95. Memorandum of Conversation1
SUBJECT
- French Views on German Question
PARTICIPANTS
- French
- Foreign Minister Couve de Murville
- Mr. Charles Lucet, Director General, Political Affairs
- Ambassador Herve Alphand
- Mr. Claude Lebel, Director, Press & Information Service
- Mr. Jacques Beaumarchais, Director of the Cabinet
- Mr. Bruno de Leusse, Minister Counselor, Embassy of the French Republic
- Americans
- The Secretary
- Under Secretary George W. Ball
- Ambassador Llewellyn E. Thompson, S/AL
- Ambassador Charles E. Bohlen
- Assistant Secretary William R. Tyler,EUR
- Ambassador Leonard Unger, Deputy Assistant Secretary, FE
- Mr. David H. McKillop, Director, WE
- Mr. Richard I. Phillips, P
- Mr. Alfred Puhan, Director, GER
The Secretary asked what French views were on the German reunification question since the Erhard-de Gaulle talks at Rambouillet and the press conference of President de Gaulle.
[Page 226]Couve de Murville referred to the Rambouillet meeting, saying that as de Gaulle had pointed out, in the long run the resolution of the German question was the resolution of the European question ending in European unity. If the Iron Curtain disappears, then Germany too may be reunited. The Germans, according to Couve, were pleased to be told that their problem was a European one. They realized that German reunification was a long process, but had asked what would be done to give the impression that the West was not disinterested. The Germans had left the impression that it was better to be turned down on an initiative than to make no effort at all. Couve said Schroeder had asked him what would be the best procedure for getting another initiative underway and had asked about the advisability of using the Ambassadorial Group. Couve had told Schroeder he thought this would be useful. An alternative suggestion made by Couve to Schroeder was to meet in Bonn. Couve preferred Washington because the Ambassadorial Group was accustomed to dealing with the subject, and would not be as exposed to the German press.
The Secretary stated our preference for the Washington Ambassadorial Group.
Couve said that Erhard had suggested a meeting of the Foreign Ministers, but this had not been followed up by Schroeder. He added that he thought the Germans would have to take the initiative, and pointed out that thus far nothing had happened.
The Secretary confirmed that we had received no communication from Schroeder requesting a meeting.
Couve raised a question whether we should do something or wait for the Germans to act.
The consensus seemed to be that we would wait for the Germans to ask for a meeting.
The Secretary said we were ready to join in some sort of German initiative.
Couve asked if this meant saying something to the Soviets.
The Secretary said if we agree to an initiative, we should all recognize that there may be consequences flowing from it which we would have to take into account. We cannot count forever on the raising of an initiative on Thursday, a Soviet rejection on Friday, and forgetting all about it on Saturday. He asked what the consequences would be if the Soviets bring up the status of Berlin. He wanted to be sure that in case of a Soviet reaction to discuss, we would be all together. He pointed to the possibility of a fresh crisis arising out of a German initiative. He added that he doubted such a crisis would arise, but wished to be sure everyone was aware of the possibility. He said he gained the impression that the Germans wished to talk about reunification, but that was about all. The Secretary continued, saying that we agreed with the French that the German [Page 227] question must be resolved in terms of resolving European problems. He did not expect any dramatic development. He did not think anyone wanted to fight a war over German reunification. The real problem, the Secretary said, is what can we do in the face of real and understandable German requirements.
Couve asked whether the Secretary agreed with the French that the only real solution lay in the opening of Eastern Europe. The real problem, as he saw it, was to isolate the GDR in Eastern Europe, place it where it would have no relations with the West.
The Secretary agreed. He added that he sometimes contemplated the report that Malenkov and Beria in 1955 had been prepared to do something about Germany.
Ambassador Bohlen thought Malenkov would have been favorably disposed toward Germany.
The Secretary said that Malenkov and Beria had even raised this thought, gave plausibility to the possibility that some day there might be a combination of German arrangements, disarmament and trade to warrant the Soviet Union going along with a united Germany.
