Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey

230. Memorandum of Conversation¹

US/MC/3

Ankara, April 22, 1966, 8:30 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• United States
  • The Secretary of State
  • Ambassador Parker T. Hart
  • Asst. Secretary Raymond Hare
  • Robert S. Dillon, Second Secretary, American Embassy
• Turkey
  • Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel
  • Foreign Minister Ihsan Caglayangil
  • Haluk Bayulken, Turk Foreign Ministry
  • Ilter Turkmen, Turk Foreign Ministry
  • Sukru Elekdag, Turk Foreign Ministry

SUBJECT

• Cyprus

Foreign Minister Caglayangil opened the conversation by telling Secretary Rusk that he was pleased to have an opportunity to talk about problems of mutual interest and particularly wanted to discuss Cyprus and the aide-mémoire which the GOT has recently delivered on the subject to the USG. The same aid-mémoire had also been sent to HMG but to no one else.²

Secretary Rusk replied that he wanted to stress that his remarks on the aide-mémoire would be strictly preliminary and that there would be an official reply after he had had an opportunity to discuss it with the President. The Secretary assured Caglayangil that the USG shared his concern about the situation of the Turkish Cypriots. He hoped that the GOT would make a full démarche on the subject to the UNSYG.

The Foreign Minister then alluded to the recent appointment of a Greek Cypriot as Minister of Agriculture on the island as another example of the Makarios technique. He stressed that the difficulty in talking with Makarios or in presenting the Turk demand for “normalization of conditions” for the Turk Cypriots (contained in the aide-mémoire) to the UN would be that Makarios would say let them go back to their villages. This, of course, would not be normalization because the Turk Cypriots would remain under pressure; what the Turks have in mind is equalization of living conditions for the Turk Cypriots within their present enclaves.

The Secretary indicated that he understood the point, but asked if that were an obstacle in going to the UNSYG. Bayulken, SYG of the Turkish Foreign Ministry, interjected “no—we can make a démarche and wait awhile.” The Secretary then asked the GOT position on Turkish participation in the Cypriot Government. For example, at one time the UNSYG had offered some guarantees in connection with Turk participation in the government.

Caglayangil then replied that Turk participation in the Cypriot Government was a good step toward normalization and would be a part of a modus vivendi which the Turks could accept. However, the prospects for such participation looked dim. The aide-mémoire was addressed to the idea that the Turks must have the same conditions in their sectors as the Greeks have in theirs. If the two communities were living under the same conditions then time would cease to be a factor working in favor of the Greek Cypriots.

The Secretary said that the USG accepted the central idea of normalization. Furthermore, the Foreign Minister was correct in saying that Makarios would reply, “if the Turks want normalization, let them go back to their villages.” Makarios would not want any steps taken that would represent de facto partition.

The Foreign Minister said that he had two very important points that he wished to emphasize: (1) the Greek Government was weak, which offers easy opportunity for Makarios to engage in provocations; (2) the Turk community was weakening; particularly its morale was weak. It also might engage in provocations. The GOT, USG and “even a reasonable Greek Government” were concerned with other important problems and would want to avoid provocations. However, Makarios, the Greek Cypriots and the Turk community would not be bound by the same sense of responsibility.

The Secretary said that he believed that the governments involved did not want to inflame the situation; therefore, it behooved all to be patient and diligent in seeking solutions to the problem.

The Foreign Minister replied that the GOT was the last one to whom patience needed to be recommended. He felt the GOT record was clear and that it had been extremely patient. He emphasized that the aide-mémoire did not represent a new GOT decision nor was it in preparation for a move (the implication was a military move). However, the GOT wished to raise some of the difficult questions involved. These were also questions that in some manner had to be answered for Turkish public opinion. For instance, what should Turkey do in case of new massacres? In case of an attack on the Turkish contingent? In case of the withdrawal of the UN forces which could lead to the events suggested in the first two questions? For how long can the Turkish community be left in its exposed position?

Without waiting for a reply, he continued that he wanted to reemphasize a point that he had already made to the Secretary. “Why is the U.S. in the Cyprus problem at all? It is not a signatory power to the treaty of guarantee. However, Cyprus has in fact become a very important factor in Turkish-American relations. There was an outbreak of violence on the island in 1963. Turkey could have intervened. At a time when there were no opposing forces on the island and an intervention could have been successful, relatively bloodless, and could have prevented the terrible things that subsequently happened to the Turkish community, why did we not intervene? The answer is that the U.S. did not want us to do so. For example, the Johnson letter was an obstacle and we are still under an obligation to reply to public opinion in Turkey to the question why we did not use this right of intervention guaranteed by the treaty.”

The Secretary replied that the problem to the U.S. had not been a question of treaty rights but a question of a war between Greece and Turkey. The U.S. position had been that the serious consequences of such an event to the NATO alliance must be considered.

The Foreign Minister said that he had given the same answer to the Turkish Parliament. However, this did not change the situation that the treaties had been violated. Furthermore, in any appeal to NATO the answer was a foregone conclusion, do nothing. Under the treaties a solution to this type of problem was already provided. Greece and the UK were committed as was Turkey to intervene to prevent violence. The real solution should have been tripartite action to protect the communities and to enforce the treaties. This had not happened because neither the UK nor Greece was willing to live up to treaty obligations. He also wanted to clarify that the GOT did not hold treaties to be permanent and that Turkey was prepared to negotiate changes as needed. He ended by emphasizing again the great pressure of public opinion on the GOT as regards a satisfactory solution to Cyprus.

