Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey

103. Telegram From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of State¹

Geneva, August 6, 1964, 2 p.m.

315. From Acheson. Had long and frustrating talk yesterday evening with Nikolareisis. Essence of message he brought back from Athens contained in three points:

1. My suggestions about safeguarding Turk-Cypriot rights, as set forth in memorandum of July 24th,² go too far and would perpetuate division between Greek and Turk communities. GOG considers objective should be to eliminate this difference so that all Cypriots could live together in peace and harmony.

2. Concession of sovereign area to Turkey is “out of the question”. Greek Government renews offer of NATO base with Turkish troops and Commander. Nikolareisis additionally authorized to explore concrete elements which would be involved in leased base: such as area, purpose, length of lease, number of troops to be accommodated, etc., but not authorized make any commitment that GOG would agree to such lease.

3. Injection of Makarios into picture as result his latest visit to Athens and his public statements, makes it impossible for GOG to continue Geneva talks on basis independence for Cyprus. Talks on this basis would require collaboration of Makarios, who has made it clear he will not accept any negotiated settlement. Therefore, only way we can proceed is on basis that immediate result of talks will be enosis; on this assumption, GOG would be discussing through me disposition to be made of its own territory and thus not have to invite Makarios in.

Nikolareisis handed me memorandum evidently prepared in Athens on subject protection to Turkish minority. It largely rejected proposals set forth my memorandum July 24th. Said GOG could accept Lausanne-type guarantees and U.N. commissioner, provided latter’s functions were “defined in detail”. Also could accept appointment two Turk-Cypriot Eparchs but they must be on exactly same basis as Greek Eparchs and there must be no separate system of administration for Turks, even at Eparchy or village level. Central Turkish authority in Nicosia to look after special rights of Turks throughout island was unacceptable as producing form of partition and being “contrary to the reestablishment of good administration and peace in the island”. Special Turkish courts could be accepted only for application personal status law; in all other respects, Turks must be subject to ordinary, nonmixed courts.

I commented that this memorandum (copy being pouched)³ was pretty bad. After some further discussion it appeared that there might still be room for clarification of my ideas and possible compromise. We therefore agreed to study this and talk about it again after we have had time for reflection.

The base question: I pointed out any Turkish force on island must have some physical location which would have to be granted to someone. This someone could not be NATO. Since it was not sovereign entity, therefore why not accept idea of long term lease to Turkey, which might conceivably act as trustee for NATO in interest of Greek-Turkish and general Western defense? I added this idea would be hard to sell to the Turks but I would try. Went on to indicate extent of what appeared to be present Turk minimum demands, i.e., whole of Karpas Peninsula plus north coast as far as Akanthou Pass north of Lefkoniko. Also mentioned their desire for port and airbase as well as problem which might arise if peninsula proved to have substantial population.

I then advanced idea that Turkish base on Cyprus (and minority protection as well) might be brought within the framework of larger Greek-Turkish joint structure similar to that in effect between U.S. and Canada. This could include joint defense board to discuss mutual problems of security in Eastern Mediterranean as well as a political, economic and social entity and perhaps other organs.

This would enable both Greece and Turkey to submerge their differences over Cyprus and resume friendly cooperation which was so important to them both. Nikolareisis did not comment specifically but seemed receptive to this idea.

We concluded discussion on base by my making appeal for GOG assurance it prepared to discuss lease in good faith so that I could have something solid to work on with Turks. Nikolareisis countered that on his part he needed something concrete as to what we had in mind. (I take it this means Papandreou unwilling to give him real authority without knowing beforehand order of magnitude of base area proposed and other characteristics of eventual arrangement.) Nikolareisis suggested starting from premise that Turks now have 650 men on island and would need base large enough only for that number. I said I thought Turks were thinking in considerably larger terms, on order of one division. We agreed to discuss this whole question further.

On matter of discussing enosis rather than Cypriot independence I said I was in entire accord; it was Papandreou—not I—who had kept saying that full and complete independence must be objective. Nikolareisis said would be helpful if I would put this strongly to Papandreou, possibly in letter. I said I thought this was dangerous, since letter might fall into wrong hands and I was already under grave suspicion as result Makarios’ statements in Athens. Thought my position on enosis had already been made clear both here and by Labouisse in Athens. However, I could probably get Labouisse to make further oral communication.

Our real problem in discussing enosis, I said, arose from Turkish distrust of GOG and GOC. They seemed to believe that Makarios and Papandreou are in cahoots.⁴ How could we prove to them case was otherwise? First of all, we must reach agreement on substance of what was to happen after enosis and secondly we must devise means to put this agreement into effect without bringing about collapse of Turkish Government. We must save Inonu, who was sole strong, moderate figure in Turkish regime. If enosis brought about without any public indication that Greece and Turkey had reached agreement safeguarding Turkey’s minimum interest, GOT would certainly fall. Only way I could think of was to have very general statement issued after agreement reached and then quickly bring about enosis. But Papandreou would have to give more than he had up to now to persuade Turks to stand still.

Nikolareisis concluded conversation by assuring me Papandreou was very anxious to find solution, while I, on my part, renewed my appeal for greater Greek help in finding solution.⁵

Tubby

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 CYP. Secret; Exdis-TAG. Repeated to Athens and Ankara.
2. Reference is presumably to Document 90.
3. Transmitted to the Department of State in airgram A–63, August 7. (Ibid.)
4. Erkin expressed this view to Hare on August 3. The discussion was reported in telegram 202 from Ankara, August 4. (Ibid.)
5. Acheson communicated the substance of this conversation to the Turks on the same day and reported their reaction in telegram 318 from Geneva, August 6. (Ibid.)