Ambassador Bohlen thought the evolution toward this end might be speeded up somewhat if an island of Stalinism in the form of the GDR finally became unacceptable to the Soviets.
The Secretary asked whether the GDR would not become more important to the Russians if the Soviets pulled back their twenty-two divisions out of the GDR. The Secretary said he had tried to explain to our people why we treat the Eastern European countries differently from the GDR. He said this has compelled us to say things at times which were unpleasant to the Soviets. He referred to a speech which he had made that had had that effect. He concluded, however, that the Soviets have apparently not objected too much to our Eastern European policies.
Mr. Tyler made allowance for the possibility, however, that the Soviets did view our efforts as divisive.
The Secretary spoke of the extraordinary changes which had occurred in Eastern Europe.
Couve agreed and pointed out that of course the Eastern Europeans were not all Slavs and also economically don’t rely on the USSR. Couve also referred to the Hungarian Peter as a “nice Calvinist Bishop”.
The Secretary thought it important to continue to improve our relations with Eastern Europe. In this regard, he said we were studying carefully with Congress our regulations and laws governing trade with Eastern Europe.
Mr. Ball pointed out that the US had never had much trade with the Eastern European countries. More of this had traditionally taken place with Western Europe.
[Page 228]Ambassador Thompson referred to the efforts of Berthold Beitz to develop cooperative German-Polish enterprises.
Couve mentioned the growing tourism to Eastern Europe. The Secretary saw possibilities for greater tourism to Eastern Europe from the US. All agreed that this was an important element in developing better relations.
The Secretary asked again if the French were prepared to support a German initiative in the Ambassadorial Group? Couve answered in the affirmative and thought the British would do so also.
The Secretary said it was his impression the British would go along, but he had not yet talked to the new British Foreign Secretary about this.
Ambassador Alphand asked if we waited for the Germans to make the initiative?
The Secretary and Ambassador Thompson answered in the affirmative.
Ambassador Alphand inquired whether we mentioned to the Germans the possible consequences of an initiative.
Ambassador Thompson thought that this would depend upon the kind of initiative suggested by the Germans.
Mr. Tyler mentioned the need of the Chancellor to do something before the German elections.
Ambassador Thompson saw two choices as to the type of initiative raised by the Germans. The first, which would be turned down immediately by the Soviets, would call for free elections. The second might be some interim step like the setting up of humanitarian commissions.
The Secretary related how he had after the December talks in Paris raised with Gromyko in a most tentative way the possibility of German unification. Gromyko, according to the Secretary, turned out to be a good Western politician. He said that there was no chance of the reunification of Germany at this time, and that he did not see what the Soviet Union had to gain in making it possible for FRG to create the impression that it was making progress in this field. The Secretary added that he would have to point out to the President that there always existed as a result of any conference with the Russians on a German initiative the possibility of a renewal of the 1958 and 1961 crises which cost us so much money and time. The Secretary wanted to be sure that we would be together if this happened, and that he would not feel so lonely as he had so often in the past.
Couve said that the Soviets would try to find a solution which would give no satisfaction to the Germans.
The Secretary asked Couve when the British were going to Paris.2
[Page 229]Couve replied that although the date had not been fixed, it could well be April 1.
Mr. Tyler asked if there were any possibility of doing something on May 8, the 20th anniversary of V–E Day.
Ambassador Bohlen thought that this was a rather tricky problem.
Couve asked whether the Russians had said anything about May 8. The answer was “no”. Couve thought the Russians would be delighted to do something with us, which would be unpleasant for the Germans.
The Secretary saw no great profit in doing something with the anniversary. Mr. Tyler suggested that much attention would be paid to the date on a worldwide basis and that the Russians should not be allowed to hold the center of the stage.
The Secretary asked whether the Russians had made any suggestions to Paris. Couve replied in the negative.