The Secretary said that he wanted to thank the Foreign Minister for understanding that the U.S. did not invent the Cyprus problem. He hoped that it was also understood that it was because of our friendship with Turkey that we had become involved. However, he wanted to say frankly that Turkey must not allow this problem to become the central issue of our bilateral relations. Around the world there were 25 such problems e.g., India-Pakistan, Indonesia-Malaysia, etc. If in each case these specific problems were to be made the central issue of our own bilateral relations with the countries involved, we would be given a burden we could not carry. “You would make us your satellite and we cannot be a satellite. This is the kind of situation that would drive us into isolation.”

The Foreign Minister thanked the Secretary for his frankness. He said that the present Turkish Government did not start to make Cyprus the central issue. He did not want to discuss internal Turkish politics, but when this government came to power, Cyprus had been made the central issue between the U.S. and Turkey by the previous government. At any rate, the GOT was now saying that if present conditions on the island continue, it must take initiative. It has prepared an aide-mémoire with a specific list of conditions to which the Turks object. The GOT wants the U.S. to come forward and say yes, the Turks are right. Human rights, etc., are being violated. This sort of stance would help the problem of Turkish-American relationships.

The Secretary answered that he had personally spent much time with the Greeks, Greek Cypriots and other parties on the problem of the Turkish Cypriots. President Johnson had also. A moment ago the Foreign Minister had raised a series of difficult questions. The Secretary wanted to emphasize that what we all wanted was to prevent the situations that gave rise to those questions. In other words, the questions were so difficult to answer that one must prevent the questions from having to be asked.

At this point Prime Minister Demirel entered the conversation, saying, “We accept the fact that you have very difficult worldwide problems but we are saying that here in this country, Cyprus is the hot issue from which none of us can escape. The events on the island have been inhuman, cruel, and against human rights. Why is the U.S. connected with Cyprus? It was not a party to the Cyprus agreements. Those agreements contained a procedure for solving the kind of dispute that arose in December 1963. That procedure was three party intervention. This did not occur for the reasons we discussed. Now the agreements have been violated several times. Makarios has said there are no agreements. The USG has said ‘no’ to the use of the guarantees contained in the treaties. We understand that the U.S. position was based on its concern that there be no war between Greece and Turkey. We are an independent country. Perhaps we should have gone ahead anyhow. However, that’s all behind us. As it appears to Turkish public opinion, you do not want us to use the agreements. But why did you react so strongly to the prospect of our intervention and then do nothing when the Greeks sent 15,000 troops to the island? Cyprus is almost under Greek occupation. Why was there no reaction to this? Perhaps there is no need to discuss this point but you must understand that it is a factor. It is for this reason in the eyes of Turkish public opinion you have responsibilities. Now our Foreign Minister is saying that the issue may flare up again. This is no threat. There are responsible governments in Turkey. However, if something happens again—public opinion will demand action. If anything happens, it will be difficult to keep peace although we want to keep the peace and it is clearly to the advantage of the Turks that there be peace in this part of the world. If the UN force withdraws leaving 10,000 Greek troops on Cyprus, what happens if shooting starts? We want you to influence Makarios and the Greek Government to see that nothing happens. We cannot always be the ones to give.”

The Foreign Minister said he wanted to make another point— because of Cyprus the Turkish army was constantly on the alert and had been distracted from its NATO mission. Another point to be remembered was that in the NATO Council the Greek Foreign Minister had said categorically there were no Greek forces on Cyprus. Now, however, Makarios, Grivas and the Greek Government were engaged in a public dispute about the function of the force, its command, etc., and there was no further pretense it did not exist.

Bayulken interjected to say that the Greeks had used the excuse that Turkey was on the point of invasion, which was not true. He also wished to emphasize, returning to the aide-mémoire, that the GOT must have a pipeline to the Turk Cypriot force supply. This was part of normalization. Furthermore, if something should flare up on the island, then what? Would there be another letter from the US? If the Turks should react, and if there were a threat from the outside, would Turkey get NATO help?

The Secretary replied that it was important to discuss this kind of situation within NATO. He then asked for Turkish views on the UN force. The Foreign Minister replied that it must continue and that an improvement in the manner in which it carried out its function was an important factor for the improvement of the condition of the Turks.

The Secretary asked the GOT’s view of the Russian position. For instance, he had heard rumors that the Russians had told Makarios that they would send no more arms. The Foreign Minister replied that the Russians accepted the principle of two separate communities on the island and accepted the idea of a federal constitution. Their other condition, however, was no outside intervention. In his opinion, if the Turks and their allies were able to come up with a solution, there would be no Russian interference.

Secretary Rusk then commented that there was at present a very weak Greek Government and asked if the GOT entertained any hope that a future GOG would be strong enough to make an agreement on Cyprus. Prime Minister Demirel replied that he expected no stronger Greek Government at any time in the future. If the Greeks were to go to elections, Cyprus would be an issue. Subsequently, a Greek Government would have even less flexibility. He wished to emphasize that his party, although it could have, had not used Cyprus as an issue in the October elections.

The Secretary then said that it had been a valuable chance to discuss the aide-mémoire. In Washington he would be discussing it again with the President following which there would be an answer.

Demirel said he wanted to emphasize his belief in Turkish-American friendship and his regret that the Cyprus issue had become a trap for this friendship. It was clear that Turkish public opinion felt that if Cyprus could not be solved by the guarantor powers, it should be solved within the NATO alliance.

The Secretary ended the Cyprus discussion by promising, “We will do our best.”

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Dillon and approved in S on May 6. The meeting was held at the Foreign Minister’s residence. Secretary Rusk was in Ankara April 19–22 to attend the CENTO Ministerial Council Meeting.
2. The Embassy in Ankara commented on the Turkish aide-mémoire in telegram 1346, April 26. (Ibid.)