Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey

65. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, June 12, 1964, 11:45 a.m.

SUBJECT

• US–UK Approach to UN Secretary General Regarding Cyprus

PARTICIPANTS

• His Excellency the Right Honorable The Lord Harlech, British Embassy
• Mr. Patrick R.H. Wright, First Secretary, British Embassy
• Under Secretary George W. Ball
• Assistant Secretary Harlan Cleveland (IO)
• Mr. George Springsteen (U)
• Deputy Assistant Secretary John D. Jernegan (NEA)

Mr. Ball explained to the Ambassador our revised view on double enosis, saying that we now thought it should be put forward to the Greeks and Turks as a serious basis for discussion (rather than dismissing it too quickly from consideration, as had been implied during the discussions in London June 8).² He also explained that he did not think it would be well to have the mediator make the proposals of enosis and double enosis to the parties.

We were giving serious thought to doing some “arm twisting” with the Greeks and Turks to induce them to negotiate realistically for a settlement. Prime Minister Inonu was probably coming to Washington and we planned to invite Prime Minister Papandreou as well. The President would bear down on both of them. Our tentative plan of action after that would be to get Greek and Turkish representatives together with an American representative as a third party. This meeting, which should be kept absolutely secret, would have as its object to hammer out an agreement which the mediator could then pick up and work on. We thought this plan had a chance of success because Mr. Ball had found during his most recent visit to Athens and Ankara that both Papandreou and Inonu had a changed attitude and wanted the United States to take an active direct role in bringing about a settlement.

We and the British should, therefore, tell U Thant and the mediator that we were going to make a real effort to get the problem settled, as it must be, between Athens and Ankara. We would not ask U Thant and the mediator to propose any bases for solutions to the Greeks and Turks (as had been contemplated in the papers worked out in London). We would just let Tuomioja keep on doing what he is doing now, for the time being.

Lord Harlech said he would tell London we thought it would not be helpful for the mediator to take any initiative.

It was agreed that the Department would prepare a new draft of proposed instructions to Ambassadors Stevenson and Dean in New York, and send a copy urgently to Lord Harlech for transmission to London.³

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 CYP. Secret; Exdis; TUG. Drafted by Jernegan.
2. Rusk’s conclusion that “hard bargaining” might result in “enosis plus territorial and other compensation to Turkey,” was reported in Unsec 32 to Geneva, June 9. (Ibid.)
3. The instructions embodying Ball’s comments were sent to the Embassy in London in telegram 8231, June 12. (Ibid.) Telegram 8250 to London, June 12, reported that Lord Harlech had informed the Department of State that the British Government could not take immediate action on the U.S. proposals because many senior Cabinet officials were away from London. (Ibid.)