Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XV, Germany and Berlin

64. Telegram From the Mission in Berlin to the Department of State¹

Berlin, August 7, 1964, 3 p.m.

166. Eyes only for: the Secretary, Under Secretary, Assistant Secretary Tyler. From Ambassador McGhee. In my meeting yesterday with FonMin Schroeder at his vacation residence on the Island of Sylt, he asked that I convey to the Secretary his regret, not only because of the problems for the US but also for the added burdens for the Secretary personally, that have been created by the North Vietnamese attack on our naval vessels.² He wanted to assure the Secretary of his strong personal support, as well as that of the German Government.

In a long talk with the FonMin over much of the afternoon, he gave me some insight into his personal situation which might be of interest. Schroeder, who has since the de Gaulle visit of July 3–4 been under constant attack from the Gaullist wing of the CDU and CSU, advised that he had last week met with Chancellor Adenauer for two hours and had, he believed, made peace with him. Indeed, he feels that he is now in better graces with Adenauer than is Erhard, whom Adenauer has never ceased to disparage and undercut.

Schroeder did not consider that any issue of importance remained between himself and Adenauer arising out of the latter’s views toward de Gaulle and France. He had assured Adenauer that he would, in his quest for European unity pursuant to the undertaking made during the de Gaulle visit, propose no development of supranational institutions—since he knows de Gaulle would never approve. When I queried him as to what he would propose he was not clear, but indicated some embellished form of the Fouchet Plan. Although he has not mentioned it to the Chancellor he is considering visiting the various capitals of the Six in order to determine what area of agreement for political unity exists before submitting his final proposals.

Schroeder feels that although basically orientated towards de Gaulle and France, Adenauer by no means follows slavishly all of de Gaulle’s policies. Adenauer is, for example, still for the MLF. In Schroeder’s view it is, however, most unfortunate that Adenauer was chosen as head of the CDU party, which greatly complicated his and Erhard’s problems.

Schroeder feels that the French will step up their campaign against the MLF, seeking to persuade the Germans that they can rely on the force de frappe. He asked me, in this connection, to provide him convincing answers to the impressive arguments the Gaullist elements in Germany are presently using in favor of the force de frappe. I will take this matter up separately with Jerry Smith.

Schroeder expressed no particular concern over his relations with Erhard, although it is obvious that there is not very close coordination—perhaps not even much rapport—between the two. He had, for example, not been advised that the Chancellor had responded to the President’s letter.³ This is but one of many examples that we find that the Chancellery, run by Minister Westrick who has a tendency to handle matters himself, operates to a very large extent in isolation from the FonOff.

Calhoun

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files,POL GER W–US. Confidential. The telegram is summarized in McGhee, At the Creation of a New Germany, pp. 150–152.
2. Reference is to the Gulf of Tonkin incidents, August 2–4.
3. President Johnson and Chancellor Erhard exchanged communications over the Gulf of Tonkin incidents, August 4 and 6, respectively. Texts are in Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, Germany.