable that elections in both our countries would give rise to certain unfortunate statements. Nevertheless he felt there would be great continuity in both countries. He said he would be happy to see all the elections over. Secretary Rusk said that Khrushchev seems to have the impression that nothing can happen until our elections are over even though we have tried to make him understand that we are still in business.

  1. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 2413. Secret. Drafted by Johnson and approved in S on June 19. The meeting was held in the Under Secretary’s Conference Room. The source text is marked “Part I of IV.”↩
  2. For text of the Soviet-East German treaty of friendship, mutual assistance, and cooperation, signed at Moscow on June 12, 1964, see Documents on Germany, 1944–1985, pp. 867–872.↩
  3. Reference is to de Gaulle’s June 24 speech welcoming Prince Sihanouk of Cambodia to France. For text, see Charles de Gaulle, Discours et Messages, vol. 4, pp. 217–218.↩
  4. Apparent reference to a May 13 speech at Nuremburg in which the Minister of Transportation attacked Czechoslovakia over its treatment of Sudeten Germans and implied the validity of the 1938 Munich agreement.↩