82. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State1
2545. Subj: Reunification initiative. I called on FonMin Schroeder yesterday (Jan 7) at my request. I had spoken to him in a preliminary way on Monday, Jan 4, following my return from the US, at which time I had conveyed to him the Secretary’s suggestion that he might wish to consider joining the Secretary, the French FonMin and the British FonSec, during the period they would be together at the UN, to discuss the question [Page 198] of an initiative on German reunification. I also indicated at that time that if it were agreeable to the British and French, we would be willing to initiate further Four-Power talks in the Bonn Group preparatory to such a meeting.
Schroeder said that his attendance at the proposed New York meeting on a unification initiative would depend on a number of factors: when it would be held, what the agenda would be, etc. The situation had been somewhat changed by the Departmental backgrounder given on this subject on Dec 30. It was always difficult for the German Govt to authorize the FonMin to go to New York during a UN meeting, since he would not be involved in the UN deliberations themselves. Moreover, to take such an unusual step under present circumstances might arouse undue expectations. He would, however, be willing to go if there were a chance of getting approval on the German Four-Power Council proposal. Otherwise it might be best to continue discussions between governments. He had not yet been able to reach a decision on the question of whether further discussions on reunification should be held by the Bonn Group. He could see certain advantages, however, there were also advantages in continuing discussions in the Washington Ambassadorial Group, where the American representative, who is the principal one concerned, would have better access to instructions.
The FonMin then went into the background of his recent espousal of the Four-Power Council concept. He had presented this idea in his meeting with Secretary of State Rusk on Nov 23,2 as well as during his subsequent meetings in Rome and London prior to the Paris meeting.3 In his discussion with the Secretary in Paris prior to the evening Quadripartite dinner,4 he had obtained the impression that the Secretary would support the proposal. The evening meeting resulted in no specific agreement, but in the general agreement that representatives of the Four would prepare a draft communiqué.
It was his impression that during this meeting the French pursued the tactic of attempting to get Sec Rusk and FonSec Gordon Walker to raise questions, to which they would then agree. During these discussions the Secretary had presented arguments very similar to those contained in the Washington backgrounder. Schroeder was at a loss to know who had given the impression to the press that the Secretary had been reluctant with respect to an initiative. The Germans had not done this. On Wednesday, it had been agreed that the Four-Power Council concept [Page 199] would be discussed further between governments. However, the French refused to sign the final communiqué because of the inclusion of the phrase “that the time had come to take appropriate steps to that end with the Soviet Union.”
Although he had not discussed it with the French, it was Schroeder’s impression that they would still agree to discuss the Four-Power Council idea, although without any prior commitment to support it. However, no agreement had been reached in Paris as to the time and place of such discussions. In view of the backgrounder, and the Cabinet discussion on Tuesday, it was necessary that the entire matter now be reviewed, both within the Cabinet and with the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Bundestag, which includes representatives of the other political parties. Since all concerned would be in Berlin together next week, an opportunity would be afforded.
Schroeder said that there was a difference between his original proposals and the version now being dealt with in the press. He did not propose putting forward a proposal to the Russians for a Four-Power Council meeting to consider reunification alone, which he knew would be turned down. Although he did not believe that a probable Soviet rejection was in itself a sufficient reason for not making a proposal, he agreed that any proposal made should be a serious one. He understood from what we had told him about Gromyko’s meetings with the Secretary and the President that the Soviets would probably insist on keeping reunification separate from other issues. The Soviets would undoubtedly introduce many topics for discussion which the other three would prefer not to discuss.
Schroeder, however, still favors putting forward a proposal for a Four-Power Council meeting to consider the German problem as a whole. This would not be a new departure but would be based on the principle of Four-Power responsibility, which is still a reality with respect to certain problems. He would be willing for the Council to be called without a specific mandate. He did not consider it necessary for the Western Four to agree in advance on the answers to all questions that might be raised in the Four-Power Council. It should be possible to eliminate those Soviet proposals which we did not wish to discuss, just as they undoubtedly would seek to do with respect to issues distasteful to them. As a minimum the Council could create a series of Four-Power commissions, which might be able to make progress in their respective fields.
What, he asked, is the risk in making such a proposal, even if it is turned down? The basic question is whether the making of such a proposal would, in its overall aspects, be helpful or harmful. From a German viewpoint he believes it necessary to have strong statements made by the Allies on reunification, such as the President’s Georgetown speech, and positive steps, such as his own current proposal, taken in common by the [Page 200] British, French and the US, even if the Soviets turned them down. He pointed out that the Sovs continually reiterate their own positions with respect to all-German questions. Why should we not?
I indicated to the FonMin that our position on the question of an initiative is the same as that which the Secretary had agreed to in Paris. We had made certain suggestions to the FonMin as to how we might proceed and would await his reply. Both were subject to approval by the British and French. He was familiar with the Secretary’s views. Certainly he recognized that there are certain points of substance which must be agreed to before a proposal can be made to the Soviets. The Secretary has never said that the answers to all questions must be determined in advance.
Comment: As to whether in practice Schroeder’s thinking on the issues which I discussed with him will correspond to that of the Dept, I do not know. I believe that the area of agreement can be determined only in terms of specifics—not through general discussion. My own feeling is that we would, in connection with any detailed consideration of the Four-Power Council proposal, not be far apart.
Tuesday’s Cabinet discussion did not result in any decision as to the course the FRG will pursue on the initiative issue. I do not anticipate that we shall have any further reaction from the FonMin until the end of next week after the meetings in Berlin. In the meantime, if the Dept has any further guidance to give me as to our own stance at this juncture, it would be appreciated.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files,POL 32–4 GER. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Berlin, Paris, London, and Moscow.↩
- See Document 73.↩
- Reference is to the North Atlantic Council Ministerial Meeting at Paris December 15–17, 1964.↩
- Reported in telegram Secto 13 from Paris, December 15, 1964. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 15–1 GER W)↩