50. Memorandum of Conversation1
CONFIDENTIAL PART OF DISCUSSION BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND CHANCELLOR ERHARD
on June 12, in the presence of Mr. Weber and Mrs. Lejins
The President indicated that the U.S. found itself presently in a very critical period. The first six months of Mr. Johnson’s administration had been extremely difficult ones. Leading Republicans, such as President Eisenhower, Nixon, Scranton, Romney and Senator Goldwater all were criticizing the part the United States plays in world affairs. They were apt to assume a martyr complex, complaining that no one loves us. The President assumed that this was only natural after 20 years of post-war efforts. Last year President Kennedy had asked Congress for $5 billion in foreign aid and there had been a terrible fight and a great deal of criticism. This year the President was asking for much more.
The struggle in Southeast Asia had been going on for ten years by now. In the last few months, alone, there had been three governments in South Vietnam. Although it was perfectly obvious that the Communists were striving to swallow up Southeast Asia and that this was of concern to the entire world, the United States were the only ones who were really [Page 116] attempting to do something about it. It was our men who were being killed and our planes that were being shot down.
We had been forced to greatly increase our national debt limit. Over $100 billion of all this money had gone into rebuilding other countries since the war. At the same time, France was causing great problems in Southeast Asia which also affected our own Cuban problem. The recognition by France of Red China was creating problems not only for the U.S. Government but was creating problems between the President and the American people.
Americans, to a degree at least, understand the British. England is sort of a mother country of us. Nevertheless, it is hard to swallow England’s shipping materials to the Communists, selling busses and railroads to Cuba.
The President said he had a greater understanding now for Mr. Erhard’s poultry problems. Australia and New Zealand are flooding the country with meat, with a resultant drop from 30 cents to 15 cents per pound and from $300 per head of cattle to $150 per head. Consequently, all cattle breeders are mad at the President, complain of Australian etc. dumping and consider us stupid. They act as though this were the only problem the country is faced with and consider themselves a particularly abused and special class of martyrs; and the Republicans, of course, exploit this to the hilt.
In all, the President felt he could tell Mr. Erhard the American people were ready to see someone else come to the rescue on the world scene and offer to carry some of the burden the United States had been carrying for these many years. This attitude would, of course, be reflected in the votes on certain issues in Congress, such as foreign aid. It also would be reflected in the coming elections.
The President indicated that he had recently met with Republican leaders and told them his problems.2 He had indicated that he would need more money to carry out U.S. policies in Southeast Asia. They had answered by asking him what other nations would help carry the burden. Therefore the President felt encouraged by what Mr. Erhard had said in this respect and his indication that Germany was willing to help in Southeast Asia. This would be advantageous not only for Southeast Asia, but also for U.S. morale. The President indicated that he would remain, of course, resolute and firm is his convictions and actions. But he could not deny the fact that Mr. Goldwater was the one who would gain from any and all dissatisfaction arising in the United States. Anyone who had a complaint of any kind would join up with Goldwater.
The President then indicated that he felt very close to Mr. Erhard and that he had never told a similar thing to another statesman. He felt that both of them were fairly new at their jobs, having assumed their responsibilities [Page 117] at about the same time. These responsibilities were very heavy ones. Mr. Johnson presently saw his chief problem in an attempt to unite the American people, and he was not at all sure whether he was the person to do it.
Very confidentially, he indicated that many decisions would have to be made within the next 60 days which would greatly affect the confidence of the people of the world. He would try to keep in touch with the Chancellor whenever it was possible on many of these questions. However, much of what needed to be discussed was as yet very unclear and very indefinite, and the President hoped that Mr. Erhard would consider any discussions of this situation as extremely confidential. He would then discuss further with him some of the problems of the United States.
The Chancellor thanked the President for his show of confidence and friendship and indicated that he very much shared the President’s feeling. He did not feel as close to any other statesman, either. Perhaps part of the explanation was that both of them, before very long, faced elections and both of them stood a pretty good chance of being re-elected. This, the Chancellor felt, was a factor greatly contributing to the stabilization of the world and of the further course of NATO developments in particular. The Chancellor indicated that he could well understand the feeling of bitterness which the President felt in view of the fact that the United States had done so much to re-establish and maintain order in the world and to assist the reconstruction of many countries—both morally and materially—without getting much thanks of any kind. But that is life, the Chancellor felt, and creditors are never very popular. Once those who have been given help get back on their own feet they like to forget those who helped them. However, the Chancellor stated, he wanted it to be understood most emphatically that Germany would never forget what the United States has done on her behalf. This memory would never be wiped out. It formed the basis of Germany’s loyal friendship for the United States, a few occasional false voices notwithstanding, who would make it appear as though there existed in Germany a de Gaullist party and a North Atlantic party in opposition to one another. This was not true. Germany was convinced of the fact that Europe itself had to build the strength of Europe and the German Bundestag was convinced of the fact that the alliance with the United States was a matter of life and death without which the German problem can never be solved. At the same time, Germany realized that this was the only way of achieving a solution and that it was a matter of slow process.
The Chancellor then stated that he wished to express surprise at the fact that the President did not view the matter of the coming elections with more confidence in his power to win. The Chancellor stated that all over the world, certainly in Europe, there existed the expectation that Mr. Johnson would win and such victory was unquestioned. The Chancellor had found out, of course, that it was not an easy job the President had. In [Page 118] addition to being the head of a Government—like the Chancellor himself—the President was also the head of the state. Although it was none of his business, the Chancellor was of the opinion that Mr. Johnson had greatly strengthened his position since he assumed office; that his leadership was undisputed and that the results of the elections were for all practical purposes assured.
The Chancellor had spoken with Mr. Rockefeller yesterday,3 whom he has known for many years. Mr. Rockefeller had expressed horror about the state of Republican affairs, and had indicated that in his opinion a Goldwater nomination would assure Johnson’s victory and guarantee a split in the Republican party. The Chancellor felt obliged to say that recent Republican events had revived certain feelings in Europe that should long since have become a thing of the past. In any event, the impression created in Europe as the result of recent Republican developments was not a good one.
The President fully agreed and indicated that he had been much saddened by the course of recent events. He disagreed, however, about the Chancellor’s evaluation of election prospects. He felt that it was too early even to tell who would be in the running, much less what the results would be. Only today Governor Scranton had announced his candidacy. Mr. Johnson had not yet made any announcement. Even if one assumed (and this was no foregone conclusion by any means) that Senator Goldwater and President Johnson would be the candidates, it would be extremely difficult to predict the outcome.
The Chancellor stated that it was not possible to win elections with such a negative approach. Only a positive approach could achieve results. Both of them were experienced when it came to elections and the Chancellor had 16 years of experience in this area. He admitted that frequently things do not look too good in advance, but as an election comes closer people begin to change their minds and to get sense and vote as they should.
The President stated that he hoped the Chancellor understood his uncertainties with reference to the U.S. elections and even the matter of candidates. He urged the Chancellor to keep this discussion completely confidential since he had not even mentioned some of these misgivings to his own Cabinet members.
The Chancellor assured him that he would.
(END OF SPECIAL CONFIDENTIAL SECTION)
- Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File: Germany, Erhard Visit, June 1964. No classification marking. No drafting information is on source text. The discussion took place during the Erhard-Johnson meeting that began at 11:30 a.m. (see Document 49).↩
- Not further identified.↩
- Governor Rockefeller called on Erhard at the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel after the Chancellor’s arrival in New York.↩