Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey

191. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Cyprus¹

Washington, May 28, 1965, 6:20 p.m.

729. Embtel 1332.² What does Embassy believe is Archbishop’s motivation in request for assistance in establishing GOC–GOT contact? Seems most likely he is intent on sabotaging GOT-GOG talks, thereby returning self to center stage. Recent reports from Nicosia and Athens indicate he strongly condemns Greco-Turkish dialogue, contending Cypriots must be allowed to decide future for themselves. Makarios knows Greeks want enosis with concessions while he obviously personally wants independence on his terms. He might figure best way achieving his goals would be to undercut Greeks by offering Turks independence which they find more palatable.

If he is sincere, he should consider having Kyprianou approach Eralp at coming session of UN or alternatively have Pelaghias or other FonMin official make approach through Turkish Embassy Nicosia. Considering fact USG strongly encouraged GOT-GOG talks, it would seem inappropriate at this time actively to aid in Makarios effort scuttle GOG effort. On other hand our position has always been Turks would some day have to talk to the Greek-Cypriots.

Makarios should also consider carefully impact his actions and statements over next several weeks on GOT’s attitude toward him. For example, report he is “calling back” Galo Plaza has caused Turks to suspect more faits accomplis. Any GOC attempt try to have SC “endorse” or “approve” Plaza report, as recently rumored, would cause even further estrangement Ankara and Nicosia. If Makarios sees these as bargaining plays to increase pressure on Turks he is making same mistaken assessment Turks do when they threaten Greeks with force.³

For Ankara: Would appreciate reading on possible receptivity to Kyprianou approach and what if any effect it would have on bilateral talks.⁴

For Athens: Would appreciate reading on possible reaction GOG to Kyprianou approach to Eralp and particularly USG involvement this effort.⁵

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Secret; Limdis-TOG. Drafted by McCaskill, cleared in GTI, and approved by Jernegan. Repeated to Athens, Ankara, London, USUN, and Paris for USRO.
2. Telegram 1332 from Nicosia, May 28, reported Greek-Cypriot hints that they would resume a dialogue with the Turkish Government. (Ibid.)
3. In telegram 1338 from Nicosia, May 30, the Embassy responded that Makarios’ primary objective remained either participating in talks on Cyprus’ future or derailing any bilateral discussions that might endanger his interests. (Ibid.)
4. In telegram 1742 from Ankara, June 2, the Embassy responded that the Turks might be receptive to talks with Kyprianou although not at the expense of their dialogue with the Greeks. (Ibid.)
5. In telegram 1772 from Athens, May 29, the Embassy responded that a Kyprianou approach to Erlap would raise “deepest suspicion” among the Greeks. (Ibid.)