Office of the Historian

186. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Rusk, at Tehran1

Washington, April 6, 1965, 9:54 p.m.

Tosec 16. Cyprus. From Ball. GOT stated publicly it considers Plaza’s services at an end because he exceeded his mandate. Thant’s letter in response strongly defended Plaza and report and called on Turks to reconsider position on Mediator.2 His letter did not ask Turks to change attitude toward substance of Mediator’s report.

Turks have replied to Thant with letter which we understand is somewhat conciliatory but does not rescind Turkish rejection Plaza; letter will not refer to report.3

Your discussion with Isik may provide an opportunity to bring the Turks nearer to reality. At the moment it is difficult to find any thread of rational strategy in their conduct. The purely negative position they have taken is not good enough. We have been trying to prevent public discussion of the report. However, by disqualifying Mediator and repeatedly threatening military action, Turks have opened the way for a GOC initiative for early SC debate on Cyprus issue. Moreover, they have weakened their position in that debate. Yet they will certainly ask our support and be bitter if they do not receive it.

Under these circumstances I think you should take a strong line with Isik. You should emphasize that Turkey is tearing itself apart over a situation that involves only 100,000 Turks and that the world is getting tired of stubborn inability of a handful of people to live together. We have made a great effort to assist Turkey to find an honorable solution. But Turkey’s position does not improve with time.

We have made clear from the beginning that there was only one way to solve the Cyprus problem and that was by negotiation. This also is the burden of the Mediator’s report. The Mediator suggests that negotiations start between the two communities on Cyprus. This may be impracticable but the GOT might still find some profit in announcing that it was advising the Turkish Community to begin such negotiations. This could put Makarios on the spot. Obviously, the GOT could provide [Page 394] competent men who could serve as advisors to the Turkish Community if such negotiations ever materialized.

If the GOT does not regard this formula as feasible, it might propose to negotiate directly with Makarios on behalf of the Turkish Community. This might be one way of forcing the hand of the GOG—compelling it to undertake negotiations with the GOT or risk losing its position in the situation.

USUN has expressed concern about the apparently aimless direction of Turkish actions and you may wish to raise one or more of the following questions:

1.
If GOT expects our support, we think they owe us fuller explanation of what they are really driving at, expressed not in terms of ideal desiderata but of real possibilities in real world.
2.
It not at all clear to us what GOT really expects to achieve through present course of action.
3.
After Geneva experience, do Turks think GOG has capability of forcing Makarios to accept either partition or Federation?
4.
Does GOT hope keep Cyprus problem on shelf for six months (beyond Turkish elections) meanwhile trying prevent status and welfare Turk-Cypriots from deteriorating?
5.
We had understood GOT wanted protection for Turk-Cypriots and assurances against enosis; if Turks feel guarantees these two items insufficiently stated in report, what guarantees conceivably acceptable to other side would they propose?
6.
If GOT continues along present course, we must assume question of Plaza report will come up for debate before UNSC very soon; how can US or other friends of Turkey be helpful unless we are fully informed re objectives present Turkish posture and actions?

You may wish also mention following elements in Plaza report which Turks might find positive and useable.

1.
Debarring of enosis.
2.
Demilitarization (genuinely demilitarized Cyprus would greatly reduce Turkey’s security worries).
3.
Human rights (Plaza’s suggestions leave considerable room for GOT to maneuver, particularly in developing international institutional arrangements ultimately to replace London-Zurich).
4.
Autonomy for Turk Cypriot community in communal affairs, specifically education, religion, and personal status.
5.
Recognition of “hard fact” of distinctive character of two communities and that, without weakening unity of state, Turkish Cypriots should have “an equitable part in public life of country as whole.”
6.
UN role in settlement (UN assistance in demilitarization; UN safeguard of human rights; UN guarantee of final settlement terms).
[Page 395]

Repeating to you USUN’s 38404 which briefs principal features of Plaza report.

Ball
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Drafted by Ball, King, and Bracken; cleared by IO; and approved by Jernegan and Ball. Repeated to Ankara, Athens, Nicosia, London, USUN, and Paris for USRO. Rusk was in Tehran April 6–9 for the CENTO Ministerial Meeting.↩
  2. For extracts of Plaza’s report (U.N. Doc. S/6253), see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1965, pp. 505–510. The Turkish letter to Thant and Thant’s reply (U.N. Doc. S/6267) are summarized ibid., p. 510, footnote 36.↩
  3. U.N. Doc. S/6267/Add. 1, summarized in telegram 3950 from USUN, April 6. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP)↩
  4. Dated March 30. (Ibid.)↩